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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1  Overview 
Technological innovations to address the adverse effects of climatic shocks on 
agriculture are widely promoted in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). At least three primary reasons 
have motivated such efforts. First, a majority of the poor in developing countries, including 
SSA, continue to reside in rural areas where rain-fed agriculture is the main source of 
livelihoods (Ravallion et al., 2007). Reliance on rain-fed agriculture coupled with low adaptive 
capacity means that rural economies in SSA are highly vulnerable to climatic shocks (Shiferaw 
et al., 2014). Second, productivity growth in agriculture is widely seen as a driver of structural 
transformation and economic growth for developing countries (Evenson and Golin, 2003; 
Ligon and Sadoulet, 2007; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2010; Christiaensen et al., 2011). Third, 
economic losses associated with climatic shocks in SSA are enormous: crop yields are projected 
to decline by 22 percent for maize, 17 percent each for sorghum and millet, and 18 percent for 
groundnuts by mid-century (Schelenker and Lobell, 2010). Moreover, farm revenues are 
expected to fall by about 39 US dollars per hectare for every degree centigrade rise in 
temperature (Hassan, 2010). 
Damages to agricultural output due to climatic shocks, chiefly droughts and floods, in 
Uganda amounted to more than 900 million US dollars in 2010; corresponding to 77 percent of 
total damages across all sectors of the country’s economy (Republic of Uganda, 2012; 2016). 
Furthermore, the current and future increased climatic shocks are in areas of existing poverty 
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and have serious consequences for local economies and food security (Republic of Uganda, 
2015). 
Technological innovations geared to addressing climatic shocks in SSA are increasingly 
promoted under the rubric of climate-smart agriculture (CSA)—predicated on the idea of 
achieving productivity growth and enhanced resilience, while contributing mitigation co-
benefits where possible (Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 2013). The popularity of 
CSA technologies is evident from, among others, the recent launch of the Alliance for Climate 
Smart Agriculture in Africa (ACSAA) spearheaded by New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) which intends to help catalyse the scaling up of CSA to 25 million 
farm households across SSA by 2025.  
Two pertinent issues, however, remain. First, adoption rates for potentially beneficial 
agricultural technologies in SSA remain very low (Duflo et al., 2011; Suri, 2011; Bold et al., 
2017). Informational constraints have been shown to contribute to low adoption of agricultural 
technologies (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Bardhan and Udry, 1999). Other identified barriers 
to adoption include time-inconsistent preferences of farmers (Duflo et al., 2011), poor quality 
of agricultural inputs (Bold et al., 2017), heterogeneity of benefits (Suri et al., 2011) and 
inability to address downside risk (Emerick et al., 2016), the degree of risk aversion, and access 
to markets. The focus of this thesis is on informational constraints to technology adoption. 
Second, empirical evidence on the impact of recommended CSA technologies on downside risk 
(that is, the probability of crop failure or exposure to losses located in the lower tail of the 
distribution of yields) and resilience is inadequate (Arslan et al., 2015; Wossen et al., 2017). 
Together, these two issues make it difficult to conclude whether and in what contexts CSA 
technologies can help to address climatic shocks in SSA (Rosenstock et al., 2016). 
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Agricultural extension can help overcome informational constraints to technology 
diffusion (Bindlish and Evenson, 1997; Davis, 2008; Anderson and Feder, 2007). Through 
extension, farmers can be provided with context-specific information about crop cultivation 
practices hence familiarising themselves with the benefits of new technologies, and bridging 
the knowledge gaps (Lambrecht et al., 2014). Yet, despite large investment to foster agricultural 
transformation through different extension approaches, performance in SSA has been dismal 
and far below the expected levels of adoption and productivity increase. Disappointing 
extension outcomes have even led to disbandment of the national agricultural advisory services 
in some countries such as Uganda. Meanwhile, there is a ray of optimism that social learning 
can help to strengthen extension systems and expedite adoption of agricultural technologies in 
SSA (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Krishnan and Patnam, 2013; Kondylis et al., 2017). Social 
learning describes a process by which an individual learns from his neighbours’ experiences, 
their previous decisions and outcomes, about a new technology (Munshi, 2004). 
Human beings are inherently social. We not only interact and exchange information, but 
also observe and learn from each other’s actions and outcomes. Social learning can, therefore, 
facilitate aggregation of dispersed and decentralised information (Acemoglu et al., 2011), shape 
people’s beliefs and attitudes, and influence the decision to adopt agricultural technologies 
(Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010; Magnan et al., 2015). Yet, our 
understanding of the mechanisms through which social learning happens in agricultural settings 
is far from perfect. The hypothesis of “passive” learning—implicitly assuming that farmers 
costlessly observe their neighbours’ plots with little friction in the flow of information, and then 
update their beliefs about the technology’s profitability—has recently been challenged. Ben 
Yishay and Mobarak (2018) indicated that technology diffusion within social networks could 
be sub-optimal in the absence of incentives for communication. Similarly, in their discussion 
about the reasons why providing direct training to contact farmers did not change the knowledge 
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of and adoption by co-villagers, Kondylis et al. (2017) pointed to lack of incentives. Still, there 
is scant empirical evidence about incentives for agricultural knowledge and technologies 
diffusion via social learning. 
Based on experimental and quasi-experimental evidence from northern Uganda, this 
thesis firstly studies the role of social learning in technology adoption, focusing on the effects 
of incentives on the diffusion of agricultural knowledge and technologies. Secondly, it studies 
the correlation between social distance and the likelihood of information exchange in the 
presence of an active intervention that provided direct agricultural training to a subset of the 
population. Social distance is defined as differences in socioeconomic and biophysical 
characteristics between disseminating farmers and their neighbours. The thesis further 
examines the effect of information exchange links on awareness exposure, that is, having heard 
about a technology; knowledge exposure, that is, understanding how to implement the 
technology; and adoption. Thirdly, the mechanisms through which social networks affect 
adoption of agricultural technologies are studied. Fourthly, the thesis examines the causal 
relationship between adoption of CSA technologies and yield, downside risk, food security, and 
resilience of livelihoods. 
Each chapter of the thesis can be read as a standalone contribution to economic 
development literature. There are, however, important cross-cutting relationships between the 
chapters culminating into one message: Incentives, both private rewards and social recognition, 
are crucial in enhancing social learning and the diffusion of agricultural technologies, 
consequently increasing productivity, improving food security, and enhancing resilience of 
livelihoods to climatic shocks. The thesis generates an enhanced understanding of the cross-
cutting relationships for policy, design and implementation of agricultural programs, and also 
for future research.  
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1.2  Agricultural Extension in Uganda 
Several extension approaches have been implemented in Uganda since before 
independence. During the pre-independence period, extension services—mainly involving new 
crops and soil conservation practices—were delivered by the administration staff of the colonial 
government often using a coercive approach (Semana, 1998). While the practices and crops 
were beneficial to the farmers and communities, adoption was only short-lived and not 
sustainable once pressure was lifted. Furthermore, the extremely top-down approach alienated 
the beneficiaries and created resentment. 
From 1956–1963, Uganda shifted to providing extension through progressive farmers. 
The intention was to encourage peer-to-peer farmer demonstrations about use of improved 
technologies. Although the approach was deemed effective in situations involving an 
inadequate number of trained extension staff, the selection criteria for progressive farmers were 
not clear (Semana, 1998; Barungi et al., 2016). Not only were progressive farmers reluctant to 
educate their peers in some instances (Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry, and Fisheries 
(MAAIF), 2017), but their co-villagers often also looked at them as a privileged group hence 
alienating them and rendering the initiative unproductive (Semana, 1998). 
In 1964, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) spearheaded 
a change in extension model towards educational approaches. The educational approach 
involved several activities to teach farmers including training at district farming institutes, 
exposure visits, field days, radio and television programs, film shows (cinema), leaflets, and 
posters (Barungi et al., 2016; MAAIF, 2017). These approaches generally helped to improve 
farming methods (MAAIF, 2017). The political turmoil that was experienced in 1972, however, 
left the country’s extension services inactive from 1972–1980. 
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The Training and Visit (T&V) approach was piloted in Uganda from the mid-1980s. 
The approach involved a systematic planning, training of extension workers and visiting of 
farmers to deliver time-sensitive messages. To be effective, the approach required massive 
human, financial and logistical resources. It was, therefore, not sustainable and could not be 
scaled up to the rest of the country. Instead, a unified extension approach was adopted in an 
attempt to address the limited human resource at sub-county level and to enable diverse needs 
and challenges of the farmers to be addressed at the same time. In this unified approach, a 
technical officer at sub-county level was expected to deliver extension messages on all subject 
matters including crops, livestock, and fisheries. In most cases, however, the staff was not 
prepared for this approach right from their training. It was, therefore, a challenge to maintain 
the integrity of the technical content and methodology. 
Backed by an Act of Parliament, the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) 
program was implemented from 2001 to 2014. The program was one of the seven pillars of the 
Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA)—a multi-sectoral strategy under Uganda’s 
strategic national planning and development framework. The NAADS program in Uganda was 
the first agricultural extension reform model in Africa that aimed at developing an alternative 
to the T&V system (Anderson et al., 2006), which had been criticised for its top-down supply-
driven nature. The program adopted a decentralised, demand-driven, and farmer-led system. 
Public sector extension agents were replaced by contracted private service providers. Farmer 
groups at the village level participated in decision making processes including contracting of 
service providers. 
Preliminary results showed positive results of the NAADS program (Benin et al., 2007). 
As the program matured, however, there were problems related to farmers’ ambivalence 
towards the program (Musemakweri, 2007; Parkinson, 2009), mismanagement of public funds, 
questionable capacity of private service providers (Mangheni et al., 2003, Obaa et.al., 2004) 
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and low technology uptake by farmers (Bua et al., 2004). In 2007, the NAADS program was 
suspended. When it was re-introduced in the same year, the NAADS program came with an 
expanded mandate. Under the “model farmer approach”, input subsidies were provided to two 
individual “model farmers” per parish—group of villages—as incentives for experimentation 
with and diffusion of agricultural technologies. Model farmers were selected by a committee 
comprising politically elected local officials, the local chairperson of the ruling party (National 
Resistance Movement), and the local intelligence officer (MAAIF, 2010). Still, limited success 
of the NAADS led to its disbandment in 2014.  
Following the disbandment of NAADS, the responsibility and function of delivering 
agricultural extension was transferred back to MAAIF by re-establishing a directorate of 
agricultural extension at national level. The current “single spine” agricultural extension system 
spearheaded by MAAIF began in June 2014. Its objective is to harmonise and coordinate all 
extension service delivery in the country to address the inefficiencies associated with its 
predecessor systems. Farmer-to-farmer technology transfer is recognised as an important 
component of the new extension system. Within this context, this thesis studies farmer-to-
farmer technology transfer when disseminating farmers are selected by co-villagers themselves 
to be “representative” of the target population and incentivised to communicate knowledge 
about new technologies. Background details of the project design are provided in section 1.7 
below. 
 
1.3  Incentives, Social Learning, and Technology Diffusion 
When individuals are exposed to diverse private information about the situation they 
face, they often base their decisions on those of others (Monzón, 2017). Social learning—
processing of information gained by observing others—has received much attention, both in 
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the theoretical (see Acemoglu et al., 2011 for a review)1 and empirical (Bandiera and Rasul, 
2006; Conley and Udry, 2010)2 literature as a conduit for technology diffusion. Studies in 
agriculture have shown how farmers learn from their neighbours about the profitability of 
agricultural technologies (Besley and Case, 1993) and optimal input use (Foster and 
Rosenzweig, 1995). A few others have indicated that social learning might be as effective or 
even better than government extension (Krishnan and Patnam, 2013; Vasilaky and Leonard, 
2018) in technology diffusion and impact on productivity. 
Most recently, literature on the relationship between social learning and the diffusion of 
agricultural technologies identifies two important issues. The first issue relates to identification 
of disseminating farmers (DFs)—the first individuals in the population to receive the 
technology (Beaman et al., 2015). The second issue relates to incentives for the diffusion of 
agricultural technologies (Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 2018)—without incentives, selected 
optimal DFs may not expend costly effort to communicate new knowledge to their peers. Still, 
much less is known about the effect of incentives on the diffusion of agricultural technologies. 
While useful insights exist about the role of private material rewards, the effect of prosocial3 
preferences and social recognition has not been adequately examined. Yet behavioural studies 
indicate that there may be important interactions between the three types of incentives, namely 
prosocial preferences, private material rewards, and social recognition, with possibilities of 
“crowding-in” and “crowding-out” effects (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Ariely et al., 2009). In 
Chapter 2, therefore, the thesis studies the effect of prosocial preferences, private material 
                                                 
1 Early studies include Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Bala and Goyal, 1995; Smith and Sørensen, 
2000; 2008; Banerjee and Fudenberg, 2004). 
2 Others include Besley and Case, 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004; Maertens and Barrett, 2012; 
Krishnan and Patnam, 2013; Magnan et al., 2015). 
3 A prosocial task includes a range of individual actions that not only take into account individual benefits, but 
also those of others. A prosocial task is, therefore, one that creates benefits enjoyed by those other than the 
employer and employee (Ashraf et al., 2014a).  
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rewards, and social recognition on effort by the DFs to experiment with new agricultural 
technologies and communicate information to their peers. 
While incentives may influence DFs’ efforts to inform their peers, successful diffusion 
of agricultural technologies will further depend on the willingness of the peers to listen to and 
learn from the DFs. In Malawi, for example, Ben Yishay et al. (2015) found that although 
female DFs retained knowledge better and experienced higher yields than their male 
counterparts, neighbours were reluctant to listen to their messages. Few empirical studies have 
explicitly examined the effect of social distance on information exchange links in agriculture 
(Feder and Savastano, 2006; Santos and Barrett, 2010). Feder and Savastano (2006), for 
example, found that the probability of information exchange links increased with social 
distance, but decreased when the distance was excessive. Furthermore, heterogeneity in the 
benefits associated with technologies may influence information exchange (Munshi, 2004; 
Magnan et al., 2015)—agricultural technologies may not be welfare enhancing to all farmers 
everywhere. Chapter 3 turns to these issues and examines systematically the role of social 
distance and differences in biophysical characteristics on the probability of link formation 
between directly trained DFs and their neighbours, and the subsequent effects on adoption of 
agricultural technologies. 
 
1.4 Social Networks Effects on Adoption of agricultural Technologies 
In developing countries, contact farmers are often used as messengers of agricultural 
information (Krishnan and Patnam, 2013; Kondylis et al., 2017). Trainings and demonstrations 
about new agricultural technologies target these contact farmers with the expectation that they 
will disseminate new information to neighbours in their villages. However, our understanding 
of how this actually happens is limited. A body of literature exists on the process of social 
network formation and underlying incentives (Bala and Goyal, 2000; Goyal et al., 2006; 
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Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Santos and Barrett, 2010). Equally, the role of social networks in 
technology diffusion has been extensively documented in empirical studies (Besley and Case, 
1993, Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010; Krishnan and Patnam, 2013). But 
these studies have largely taken pre-existing networks to be fixed, and do not address how 
existing networks change in response to exogenous shocks (Breza, 2015)—like training of a 
random node in the network. 
A few studies have shown how external stimulus can change networks. Feigenberg et 
al. (2013) showed changes in the strength of ties through microfinance whereas Banerjee et al. 
(2018) analysed persistent changes in the number of links when a random subset of the 
population was exposed to microfinance. In a study that assessed how transfers between 
households changed in response to a randomised savings intervention, Comola and Prina (2014) 
found that treatment households increased the number of recipients relative to the control. Still, 
empirical evidence about the effect of external factors on networks in agricultural settings is 
missing. Furthermore, most studies do not indicate the underlying mechanisms through which 
information dissemination takes place. Neither do they address how incentives could affect 
social networks. 
The main challenge in identifying the causal effect of social networks on adoption is the 
reflection problem (Manski, 1993). Individual behaviour may simply reflect the average 
behaviour of the reference group, but that does not necessarily mean that group behaviour 
causes the individual’s behaviour (Manski, 1993). In the absence of learning, individuals may 
still behave like their neighbours as a result of interdependent preferences or because they are 
exposed to related unobservable shocks (Manski, 1993; Conley and Udry, 2010; Krishnan and 
Patnam, 2013). Therefore, disentangling learning from contextual and correlated effects may 
be problematic. 
11 
 
Therefore, having established in Chapter 2 the effect of incentives on adoption decisions 
and networks of disseminating farmers (DFs), Chapter 4 asks: (1) Does having an adopter DF 
in a neighbour’s contacts for agricultural advice influence his or her own knowledge and 
decision to adopt an agricultural technology?  (2) Do incentives change the networks of 
neighbours, and does it matter whether the rewards are private material or social recognition? 
The chapter employs several econometric techniques to address the reflection problem. 
 
1.5  Technology Adoption, Food Security, Downside Risk, and Resilience 
Achieving increased food security and enhanced resilience of livelihoods under climatic 
shocks is at the top on economic development agenda in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). About 50 
percent of household income in Uganda is spent on food (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2017). 
The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that nearly half of all Ugandans consume fewer 
calories than they need every day. About 29 percent of children under five years suffers from 
stunting.  
Adoption of agricultural technologies can help to reduce food insecurity and increase 
income hence improving the welfare of the rural poor in SSA (Kassie et al., 2011; Asfaw et al., 
2012; Kabunga et al., 2014; Shiferaw et al., 2014). However, the increasing frequency and 
intensity of extreme weather events in the region primarily affects the risk profiles of 
agricultural technologies (Arslan et al., 2017). Although agriculture has always been subject to 
weather risks, these new challenges increase the importance of controlling for the effects of 
relevant weather related risks on adoption decisions as well as on productivity and resilience 
(Di Falco and Veronesi, 2013; Arslan et al., 2015). Empirical evidence about the effect of 
agricultural technologies on food security under climatic shocks is inadequate. A few 
exceptional studies include Arslan et al. (2015; 2017) and Di Falco and Veronesi (2013). These 
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studies provide important insights suggesting that CSA technologies can help to increase crop 
yields and income. 
Focusing on average crop yields is undoubtedly important, especially because an 
increase in yields tends to correlate with improved food security for households in many parts 
of SSA. Failure to adequately capture higher moments, such as variance and skewness of yields 
may, however, mask the effects of agricultural technologies on the downside risk brought by 
extreme weather events (Di Falco and Chavas, 2009; Shi et al., 2013; Wossen et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, evidence of the effect of agricultural technologies on resilience of livelihoods is 
missing. This is partly because of methodological limitations in measuring resilience. In 
Chapter 5, resilience is defined consistent with Barrett and Constas (2014) as, “the capacity of 
a household to avoid and escape from poverty over time and in the face of shocks. If and only 
if that capacity is and remains high over time, then the unit is resilient”. Using a moment-based 
approach (Antle, 1987; Di Falco and Chavas, 2009; Barrett and Constas, 2014), the chapter 
examines the impacts of CSA technologies on yields, downside risk, and resilience. The chapter 
further looks beyond yields to assess effects on additional indicators of food security including 
number of months of food shortage and frequency of consumption of food. 
 
1.6  Objectives 
The empirical questions of this thesis are based on the following simplified theory of 
change. Training randomly selected and community-perceived “representative” disseminating 
farmers (DFs) and providing them with incentives will increase their probability of 
experimenting with climate-smart agricultural (CSA) technologies and effort to communicate 
to their peers. Incentives are further expected to positively influence changes in networks of 
other farmers subsequently improving their knowledge about CSA technologies. Reduced 
informational barriers and increased adoption by DFs is in turn expected to increase the 
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likelihood of other farmers experimenting with the CSA technologies. Ultimately, adoption of 
the CSA technologies is expected to increase yield and food security, reduce downside risk, and 
enhance resilience of livelihoods. 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to examine the effect of incentives on the 
diffusion of agricultural technologies through social learning, and to quantify the subsequent 
impacts of adoption on productivity, downside risk, food security, and resilience of livelihoods 
in the post-conflict northern Uganda. Specifically, the thesis addresses the following research 
questions throughout its four core chapters: 
(1) Chapter 2: What effect does incentivised training of disseminating farmers (DFs) have 
on the diffusion of agricultural knowledge and technologies? Does the effect differ 
depending on whether DFs receive a private material reward or social recognition and 
is there a mediating role of prosocial preferences? 
(2) Chapter 3: What is the effect of social distance and heterogeneity in biophysical soil 
characteristics on the probability of information exchange link formation between 
trained DFs and their peers? Do information exchange links subsequently influence 
awareness and knowledge exposure, and adoption of agricultural technologies? 
(3) Chapter 4: What mechanisms underlie social network effects on adoption of CSA 
technologies? 
(4) Chapter 5: What are the effects of adoption of CSA technologies on yields and downside 
risk, food security, and resilience of livelihoods? 
 
1.7  Methodology 
Both experimental and non-experimental approaches are used in this thesis to answer 
its research questions. Data come from three waves of household survey. A baseline survey was 
conducted in 2015 interviewing 1,320 randomly sampled households from 132 sub-villages. 
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The midline survey was conducted in 2016 to measure effort expended by DFs to train other 
farmers as well as knowledge of other farmers and experimentation with the technologies by 
both the DFs and the other farmers. During the midline, all the DFs and a random sample of 
123 other farmers selected from the original list of farmers interviewed at baseline were 
revisited. An endline survey was implemented in 2017 involving all households that were 
interviewed at baseline. In addition to survey data, the thesis utilises georeferenced biophysical 
data, specifically on rainfall, temperature, and soil characteristics. Most of the georeferenced 
data are used in Chapter 4. 
The research design is a randomised control trial (RCT). The experiment was designed 
to test incentives for the diffusion of agricultural knowledge and technologies. It involved 
random assignment of selected DFs into three groups, namely training only, private material 
reward, and social recognition. All DFs received training about some recommended CSA 
technologies. The experiment then varied the incentive for the DFs to share information with 
their neighbours.  
In addition to the RCT, the thesis utilises artefactual field experiments (also called lab-
in-the-field experiments) to measure social preferences. Specifically, the thesis utilises an 
augmented dictator game to measure prosocial preferences, that is, the intrinsic motivation of 
DFs to train their neighbours. Furthermore, incentive-compatible risk and time experiments 
were conducted to measure DFs’ preferences for risk and time. 
Under the conditions that the randomisation succeeds in achieving balance across the 
experimental arms and that the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) holds, 
identification of causal impacts is straightforward. This is the case for the approach followed in 
Chapter 2 and (partly) Chapter 4. In Chapters 3 and 5, however, observational data are utilised 
raising issues of identification. Several approaches have been recommended in literature for use 
in the absence of experimental data. Commonly used estimators include instrumental variables 
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(IV), propensity score matching (PSM), difference-in-difference (DID), the standard fixed 
effects (FE), and regression discontinuity. This thesis employs panel data and utilises IV 
estimators as well as a combination of DID with matching techniques in Chapter 3. In Chapter 
5, the standard FE model and matching techniques are used to identify causal effects. 
Ethical issues are important in this thesis because it involves household interviews and 
experiments with human subjects. To address ethical issues, an informed consent was sought 
before commencing interviews and the experiments. Participation in the surveys and the field 
experiments was voluntary. Anonymity of interviewee’s responses was preserved and data were 
kept confidential. The study was reviewed and approved by the ethics review board of 
Wageningen University and Research, prior to field implementation.  
 
1.8  Outline 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 examines incentives for 
agricultural knowledge and technology diffusion. Chapter 3 studies the factors that shape 
information exchange links and the subsequent effects of links on adoption of agricultural 
technologies. Chapter 4 examines the mechanisms through which social network effects on 
adoption of agricultural technologies occur. Chapter 5 looks at the effects of adoption of 
agricultural technologies on yields, downside risk, food security, and resilience of livelihoods. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents a synthesis and discusses implications of the findings for policy 
and future research.  
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Chapter 2 
Incentives and the Diffusion of Agricultural Knowledge 
Experimental Evidence from Northern Uganda 
 
Abstract 
This chapter presents results of a randomised evaluation that assesses the effects of different 
incentives for diffusion of agricultural knowledge by smallholders in northern Uganda. 
Randomly selected disseminating farmers (DFs) from a large sample of villages are assigned 
to one of three treatment arms: (i) training about climate smart agriculture, (ii) training plus a 
material reward for knowledge diffusion, and (iii) training plus a reputational gain for 
knowledge diffusion. The chapter documents fairly robust evidence that leveraging somebody’s 
reputation (or social recognition) has large effects on experimentation with new technologies 
and diffusion effort by DFs. The impact of providing private material gains is less robust. 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Shikuku, K.M., Pieters, J., Bulte, E., and Läderach, P. (2018). Incentives and the Diffusion of 
Agricultural Knowledge: Experimental Evidence from Northern Uganda. Revised manuscript 
in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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2.1   Introduction 
Transforming smallholder agriculture in order to lift the majority of the population in 
sub-Saharan Africa out of poverty requires boosting agricultural productivity under 
increasingly volatile conditions. This requires diffusion of modern technologies (e.g., Evenson 
and Gollin, 2003; Minten and Barrett, 2008), but in many African countries adoption rates of 
innovations remain low (Pamuk et al., 2014). Several well-known reasons help to explain this. 
Benefits may be heterogeneous, reflecting variety in growing conditions and other factors, so 
adoption may be unprofitable for some smallholders (e.g., Suri, 2011; Magnan et al., 2015). 
Costs associated with innovations such as improved seeds or fertiliser may be an impediment 
to adoption if capital markets are imperfect. Low quality of agricultural inputs may help explain 
low take up (Bold et al., 2017), as does lack of information about the existence and proper 
implementation of agricultural innovations (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995).  
This chapter focuses on the diffusion of information. Development organisations and 
policy makers have long believed that information “travels easily” within social networks. 
Interventions reaching small target groups are expected to reach much larger populations as 
information diffuses from “treated individuals” to their peers. Interventions based on the 
assumption of automatic and extensive spreading of information, such as traditional extension 
efforts, have by and large produced unsatisfactory results and failed to reach large parts of the 
intended population (de Janvry et al., 2016). In some countries, such as Uganda, disappointing 
outcomes have led to disbandment of national agricultural advisory services systems. Current 
efforts to strengthen national extension systems in developing countries recognise the need to 
search for cost-effective complementary actions (Godtland et al., 2004).  
Recent evidence suggests that knowledge does not diffuse automatically. Diffusion of 
information requires time and effort of agents on both the “supply” and the “demand” side. 
Allocation of effort to teaching and learning is akin to an investment by smallholders, so it 
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makes sense for development agents to consider complementary measures to facilitate such 
investments. There are several dimensions to this issue. The first one is who to select as the 
“disseminating farmer (DF)” – the first individual in the target population to receive the 
technology (Banerjee et al., 2018). Not all individuals are equally likely to reach large numbers 
of co-villagers, or be in a position to convince others to follow their behaviour. Traditionally, 
extension efforts targeted better-off farmers, who typically are well-connected and expected to 
be role models for their peers. However, since such farmers may not be representative of their 
co-villagers, their experiences may be of limited value to others (e.g., Munshi, 2004; Conley 
and Udry, 2010; BenYishay and Mobarak, 2018). Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to identify optimal DFs or map the network structure, a recent literature focuses on exploiting 
(social) network theory, and proposes to target individuals who occupy either a central (e.g., 
Kim et al., 2015), or clustered position in the network (Beaman et al., 2015, Chami et al., 2017). 
In this thesis, selected DFs are farmers comparable to their fellow villagers in terms of wealth 
and education. 
A second dimension, which is the focus of this chapter, concerns how to motivate DFs 
to inform their peers and encourage them to adopt the technology (Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 
2018). Following Benabou and Tirole (2006) the chapter distinguishes between three motives 
why farmers may invest time and effort in educating their peers. First, they may be altruistic 
and intrinsically motivated to help their co-villagers. Second, they may gain status and social 
recognition by helping others. Finally, they may engage in diffusion if there are private tangible 
rewards associated with knowledge diffusion. This could happen if there are externalities in 
adoption or use of new technologies (e.g. pest management), or if external rewards for diffusion 
are introduced. BenYishay and Mobarak (2018) demonstrated that incentivising DFs via 
material rewards may be an effective approach to promote diffusion.  They trained DFs in 
Malawi to use new technologies (pit planting and composting), and promised some of them a 
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bag of seeds in case knowledge and adoption of new technologies increased sufficiently among 
other farmers. They found that only with the incentive, DFs experiment with and communicate 
about the technologies, leading to increased adoption among other farmers. These findings 
underline the importance of understanding the motives for farmers to spread information to 
others. 
The objectives of this chapter are twofold. First, an experimental approach is used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of approaches based on the above-mentioned motives for knowledge 
diffusion within one integrated framework: altruism or intrinsic motivation, social recognition 
and private rewards. The chapter asks whether social recognition and private rewards for 
diffusion affect DFs’ effort to learn about the benefits of the new technology and subsequently 
diffuse information. Second, the chapter probes whether the impact of social recognition and 
private reward incentives varies with DFs’ prosocial preferences. Social preferences of DFs are 
measured with an auxiliary lab-in-the-field game––an augmented dictator game with a local 
charity as the receiver. 
A field experiment was designed in northern Uganda with three treatment arms: (i) a 
basic arm where DFs receive training about specific climate-smart agricultural technologies; 
(ii) another arm where they receive the same training plus a private reward (a weighing scale) 
in case of sufficient increase in knowledge among other farmers (to be specified below); and 
(iii) a final arm that combines the training with social recognition in case of sufficient increase 
in knowledge among other farmers. Specifically, in case a threshold level was reached, a public 
ceremony was organised in which the DF’s contribution was highlighted and a weighing scale 
was given “to the community.” As dependent variables, experimentation with the new 
technologies by the DFs and other farmers, effort devoted by DFs towards training other 
farmers, and the knowledge gained by other farmers are used. The chapter’s main results are 
that (i) incentivising DFs by providing them with social recognition has a significant and large 
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effect on diffusion effort and levels of knowledge diffusion; (ii) the effects of providing a 
private material reward are small; and (iii) the effect of both types of incentives is not mediated 
by prosocial preferences (see also Ashraf et al., 2014a). 
The results speak to several literatures. First, and as mentioned above, they relate to the 
rapidly growing literature on social learning.  Learning from others facilitates aggregation of 
dispersed information (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Alatas et al., 2016) and can generate social 
multiplier effects in diffusion of innovations (Hogset and Barrett, 2010). Social learning can, 
therefore, contribute to increased agricultural productivity (Vasilaky, 2012; Vasilaky and 
Leonard, 2018). Second, the findings contribute to the literature on incentives for prosocial 
behaviour or contributions to the common good.  This literature has benefitted from recent 
insights in the field of behavioural economics, highlighting the potential interaction between 
motives (e.g., Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Ariely et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2011). For example, 
the provision of private rewards for prosocial behaviour may crowd out altruism or social 
recognition motives, by obscuring the (self)signal that someone is doing “good” – instead of 
simply doing “well.” Diffusion of agricultural knowledge is a prosocial task; the direct benefits 
created by the task are enjoyed by those other than the person who expends the costly effort 
(Ashraf et al., 2014a). The chapter’s inclusion of a social recognition incentive and analysis of 
the role of altruism further differentiates the current study from that of Ben Yishay and Mobarak 
(2018), who focus on the effect of private reward incentives. To our knowledge, the chapter 
provides the first evidence about the effects of social recognition on diffusion of agricultural 
knowledge. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the agricultural context, 
experimental design, and data. Section 2.3 discusses the identification strategy. Section 2.4 
presents the findings, and Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
22 
 
2.2   Context, Experimental Design, and Data 
2.2.1   Context 
The experiment was implemented in Nwoya district, northern Uganda, a predominantly 
agrarian region characterised by low agricultural productivity. The region’s poverty level is the 
highest in the country – about 44 percent of the population lives on less than one US dollar per 
day (Republic of Uganda, 2015). The region is expected to suffer more frequently from weather 
shocks in the future, including prolonged dry spells and uncertainty about the onset and 
cessation of rainfall (Mwongera et al., 2014). Damages to agricultural output due to weather 
shocks amounted to more than 900 million US dollars in 2010, or 77 percent of total damages 
across all sectors of the country’s economy (Republic of Uganda, 2012; 2016). Although 
households tend to engage in off-farm activities such as weeding neighbours’ plots, brick 
making and small businesses, diversification to non-farm activities in rural parts of northern 
Uganda remains minimal due to limited employment opportunities outside agriculture. 
Efforts to sustain agricultural production in the region have focused on promoting 
adoption of climate-smart agricultural (CSA) technologies. The government of Uganda has 
identified CSA as an effective means of addressing challenges related to weather shocks. 
However, farmers lack knowledge about CSA technologies and perceive this as a major 
constraint to widespread adoption (Shikuku et al., 2015). Current efforts to restructure the 
extension system recognise the importance of working with DFs at the sub-county and village 
level to enhance dissemination of improved technologies (MAAIF, 2017). This chapter is part 
of these efforts, and it focuses on the performance of DFs that are more or less representative 
of the target population.   
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2.2.2   Sampling and intervention 
A list of 310 sub-villages was first generated in Nwoya district, from which 132 sub-
villages were randomly selected to participate in the study.4 A census of all households and 
household heads was compiled for these selected sub-villages, and 10 households randomly 
sampled from each sub-village. One potential DF was then randomly picked from this sub-
sample and a meeting organised with co-villagers to discuss whether the thus selected candidate 
was “not too different” (especially in terms of wealth and landholdings) from the rest of the 
village, and potentially interested to experiment with new technologies. Data on individual 
characteristics were not collected during the meeting. In more than 75 percent of the cases, the 
first candidate was selected as a DF. In the other villages another candidate was randomly 
picked and the process repeated. In one village three iterations were performed before the 
selected candidate was endorsed by his or her co-villagers. 
Selected DFs were trained and had to decide whether or not to experiment with the new 
CSA technologies on their own farms. Importantly, the new technologies were not subsidised 
or “offered for free” to encourage farmers to try them out. Instead, farmers had to decide 
whether or not to purchase certain inputs from local agro-dealers, and whether or not to allocate 
labour (effort) to the construction of structures recommended during the training.5 They also 
had to decide about the level of effort devoted to the diffusion of information. The main 
technologies, described below, were new and unfamiliar to the farmers so DFs had to spend 
time explaining the implementation of proposed activities as well as the potential benefits. 
The 132 sub-villages were randomly assigned to one of three experimental arms of 44 
sub-villages each: (i) training only, (ii) training plus a private material reward, and (iii) training 
                                                 
4 A sub-village is equivalent to a hamlet. It is the lowest administrative unit in Uganda. The 132 sub-villages in 
our sample are located within four sub-counties. 
5 We verified that inputs that had to be purchased were actually available in local agro-dealers. This was invariably 
the case. 
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plus social recognition. Disseminating farmers in the first treatment arm received training about 
drought-tolerant maize variety and conservation farming basins and were subsequently asked 
to share the information with their co-villagers.  Disseminating farmers in the second treatment 
arm received the same training, but after the training were informed they could earn a private 
reward. They were promised a weighing scale if they managed to share sufficient knowledge 
with their peers – to be established during a surprise visit at some unknown date in the future. 
They would earn the weighing scale in case the knowledge score of one randomly sampled co-
villager exceeded a threshold. They were told the reward was private, that the weighing scale 
was theirs to keep, and that they were free to decide how to use it.  Disseminating farmers in 
the third treatment arm also received the training, and were informed their community would 
receive a weighing scale if they managed to share sufficient knowledge with their peers – to be 
evaluated the same way as in the previous treatment arm. An announcement was made that, in 
case of sufficient knowledge diffusion, there would be a public celebration during which the 
“good performance” of the DF was publicly announced, and the weighing scale would be 
handed over to the village chief in the presence of other villagers. We do not have information 
on what the DFs told other farmers about the potential rewards. The chapter, therefore, 
acknowledges that in both the social recognition and the private reward treatment, it is possible 
that DFs told other farmers about the potential for getting access to a scale. If so, both the social 
recognition and private reward treatments may also have had an incentivising effect on other 
farmers (in addition to the DF). 
Observe that DFs were not informed about the (private or social) reward until after 
completing the training. This design, therefore, deviates from BenYishay and Mobarak (2018), 
who informed their subjects about the potential reward before the training. Informing DFs after 
the training rules out the potential impact of incentives on two intermediate outcomes. First, 
incentives may change the composition of the group of DFs who attend the complete training. 
25 
 
Incentives may potentially stimulate invitees with low intrinsic motivation to attend (see Finan 
et al., 2017, on financial incentives and recruitment of public sector workers). Second, for a 
given pool of participating DFs, the incentives may affect their level of learning effort and 
hence the knowledge they accumulate during the training (Sseruyange and Bulte, 2018). It is 
not entirely clear, a priori, what the direction of these effects would be, and whether these effects 
increase or diminish the impacts on knowledge and technology adoption by other farmers. Since 
the chapter is primarily interested in the effect of incentives on DFs’ knowledge diffusion 
efforts (and not selection effects or learning effort), we opted for a design in which the type of 
DF and his or her knowledge accumulation during the training is orthogonal to treatment status, 
that is, by informing DFs of their potential rewards after the training.  
Interventions were rolled-out in March 2016. We partnered with researchers from the 
National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) and Tillers International – an NGO 
working with NARO to promote conservation farming in Uganda. A three-day training session 
was provided to the selected DFs. This training lasted five hours per training day. In addition 
to learning about the benefits and cultivation of drought-tolerant (DT) maize (Longe 10H), 
selected farmers learned how to construct so-called conservation farming (CF) basins which 
are 15 cm long, 15 cm wide, and 15 cm deep, and how to sow seeds of the improved varieties 
in these basins. Basins retain soil moisture, improve water infiltration (reducing surface water 
run-off) and minimise soil disturbance—similar as the “pit planting” technology studied in 
Malawi by BenYishay and Mobarak (2018). Experimental evidence suggests the existence of 
yield gains associated with this technology (Otim et al., 2015, see also Haggblade and Tembo, 
2003; Gatere et al., 2013). The training also included crop management practices, such as 
correct spacing, row planting, and timely weeding. While the technology requires an upfront 
labour investment, the labour burden decreases in subsequent periods as the constructed basins 
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are “permanent” (Haggblade and Tembo, 2003). As part of the training about conservation 
farming, farmers also learnt about proper use of herbicides to control weeds. 
The trainings were organised in central locations, and DFs were invited to travel to these 
sites. Training sessions were organised per sub-county, with 11 farmers per session. In each 
sub-county, DFs from different treatment arms were trained in separate venues to minimise 
contamination. The cost of transport to the training venue and back was refunded (USD 4, on 
average) and tea and lunch were provided during the training. Of the 132 farmers that were 
invited, 126 attended the full training. 
 
2.2.3   Data and summary statistics 
Data were collected during two household survey waves. A detailed baseline survey 
was conducted between September and December 2015. We visited 132 sub-villages and in 
every village surveyed the DFs as well as nine randomly selected co-villagers. In total we 
visited 1,320 households, and collected information on household demographics, crop and 
livestock production, off-farm income, assets ownership, exposure to weather shocks, sources 
of agricultural information and knowledge about farming practices, social networks, and food 
security. The “random villager” that was later used to evaluate the extent of knowledge 
diffusion was randomly drawn from this subsample (enabling us to control for ex ante 
knowledge levels in regression models, to increase precision of our estimates), but this was not 
communicated to DFs. It is possible that DFs suspected that we would interview the same co-
villagers visited at baseline, so they might target diffusion efforts towards these individuals. If 
so, this may bias our estimates of diffusion in all treatment arms, and our estimates of treatment 
effects if DFs in different treatment arms responded differently in terms of their targeting 
effort.6  
                                                 
6 This would be especially problematic if DFs were informed about the time of the evaluation visit or the content 
of the knowledge exam. However, DFs neither knew the date of the visit nor details of the knowledge exam. 
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Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of baseline data per treatment group, including 
demographic information, social network variables, exposure to weather shocks, and sources 
for agricultural information. Differences across the three groups are small in magnitude. Using 
the “orth_out” command in STATA, pre-treatment covariates are regressed on treatment 
dummies: an F-test that all treatment arm coefficients equal zero failed to reject. In addition, 
we perform an F-test of joint orthogonality using a multinomial logit, which tests whether the 
observable characteristics in Table 2.1 are jointly unrelated to treatment status. We cannot reject 
this null hypothesis (p-value = 0.227), suggesting that the randomisation succeeded in achieving 
balance across the experimental arms.  
Most sample households are male-headed with an average age of 43 years and six years 
of completed formal education. The average size of a household is six with a dependency ratio 
of 54 percent. Ownership of both agricultural and livestock assets is very low. A household has 
on average two people from whom it seeks advice about crop production and two relatives. 
More than 90 percent of the sample households reported to have experienced drought. Access 
to government extension is very low: only two percent of the sample respondents had received 
agricultural advice from government extension. 
The second survey wave was conducted in September 2016, after the first post-
experimental cropping season, to measure performance of the DFs. We visited 246 farmers: 
123 DFs (three of the initial sample of 126 farmers were not available for interview at the time 
of the survey)7 and a random sub-sample of 123 “other farmers” (sampled from the original 
baseline sample of 1,188 households). We measured three types of dependent variables: 
                                                 
7 Overall, attrition was low and not concentrated in a particular treatment arm. Specifically, only 4.5 percent of the 
selected disseminating farmers did not attend the training. Because DFs were only informed about the incentives 
(for those in the material reward and social recognition groups) at the end of the training, attrition ought not to be 
related to treatment assignment.  Three more DFs (2%) were not available for interviews during data collection: 
one had got a temporary job at an electricity dam constructed by the government; another had migrated to 
neighboring Gulu town; and the third one had been hospitalised. These three DFs were from three different 
treatment arms. 
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knowledge levels (of the DFs and their co-villagers), on-farm experimentation (by the DFs and 
their co-villagers) and diffusion effort by the DFs. 
Table 2.1. Baseline Characteristics by Treatment Group 
 Training only Private reward Social recognition 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Baseline individual and household characteristics  
Household head is male 0.820 
(0.384) 
0.791 
(0.407) 
0.817 
(0.387) 
Age of household head (years) 44.084 
(16.080) 
44.548 
(15.644) 
42.778 
(14.216) 
Household head’s number of years of formal 
education 
6.336 
(3.336) 
6.032 
(4.167) 
5.808 
(4.022) 
Number of resident household members 5.603 
(2.317) 
5.870 
(2.576) 
5.841 
(2.331) 
Dependency ratio 0.551 
(0.233) 
0.539 
(0.226) 
0.545 
(0.211) 
The main activity of household head is 
farming 
0.881 
(0.324) 
0.926 
(0.262) 
0.904 
(0.295) 
Per capita household income 564,217 
(752,677) 
519,178 
(782,057) 
579,632 
(871,267) 
Agricultural assets index 0.064 
(4.200) 
-0.010 
(4.513) 
-0.063 
(4.326) 
Access to credit (1=yes; 0=no) 0.647 
(0.478) 
0.638 
(0.481) 
0.719 
(0.450) 
Government extension 0.028 
(0.165) 
0.023 
(0.151) 
0.023 
(0.151) 
Median social distance in education in the 
sub-village 
2.938 
(1.272) 
3.269 
(1.307) 
3.409 
(1.382) 
Median social distance in wealth index in the 
sub-village 
3.023 
(0.908) 
3.052 
(0.952) 
3.377 
(0.991) 
    
Panel B: Baseline social networks 
Number of agricultural information network 
links 
2.018 
(1.009) 
1.907 
(1.066) 
1.857 
(1.445) 
Number of kinship links outside the 
household but within the same sub-village 
1.752 
(0.972) 
1.722 
(1.051) 
1.724 
(1.111) 
    
Panel C: Baseline exposure to weather shocks 
Household has experienced droughts 0.956 
(0.206) 
0.944 
(0.230) 
0.953 
(0.212) 
    
Number of sub-villages (total = 132) 44 44 44 
Number of observations 428 431 427 
p-value for joint orthogonality test 0.227 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The p-value for joint orthogonality test is obtained from a 
multinomial logit regression of the treatment arms on the variables with robust standard errors clustered at the 
sub-village level. 
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To gauge knowledge levels we administered a simple test focusing on the content of the 
CSA training. Such exams are an effective approach of assessing knowledge retention by 
subjects (Kondylis et al., 2015), picking up effort during the training as well as effort to 
memorise the training content afterwards. We weigh correct answers by the inverse probability 
of a correct response so that difficult questions carry more weight in the final outcome (see 
Appendix C for the questions). Knowledge scores for DFs ranged between 0 and 33.0, with a 
mean of 20.0 (the mean knowledge score for “other villagers” was only 13.2).  
We further measured uptake of other Longe maize varieties, also discussed during the 
trainings and more familiar to the farmers in our sample. About 8.3 percent of the DFs had tried 
out the Longe 10H maize variety, and 22 percent had constructed CF basins. In addition, about 
one-third had planted another Longe maize variety. Not surprisingly, experimentation by co-
villagers was much lower: about two percent tried out Longe 10H maize; another two percent 
tried out CF basins; and 6.5 percent grew a different Longe maize variety of maize. 
To measure diffusion effort chosen by DFs we used a binary outcome capturing whether 
or not the DF organised at least one activity in the sub-village intended to train co-villagers. 
Specifically, we asked the other farmer whether he or she knew of (or had attended) any activity 
organised by another farmer in their sub-village during the first season of 2016 to train co-
villagers about agricultural technologies. If they answered affirmatively we asked the name of 
the farmer who had organised the activity by a series of follow up questions. We also asked 
about the content of the activity. On average, 18 percent of the other farmers indicated the DF 
from their villages had organised at least one meeting to train co-villagers during the previous 
season. It is possible, however, that DFs communicated with their neighbors via word of mouth. 
To capture this, we include an additional effort variable measuring the number of people with 
whom the DF communicated about improved farming methods (based on survey data provided 
by co-villagers, not the DFs). 
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Finally, we organised an artefactual field experiment to measure altruism. As 
mentioned, intrinsic motivation may interact with extrinsic and reputation motives. Following 
Ashraf et al.  (2014a) we implemented a dictator game to elicit an incentive-compatible measure 
of prosocial motives. We assume prosocial preferences are exogenous and do not vary with 
exposure to the training or experiment. A formal test (Appendix Table 2.A.1) was performed 
to check whether the experiment affected the outcome of the prosocial preferences game. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that treatment did not affect the outcome of the games. Games 
were implemented during the second survey wave. Each disseminating farmer received 5,000 
Ugandan shillings,8 of which a fraction could be donated to a charity organisation helping 
farmers to increase agricultural productivity and improve their lives.9 We interpret the amount 
donated as a proxy for the DF’s intrinsic motivation for the cause (see also Carpenter and 
Myers, 2010). The average donation was UGX 1,900, with a median of UGX 2,000.  
 
2.3   Identification and Empirical Estimation 
First, the effect of incentives on the main outcomes of interest is examined, using the 
following equation: 
𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑐 =  𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑣
𝑗2
𝑗=1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑊𝑖𝑣𝑐  +  𝐶𝑐  +  𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑐                              (2.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑐 represents the outcome of interest for farmer 𝑖 in sub-village 𝑣 and sub-county 𝑐: 
the above-mentioned measures of knowledge, experimentation, or diffusion effort. The variable 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑣
𝑗
 denotes the two treatment dummies, with the training-only group as comparison group. 
Next, 𝑊𝑖𝑣𝑐 is a vector of individual characteristics, and 𝐶𝑐 captures sub-county fixed effects. 
Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is used to explain variation in knowledge (by DFs and 
other farmers), and a probit model is used to analyse the DF’s and other farmer’s on-farm 
                                                 
8 USD 1 = UGX 3,000 during the time of our experiment. 
9 The exact script used in the adapted dictator game is provided in the appendix. 
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experimentation. For DF’s training effort, a probit model is used for the dummy effort variable 
and OLS for the number of people with whom the DF communicated. Throughout, robust 
standard errors are clustered at the sub-village level. 
The decision to use the training-only group as comparison group instead of including a 
fourth arm (pure control) was informed by limitations in terms of statistical power, especially 
because the randomisation was done at sub-village and not individual level. Our experiment, 
therefore, provided training to all DFs, but varied the incentive received to expend costly effort. 
The experiment provides a convincing way of understanding effect of incentivised versus non-
incentivised training of DFs on diffusion effort. We recognise, however, that use of the training-
only group instead of a pure control as comparison group may underestimate effects of the 
incentives. 
The coefficients 𝛽𝑗 in equation (2.1) measure the causal effect of the incentive 
treatments on knowledge scores, experimentation and effort, under the identifying assumption 
that 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑣
𝑗
 is orthogonal to 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑐. Random assignment to treatment implies the identifying 
assumption is satisfied, unless there are substantial spillover effects (so that the SUTVA is 
violated). This might happen if DFs in the training-only group changed their behaviour as a 
result of knowing that others had been offered rewards. Two design features were employed to 
minimise this risk: (i) we selected only one DF from each sub-village and hence there was only 
one treatment per sub-village;10 and (ii) DFs attended the training with others who were 
assigned to the same experimental arm (even if this was not announced to the DFs before the 
training). Training sessions for different treatment arms were organised at different venues. 
Furthermore, sub-villages in northern Uganda, and Nwoya district specifically, are 
geographically dispersed. Still, we use Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates of the 
                                                 
10 Only one of our DFs migrated after the training, and none moved to another sub-village with a different 
treatment. 
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sub-villages to test for evidence of spillovers across neighbouring sub-villages. We ask if the 
presence of a DF from another experimental arm in a neighbouring sub-village affects diffusion 
effort. Appendix Figure 2.B.1 (top panel) graphically shows the random assignment of 
treatments whereas the lower panel shows sub-villages receiving different treatments but 
neighbouring each other. We ask whether diffusion effort of DFs of the control group was 
affected by spillovers by comparing effort levels of control group DFs neighbouring a treated 
DF, and control group DFs further away from treated units. According to our estimates, 
summarised in Appendix Table 2.A.2, there are no spillovers. Using a border-to-treatment 
dummy variable, a t-test indicates that control group DF effort was not significantly affected 
by the presence of a neighbour from another experimental arm. 
Finally, we assess heterogeneity in the treatment effect of incentives. To evaluate the 
mediating effect of altruism on the level of diffusion effort chosen by the DF we follow Ashraf 
et al. (2014a) and use donations in the dictator game to construct a continuous variable 𝜋. This 
variable represents the (standardised) level of donations. Using actual amounts donated may 
however be affected by outliers. Appendix Figure 2.B.2 shows the distribution of the actual 
amounts of money donated. As shown, the distribution is approximately normal. Nevertheless, 
we construct and use a dummy variable equal to one if the DF donated above the median amount 
and zero if otherwise. The prosocial preference variable was interacted with the treatment 
dummies and included in the DF effort equation: 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑐  =  𝛼 + ∑ 𝜗𝑗𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑣
𝑗2
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜎𝑗𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑣
𝑗 ∗ 𝜋𝑖
2
𝑗=1 + 𝜆𝜋𝑖 + 𝜌𝑊𝑖𝑣𝑐  +  𝐶𝑐  +
                          + 𝜍𝑖𝑣𝑐                                   (2.2) 
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2.4  Results 
2.4.1   Incentives and knowledge, experimentation, and diffusion effort 
Table 2.2 presents results of a series of OLS and probit regressions assessing the effect 
of incentives on DFs’ experimentation with the technologies (columns 1–3), their retained 
knowledge six months after the training (column 4), and their diffusion effort (columns 5–6).  
Considering on-farm experimentation with the new technologies, we find that the social 
recognition treatment increases the propensity to experiment with Longe 10H DT maize 
(column 1)—compared to control group farmers, DFs incentivised with social recognition are 
14 percentage points more likely to experiment with Longe 10H DT maize on their own farm. 
The impact of the private material reward is positive, but much smaller. Disseminating farmers 
in this group are as likely as un-incentivised DFs to grow Longe 10H DT maize.  
Social recognition also increases the likelihood of using improved maize varieties (other 
than Longe 10H DT maize, column 2) and CF basins (column 3). On average, the probability 
of growing improved maize varieties increases by 17 percentage points more for the social 
recognition reward arm. Similarly, social recognition increases the probability of using CF 
basins by around 15 percentage points as compared to the comparison group. For these 
experimentation outcomes there are no differences between the private material reward and 
social recognition treatment, but again we observe that the effect of the private material reward 
incentive does not significantly differ from zero either. 
Results in column 4 show that the incentive treatments did not affect DFs’ level of 
knowledge. Remember that DFs were informed about the treatments after they completed their 
training, ruling out any impact on their knowledge accumulation during training. These results 
further indicate that knowledge levels did not change differentially during the subsequent six 
months. The training included a practical session where, for example, spacing, number of seeds 
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to sow in a hole, and length, width, and height of the CF basins was demonstrated in the field. 
The knowledge questions in the test focused on this sort of information, not on the practical 
knowledge that farmers acquire through on-farm experimentation. Hence it is not surprising 
that test scores did not vary across treatment arms (that is, did not improve with own on-farm 
experimentation). 
Table 2.2. Incentives and Disseminating Farmers’ Knowledge, On-farm Experimentation, 
and Diffusion Effort  
Incentive type 
On-farm experimentation 
  
Knowledge 
 
 
Effort 
DT 
maize 
Improved 
maize 
CF 
basin 
   Organised 
activity 
Information 
exchange 
(1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
Training plus private 
reward (PR) 
0.025 
(0.073) 
0.153 
(0.097) 
0.133 
(0.085) 
 -0.118 
(0.231) 
 0.209** 
(0.089) 
0.689** 
(0.282) 
Training plus social 
recognition (SR) 
0.136** 
(0.057) 
0.171* 
(0.096) 
0.147* 
(0.082) 
 -0.064 
(0.231) 
 0.244*** 
(0.083) 
0.908*** 
(0.300) 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Sub-county fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
R-squared 0.340 0.168 0.158  0.037  0.139 0.169 
Observations 123 123 123  123  123 123 
Mean of dependent 
variable for non-
incentivised DFs 
0.025 
[0.158] 
0.150 
[0.362] 
0.125 
[0.335] 
 0.090 
[1.086] 
 0.075 
[0.267] 
1.225 
[1.050] 
PR = SR (p-value)  0.067 0.836 0.857  0.814  0.674 0.513 
Notes: DF means disseminating farmer. Dependent variables are as follows: column (1), (2), and (3) are dummy 
variables equal to one if disseminating farmer (DF) tried out the technology on at least one of the household’s 
plots and zero otherwise; column (4) is the standardised knowledge score of the DF;  column (5) is a dummy equal 
to one if DF held at least one meeting or activity to train other farmers and zero otherwise; column (6) measures 
the number of people in the sub-village with whom the DF communicated about improved farming methods. 
Robust standard errors corrected for sub-village level clustering are reported in parentheses. Square parentheses 
are the standard deviations of the control group means. Asterisks indicate the following: ∗∗∗=p < 0.01, ∗∗=p < 0.05, 
∗=p < 0.1. Household controls include sex, age, education, and main economic activity of the household head, 
dependency ratio, livestock ownership, agricultural assets ownership, and access to credit. Columns (4) and (6) 
are OLS estimates. Columns (1), (2), (3), (5), and (6) report average marginal effects from probit regression. DT 
maize means drought-tolerant maize; CF basin means conservation farming basin. 
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Column 5 shows that both incentive regimes increase the probability that a DF organised 
an activity to train other farmers, compared to the training-only group. Both types of incentives 
are effective in stimulating DFs’ diffusion activity. Specifically, DFs incentivised by a private 
material reward are 21 percentage points more likely than un-incentivised DFs to train other 
farmers, and DFs incentivised by social recognition are 24 percentage points more likely to 
train other farmers. These outcomes are statistically identical. Observe that the size of the 
treatment effect, relative to the mean experimentation or effort level of the control group is 
large.  We find similar evidence for the effect of the incentives on the number of people a DF 
communicated with about improved farming methods (column 6). Specifically, the DF’s out 
degree—the number of people to whom information was communicated increased by 0.9 in the 
social recognition treatment arm and 0.7 in the private material arm, compared to the control 
group.  
These findings support and extend insights by Ben Yishay and Mobarak (2018). 
Disseminating farmers respond strongly to incentives for diffusion. The findings are also 
consistent with Ashraf et al. (2014b) as well as Carpenter and Myers (2010) who found that 
social recognition incentives may be as effective as private material rewards for promoting 
prosocial behaviour. If anything, we find that social recognition may matter even more than 
private material rewards11.  
                                                 
11 we developed a small guide for data collection and went back to the field in May, 2018 to collect additional data 
on how the weighing scales were being used in the private and social recognition treatment groups. We found that 
in both groups, the weighing scales still existed and were in working condition. In the private arm, the DFs mostly 
used the weighing scales for weighing their own produce (mainly maize), rarely allowing others to access it—in 
very few isolated cases, access was allowed to close relatives and neighbours. Whereas relatives did not pay, 
neighbours were typically charged a small fee for using the scale. The story was different in the social recognition 
arm where the village chief was in charge of the scale. First, we found that the village chiefs were still in charge 
of keeping and maintaining the weighing scales—ruling out the possibility that the weighing scale ended up with 
the DFs in the social recognition arm. We further asked to see the weighing scales in order to verify that the village 
chief indeed was keeping the scale. Second, co-villagers were allowed to access the weighing scale at no fee, but 
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Results of the effect of incentives on knowledge of “other farmers” and experimentation 
with the technologies are presented in Table 2.3. Compared to respondents from training-only 
sub-villages, knowledge scores (column 1) increased by 0.41 standard deviations in the social 
recognition treatment arm (corresponding to an increase of 8.56 in the unstandardised 
knowledge score), significant at the 10 percent level, and by a statistically insignificant 0.27 
standard deviations in the private material reward arm (corresponding to an increase of 5.42 in 
the unstandardised knowledge score). In terms of experimentation, we find no significant 
effects on Longe 10H DT maize (column 2) and CF basin (column 4). The probability of 
experimenting with an improved variety of maize, however, increased by 10 percentage points 
in the social recognition treatment arm (column 3), significant at the 10 percent level. Although 
our experiment was designed to test incentives for knowledge diffusion and experimentation 
by the DFs, actual implementation by other farmers is important for policy reasons.  
Our small and insignificant effects for other farmers’ experimentation are probably 
explained by the fact that outcomes were measured only one cropping season (six months) after 
the interventions were rolled out. While this is enough time for co-villagers to learn about new 
technologies (and sufficiently long for experimentation by DFs to occur), it may be too short to 
enable experimentation by other farmers. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
with strict instructions to handle the scale with care. It is also important to mention that besides the weighing scales 
that we provided as rewards for DFs efforts, there were a few other individuals—in both the private and social 
recognition arms—who owned weighing scales. For these privately owned weighing scales access by co-villagers 
was limited. 
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Table 2.3. Incentives and Other Farmers’ Knowledge and On-farm Experimentation 
Incentive type 
Other 
farmers’ 
knowledge 
 
On-farm experimentation 
 DT 
maize 
Improved 
maize 
CF 
basin 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Training plus private reward (PR) 0.267 
(0.210) 
 0.033 
(0.030) 
0.031 
(0.043) 
-0.045 
(0.032) 
Training plus social recognition (SR) 0.413* 
(0.232) 
 0.052 
(0.033) 
0.102* 
(0.055) 
-0.046 
(0.033) 
Baseline knowledge score 0.030 
(0.037) 
 
- - - 
Household controls Yes  No No No 
Sub-county fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.100  0.065 0.040 0.043 
Observations 123  123 123 123 
Mean of dependent variable for other 
farmers in sub-villages where DFs were 
not incentivized 
-0.211 
[0.729] 
 0.000 
[0.000] 
0.025 
[0.158] 
0.050 
[0.221] 
PR = SR (p-value)  0.529  0.617 0.236 0.908 
 
Notes: DF means disseminating farmer. Dependent variables are as follows: column (1) is standardised knowledge 
scores of the other farmer (not DF); columns (2), (3), and (4) are dummy variables equal to one if another farmer 
(not the DF) tried out the technology on at least one of the household’s plots and zero otherwise. Robust standard 
errors corrected for sub-village level clustering are reported in parentheses. Square parentheses are the standard 
deviations of the control group means. Asterisks indicate the following: ∗∗∗=p < 0.01, ∗∗=p < 0.05, ∗=p < 0.1. Linear 
probability model (LPM) estimates for column (1) and average marginal effects from probit regression for columns 
(2–4). DT means drought-tolerant variety of maize (Longe 10H); CF basin means conservation farming basin. 
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 2.4.2.  Heterogeneous treatment effects of incentives 
It is plausible that not all DFs are equally responsive to incentives. For example, in their 
study of promoting health-related prosocial behaviour, Ashraf et al. (2014a) found that the 
effects of private material rewards and social recognition were stronger for intrinsically 
altruistic subjects. We now analyse whether this result extends to the domain of agricultural 
knowledge diffusion. We first ask whether the impact of incentives on the propensity to invest 
effort in knowledge diffusion is mediated by prosocial preferences, and whether external 
incentives may “crowd out” altruism—as sometimes proposed in the literature. Specifically, if 
altruism leverages the impact of incentives then we expect the interaction of our altruism 
variable and the incentive (treatment) dummies to enter with a positive sign and significantly. 
Instead, if incentives crowd out altruism, then we expect that the altruism variable enters with 
a positive sign (level effect), but that the interaction between altruism and incentive dummies 
enters with negative signs. 
Results are reported in Table 2.4, where we use a dummy variable equal to one if the 
DF donated above the median amount of money and zero if otherwise as a proxy for prosocial 
preferences or altruism. One might expect that altruistic farmers would have greater incentives 
to experiment because their utility goes up if they can help their peers with superior information 
in the future. We, however, find that the interaction between prosocial preferences and 
incentives––consider the terms PR × donation and SR × donation––is not significant at 10 
percent level for DF’s experimentation with the technologies (columns 3–5) and the knowledge 
of other farmers (column 6). Looking at effort expended by DFs to hold activities and train 
other farmers, the interaction between prosocial preferences and incentives is positive and 
statistically significant at one percent level (column 1). However, we also find a significant and 
negative level effect of prosocial preferences (column 1). More altruistic farmers spend, on 
average, less effort organising activities or holding meetings to demonstrate to their peers how 
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to use new technologies. The interaction terms and level effect are statistically of the same 
magnitude, but have opposite signs meaning that the positive effect of the interaction terms is 
cancelled out by the negative effect of the level prosocial variable. The effect of incentives on 
DF’s effort and actual experimentation with the technologies does not, therefore, seem to be 
mediated by prosocial preferences. The effect of the interaction terms on the number of people 
that the DF informed about the technologies is also not statistically significant at 10 percent 
level (column 2)12.  
                                                 
12 First, consider the negative effect of altruism: in the absence of incentives, why are more altruistic DFs less 
likely to invest effort in training their peers? This finding is consistent with our understanding of heterogeneity in 
farm productivity and the low quality of agricultural inputs in Africa. Altruistic farmers who lack confidence in 
the profitability of new technologies for their co-villagers should not diffuse information. Such lack of confidence 
in overall profitability may follow from three reasons. (1) Heterogeneity in production conditions imply that the 
same technology will not be profitable for all farmers—even within the same village (Suri, 2011). This is especially 
likely for labour-intensive (or costly) innovations such as the construction of CF basins. (2) Drought-tolerant seeds 
might not have a yield advantage over other improved varieties, or might even have a yield penalty in normal years 
(Holden and Fisher, 2015). (3) There exists a major problem of counterfeit inputs in northern Uganda. In a recent 
study, Bold et al. (2017) find that 30 percent of nutrients are missing in chemical fertilizer, and samples of hybrid 
maize were estimated to contain less than 50 percent of improved seeds (presumably due to extensive 
adulteration).12 They find that, on average, low quality inputs results in near zero average rates of return in Uganda. 
In light of these observations it seems reasonable for DFs to question whether adopting these innovations 
is actually welfare-improving for all co-villagers. Instead, it may be optimal to delay transmission of the relevant 
information until after additional information has come available. Such a cautionary response can, however, be 
overwhelmed by incentives. If DFs are incentivised to diffuse information they choose not to delay transmission, 
and behave like their non-altruistic peers. In an effort to gain the material reward or social recognition, they seem 
willing to take the risk of spreading information that is potentially not useful to their peers. Extrinsic and intrinsic 
motives therefore work in opposite directions if the net benefits of new technologies are uncertain, and can offset 
each other. 
The finding of a positive effect of prosocial preferences on the number of people that the DF talked with 
about the technologies perhaps suggests that while altruistic DFs may be reluctant to demonstrate the use of new 
technologies to their peers, they may see it harmless to make them aware of such technologies. Altruistic DFs may 
also talk to their peers about the new technologies because they enjoy interacting with them, or to “send a signal” 
that they are not withholding information that could potentially be relevant for them. The interaction terms are, 
however, not statistically different from zero. 
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Finally, we examine heterogeneous treatment effects of incentives by social distance. 
Motivated by the selection criteria for the DFs, we consider two social distance variables, 
namely wealth status and education. The social distance variables are measured based on 
baseline data as follows. First, we construct dyadic pairs for each of the respondents in a sub-
village who were interviewed at baseline. Next, for each dyadic pair, we compute the absolute 
difference in wealth status (household assets index) and education. We then calculate the 
median distance for each sub-village and variable and observe how close or far the absolute 
distance between the DFs and their neighbours is from the median distance in the sub-village. 
This allows us to capture heterogeneity in distance in the sub-village: in other words, we control 
for the possibility that in a sub-village, a wide social distance between the DF and the neighbour 
might simply reflect an existing wide median distance in the sub-village. Results are not 
statistically significant for wealth status (Table 2.5, columns 1 and 3). In terms of distance in 
education, we find an increased likelihood by 6.3 percentage points, of DFs holding an activity 
to discuss with their neighbours about the technologies, for the private rewards (Table 2.5, 
column 2). Heterogeneous treatment effects by distance in education are positive, for both 
private reward and social recognition, but not statistically significant in terms of the DFs’ out-
degree. 
 
 
                                                 
That prosocial preferences do not significantly affect the propensity to experiment (see columns 3–5 in 
Table 2.4) may reflect one of the lessons of Bold et al. (2017), who highlight the difficulty of Bayesian updating 
in the context of agricultural inputs and volatile production conditions. While Bayesian updating is relatively easy 
when counterfeit inputs are of either very low or very high quality, it is difficult and slow when adulteration of 
inputs occurs at intermediate levels—exactly as observed in actual Ugandan input markets. If farmers know that 
learning about the quality of inputs is slow and imperfect, the interaction between altruism and incentives is 
unlikely to have big effects on experimentation.  
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Table 2.4. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Pro-social Preferences 
 
 
Organised 
activity 
Information 
exchange 
DT 
maize 
Improved 
maize 
CF basin 
Other 
farmers’ 
knowledge 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Private 
reward (PR)  
 0.184** 
(0.091) 
0.754** 
(0.317) 
0.020 
(0.050) 
0.182 
(0.112) 
0.097 
(0.097) 
0.340 
(0.252) 
Social 
recognition 
(SR)  
 0.188** 
 (0.087) 
0.794** 
(0.340) 
0.156* 
(0.084) 
0.255** 
(0.108) 
0.090 
(0.093) 
0.277 
(0.241) 
Donation (in 
dictator game) 
 -0.938*** 
(0.161) 
0.677* 
(0.382) 
-0.074 
(0.050) 
0.182 
(0.162) 
0.013 
(0.147) 
0.039 
(0.228) 
PR × donation  0.900*** 
(0.220) 
-0.117 
(0.714) 
0.040 
(0.073) 
-0.124 
(0.230) 
0.150 
(0.196) 
-0.311 
(0.417) 
SR × donation  1.010*** 
(0.209) 
0.268 
(0.620) 
0.034 
(0.129) 
-0.317 
(0.206) 
0.170 
(0.184) 
0.471 
(0.498) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-county 
fixed effects 
 Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
R-squared  0.156 0.220 0.178 0.184 0.163 0.136 
Observations  123 123 123 123 123 123 
p-value (PR × 
donation) = 
(SR × 
donation) 
 0.565 0.629 0.967 0.352 0.188 0.169 
Notes: Average marginal effects. Household controls include sex, age, education, and main economic activity of 
the household head, dependency ratio, livestock ownership, agricultural assets ownership, and access to credit. 
Robust standard errors corrected for sub-village level clustering (123) are reported in parentheses. Asterisks 
indicate the following: ∗∗∗=p < 0.01, ∗∗=p < 0.05, ∗=p < 0.1. DT means drought-tolerant variety of maize (Longe 
10H); CF basin means conservation farming basin. 
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Table 2.5. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Social Distance 
 
Organised activity  Information exchange 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Private reward (PR)  0.200 
(0.125) 
0.076 
(0.131) 
 1.149*** 
(0.434) 
0.157 
(0.524) 
Social recognition (SR)  0.215* 
 (0.110) 
0.183* 
(0.108) 
 0.960** 
(0.421) 
0.982* 
(0.506) 
DistHHassets index -0.019 
(0.022) 
  -0.011 
(0.087) 
 
PR × DistHHassets index 0.002 
(0.036) 
  -0.174 
(0.133) 
 
SR × DistHHassets index 0.007 
(0.035) 
  -0.031 
(0.146) 
 
DistHHHeduc  -0.048** 
(0.024) 
 
 
-0.164** 
(0.079) 
PR × DistHHHeduc  0.063* 
(0.037) 
 
 
0.199 
(0.165) 
SR × DistHHHeduc  0.039 
(0.027) 
 
 
0.013 
(0.102) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Sub-county fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.146 0.155  0.192 0.210 
Observations 123 123  123 123 
p-value (PR × social distance) 
= (SR × social distance) 
0.911 0.488  0.363 0.258 
Notes: Average marginal effects. DistHHassets index and DistHHHeduc measure social distance in terms of 
household assets (wealth status) and education, respectively. Household controls include sex, age, education, and 
main economic activity of the household head, dependency ratio, livestock ownership, agricultural assets 
ownership, and access to credit. Robust standard errors corrected for sub-village level clustering (123) are reported 
in parentheses. Asterisks indicate the following: ∗∗∗=p < 0.01, ∗∗=p < 0.05, ∗=p < 0.1. 
 
2.5  Discussion and conclusions  
Effective approaches to alleviate poverty in sub-Saharan Africa will require rural 
development and agricultural intensification. A key concern is how to promote the adoption of 
modern production techniques that are more productive and resilient. Conventional extension 
efforts have by and large failed to reach large swaths of the rural population, and the search is 
on for innovative approaches to stimulate the diffusion of information about agricultural 
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innovations. Social learning has long since been an important component of such efforts, but 
the insight is sinking in that diffusion of information within social networks may neither be 
easy nor “automatic.” In contexts where individual farmers stand to gain little from spreading 
information but expect to pay a positive (effort) cost, diffusion is often slow and imperfect. 
Incentivising farmers to engage in diffusion represents one potential solution. 
In this chapter we use an experimental approach to study the effects of incentivising 
farmers to allocate effort to the diffusion of information. Incentivising can happen in different 
forms, and we consider two types of “extrinsic rewards” for effective information sharing; a 
private material reward for the disseminating farmer and an intervention that aims to build the 
reputation of the disseminating farmer within his or her community (“social recognition”). As 
a material reward we used a weighing scale, and we focus on the diffusion of knowledge about 
climate-smart agricultural practices. We find that reputation building may be a particularly 
effective way to promote diffusion—while a private material reward had small effects on 
diffusion, the same reward given to “the community” in a public ceremony celebrating the 
efforts of the contact farmer effectively pushed up own experimentation by the disseminating 
farmer, his diffusion effort, and actual information transmission. We believe this result speaks 
to the importance of community structures for rural livelihoods in Africa. 
A large literature studies the interaction between different motives for prosocial 
behaviour, and in particular asks whether extrinsic motives (private rewards or “reputation 
building”) may interact with intrinsic motives. Indeed, in theory it would be possible that 
providing extrinsic rewards reduces the diffusion of information if the “crowding out effect” is 
sufficiently large and dominates the direct incentive effect. However, our data are not consistent 
with such outcomes. We show that altruistic farmers are more responsive to extrinsic rewards 
than non-altruistic farmers when required to demonstrate use of improved technologies. 
Altruistic disseminating farmers are more likely to communicate by word of mouth to their 
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neighbors, but reluctant to demonstrate implementation of improved technologies than non-
altruistic dissemination farmers. However, extrinsic incentives attenuate this reluctance. While 
it seems paradoxical that altruistic farmers invest less in demonstrating technology use than 
their non-altruistic counterparts, we speculate this finding is due to fundamental uncertainty 
about the value of new technologies. This uncertainty follows from heterogeneity in production 
conditions, or from uncertainty about the quality of the inputs. Altruistic farmers appear 
reluctant to expose their peers to new technologies with unproven welfare effects. 
We hope the results in this chapter can guide thinking about effective ways to promote 
the diffusion of information. The main policy message is that including incentives in extension 
schemes may be welfare-enhancing. However, this begs the question about scalability – can 
extension approaches based on incentives be scaled across larger landscapes, and how can first-
order beneficiaries in turn be incentivised to reach out to second-order beneficiaries, and so on? 
Additional experimenting with innovative approaches is presumably necessary for this. An 
auxiliary policy message concerns the perceived low quality of agricultural inputs. Bold et al. 
(2017) correctly identify that poor handling and adulteration reduce the rate of return of 
adopting these inputs. Our results suggest low input quality may also attenuate incentives to 
share information in social networks. Addressing the issue of low-quality inputs may therefore 
have beneficial effects along multiple dimensions. 
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Appendix 2.A: Tables 
Table 2.A.1. Did the Experiment Affect the Outcome of the Donations Game? 
Dependent variable: amount of money donated in the pro-social preferences game 
 Coefficient p-value 
Training plus private reward (PR) -0.285 
(0.215) 
0.188 
Training plus social recognition (SR) -0.062 
(0.221) 
0.780 
Intercept 0.112 
(0.150) 
0.454 
R-squared 0.015 
Observations 123 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for sub-village level clustering (123) reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 2.A.2. Testing for Spillover Effects 
 Close but different 
treatment 
 
Otherwise 
 
Difference t-value p-value 
Effort 0.091 
(0.063) 
 0.198 
(0.040) 
0.107 
(0.074) 
1.441 0.157 
Observations 101  22    
Notes: In parentheses are standard errors. 
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Appendix 2.B: Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.B.1. Location of disseminating farmers (top panel) and potential for spillover 
(bottom panel) 
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Appendix 2.C. Knowledge questions 
Q1. Have you ever heard about improved varieties of crops? (1mk if the farmer has heard 
about improved varieties of crops) 
Q2. What improved varieties of maize have you heard about? (1mk if the farmer mentions at 
least one name of an improved variety of maize) 
Q3. What improved varieties of groundnuts have you heard about? (1mk if the farmer 
mentions at least one name of an improved variety of groundnuts) 
Q4. What benefits do improved varieties of crops have? (1mk if the farmer mentions at least 
one benefit of an improved variety of crop) 
Q5. Have you ever heard about conservation farming basins? (1mk if the farmer has heard 
about conservation farming basins) 
Q6. How long should a conservation farming basin be? (1mk if the farmer answers 30cm–
40cm; estimated using length of a straight stick and measured by enumerator using a ruler) 
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Figure 2.B.2. Distribution of amount donated by disseminating farmers in the augmented 
dictator game 
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Q7. How wide should a conservation basin be? (1mk if the farmer answers 10cm–15cm; 
estimated using length of a straight stick and measured by enumerator using a ruler) 
Q8. How deep should a conservation farming basin be? (1mk if the farmer answers 10cm–
15cm; estimated using length of a straight stick and measured by enumerator using a ruler) 
Q9. When planting maize in a conservation farming basin, how many seeds should a farmer 
plant? (1mk if farmer answers three) 
Q10. When planting groundnuts in a conservation farming basin, how many seeds should a 
farmer plant? (1mk if farmer answers 6–8 seeds) 
 
Appendix 2.D. Instructions for the Augmented Dictator Game 
 
We recently had a meeting in which farmers were trained about new farming methods. 
During the meeting, each participant was provided with transport fee. After the meeting, we 
found out that we had some funds remaining. The funds that remained are enough to allow us 
to give you 5,000 UGX. Therefore, I have with me here, 5,000 UGX [SHOW THE 5,000 UGX 
TO THE RESPONDENT] that I will give to you. You can choose how much of this sum to 
keep for yourself and how much to donate to African Revival or Charity for Rural Development 
(CHAFORD), local charities that work with farmers to train them about new farming methods. 
I will give you this envelope [GIVE THE ENVELOPE TO THE RESPONDENT]. With me I 
have this collection box [SHOW THE BOX TO THE RESPONDENT]. If you wish to donate, 
please put your donation in the envelope and drop it in the collection box. Note that the amount 
you donate is totally up to you: you can give nothing, part of the 5,000 UGX, or the entire thing. 
The amount you contribute will be kept completely confidential. I will give you a few minutes 
to think about it. When you've taken a decision, please drop your envelope in the box. Is it 
clear? [IF THE RESPONDENT HAS UNDERSTOOD THE INSTRUCTIONS] I will now give 
you 5,000 UGX and allow you a few minutes to make your decision [GIVE THE 
RESPONDENT 5,000 UGX in 1,000 notes].  
AFTER THE GAME  
Thank you for your donation  
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Appendix 2.E. Theoretical Model 
To guide our empirical analysis, we summarise a framework that combines insights 
from the standard target input model commonly used in diffusion studies (e.g. Bardhan and 
Udry, 1999; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006) and a model of incentives for communication proposed 
by BenYishay and Mobarak (2018).  
The basic set-up is as follows. There is a continuum of farmers distributed on a line, 
with mean revenues equal to zero and variance equal to one. Farmers can produce output using 
a conventional technology, producing known profit q, or a new technology. While the basics of 
the new technology are observable and known to all farmers, one parameter is random and ex 
ante unknown. This parameter is the target level of a variable input (say, labour), denoted by 
y*.13 Payoffs of the new technology for farmer 𝑖 depend on the distance between the applied 
input level and the target: 𝑄𝑖 = 1– (𝑦𝑖– 𝑦
∗)2. For simplicity we assume both the target value 
and productivity of the new technology is homogenous across farmers. Nevertheless, payoffs 
may depend on the location of farmers in the distribution. The reason is that farmers receive 
signals about the profitability and implementation of the new technology by observing their 
peers, but the signal of “neighbouring farmers” is more informative than signals received from 
farmers further away in the distribution.  
Assume there is an ex ante common belief about the target input level, which is normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2. If farmers adopt the new technology their expected 
payoff equals 1–σ2, so in the absence of additional information farmers will choose not to adopt 
when q > 1–σ2. Next assume there is one informed farmer, the disseminating farmer, who knows 
the target level y*. This farmer is located at 𝑥 in the distribution and can choose to send a signal 
with precision ρ to her peers at a cost 𝑐(𝜌). We assume these costs are increasing in the precision 
of the signal, 𝑐′(𝜌) > 0 and 𝑐′′(𝜌) > 0. Following BenYishay and Mobarak (2018), we assume 
that if the disseminating farmer sends a signal, farmer 𝑖 receives a noisy message with the noise 
level increasing in the distance between x and i: 
                                                 
13 The original diffusion model developed by Bardhan and Udry (1999) and Bandiera and Rasul (2006) assumes 
that the target level y* varies across farms (i.e. 𝑦𝑖
*). This approach captures differences in agronomic conditions 
between farms. However, since our data do not enable quantification of “proximity” (or similarity) between 
farmers, and our analysis does not consider the question “who learns from whom?”, we ignore such heterogeneity 
in production in the theoretical model. 
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𝑠𝑥𝑖 = 𝑦
∗ +
|𝑥−𝑖|
𝜌
        (2.E.1) 
After receiving signal 𝑠𝑥𝑖 the receiving farmer uses Bayesian updating to update his 
beliefs about the target level. The ex post mean and variance are now given by: 
𝐸[𝑦∗|𝑠𝑥𝑖, 𝜌] =
𝜎2𝜌2𝑠𝑥𝑖
𝜎2𝜌2+(𝑥−𝑖)2
       (2.E.2) 
𝑉𝐴𝑅[𝑦∗|𝑠𝑥𝑖, 𝜌] =
1
1
𝜎2
+
𝜌2
(𝑥−𝑖)2
       (2.E.3) 
Farmers further away from the disseminating farmer receive a more noisy signal; their updated 
beliefs are more biased and variable than the updated beliefs of farmers closer to the 
disseminating farmer. Since farmers will only adopt if their expected payoffs of the new 
technology are higher than their profits under the traditional technology, farmer 𝑖 will adopt the 
new technology if the following condition is satisfied: 
𝑞 < 𝑄𝑖 = 1 −
1
1
𝜎2
+
𝜌2
(𝑥−𝑖)2
       (2.E.4) 
While diffusion of the new technology in the absence of signal-sending by the 
disseminating farmer only occurs if q < 1–σ2, the probability that adoption occurs increases 
after receiving a signal. Since the variance of the target level is decreasing in the distance 
between sending and receiving farmers (𝑥– 𝑖), diffusion is most likely to occur among “similar 
farmers” exposed to the signal. The variance is also decreasing in the precision of the signal, so 
disseminating farmers willing to incur greater signalling costs will also promote diffusion.  
The level of signal-sending chosen by the disseminating farmer will vary with marginal 
benefits and costs of increasing the precision of the signal. In the absence of any benefits, 
farmers will not invest in information diffusion and choose 𝜌 = 0. We distinguish between two 
reasons why disseminating farmers may choose a precision level that is greater than 0 and incur 
positive signalling costs. 
First, altruistic disseminating farmers may invest in signalling to increase the payoffs of 
their peers (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2014a). Specifically, assume farmer x internalises the payoffs of 
farmer 𝑖 and knows that (𝑖) adopting the technology would be welfare-increasing for farmer 𝑖 
and (ii) that sending a signal would convince that farmer to adopt the new technology. Farmer 
x’s full payoff function reads as: 
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𝜋𝑥 = 𝑄𝑥 + 𝛽[𝑄𝑖 − 𝑞] − 𝑐(𝜌)       (2.E.5) 
where 𝑄𝑥 are the own material payoffs for farmer 𝑥 and 𝛽 ≤ 1 is the parameter used to weigh 
the payoffs of farmer 𝑖. For 𝑄𝑖– 𝑞 > 0, an altruistic disseminating farmer will set 𝜌 > 0. For 
𝑄𝑖 > 𝑞, the optimal precision level of the signal solves: 
 
2𝛽𝜌
(𝑥−𝑖)2
(
1
𝜎2
+
𝜌2
(𝑥−𝑖)2
)
2 = 𝑐′(𝜌).        (2.E.6) 
Importantly, altruistic disseminating farmers should not send a signal to their peers if they 
believe the distance to others is “too large” so that the resulting signal for the receivers will be 
“too noisy.”14  
Second, disseminating farmers may invest in signalling to secure private payoffs – either 
in the form of a private material reward PR or in the form of social recognition SR. Following 
Ben Yishay and Mobarak (2018), assume the disseminating farmer receives a reward PR (or 
SR) if a certain mass of peer farmers knows about the new technology or adopts the new 
technology. From (2.E.4), adoption will occur by the mass of farmers 𝑖 satisfying the following 
condition:  
(𝑥 − 𝑖)2 ≤
𝜌2
1
1−𝑞
−
1
𝜎2
.        (2.E.7) 
Suppose the reward is given if a mass z of farmers adopts. To obtain the reward, disseminating 
farmer x should send signal with precision ρ* such that condition (2.E.7) is satisfied for all 
farmers located on the interval [x–½z, x+½z]. Of course this signal will only be sent if c(ρ*)<PR 
(or if c(ρ*)<SR). 
According to this model, farmers who are motivated by both altruism and a desire for 
(social) rewards are more likely to send a signal than farmers who are either altruistic or 
signalling for rewards. However, this result depends on two simplifications. First, as discussed 
above, engaging in an activity because of an extrinsic private or social recognition reward may 
                                                 
14 Observe that this finding depends on the assumption that disseminating farmers discount the future. Her 
neighbours, after receiving a precise signal about input use, may subsequently decide to send a signal to their own 
neighbours (located further away from the disseminating farmer). This would allow information about the new 
technology to gradually and accurately spread. We assume such second-order diffusion is ignored by the 
disseminating farmers. 
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undermine altruistic benefits (e.g. Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Second, we have assumed the 
new technology is equally productive for all farmers (upon applying the same level of input y). 
If heterogeneity in production conditions––due to agronomic circumstances or farming skills, 
say—implies a range of payoffs from adoption (as documented by Suri, 2011), then an altruistic 
disseminating farmer may decide to not send a signal if she suspects a fraction of her peers will 
be worse off after adoption – even if they choose the optimal target y*. Altruistic disseminating 
farmers should only work hard to diffuse knowledge if they believe the net payoffs of the new 
technology are positive for their peers. 
Mutatis Mutandis, the theoretical model is also applied in Chapter 4 where it implies a 
potential for changes in information networks coming from two sources. First, DFs may be 
motivated to reach out to more neighbours either to optimise their altruistic behaviour or to 
achieve the critical mass of peer farmers who know about the new technology to secure getting 
the reward. In the end, this leads to an increase in the number of people with whom the DF 
shares information about the new technology. Second, providing training to DFs exogenously 
makes them potentially important nodes as a source of information about a highly relevant new 
technology in the context of rural Uganda. Neighbours, including those who were not in the 
DFs’ networks at the baseline, may realise this, and actively seek to be connected with DFs, 
ultimately implying changes in information networks of neighbours. 
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Chapter 3 
Information Exchange Links, Knowledge Exposure, and Adoption 
of Agricultural Technologies in Northern Uganda 
 
Abstract 
Using panel data from northern Uganda and employing quasi-experimental econometric 
techniques, this chapter systematically studies the relationship between social distance and the 
likelihood of information exchange, subsequently evaluating effects on awareness, knowledge, 
and adoption of agricultural technologies. We find an increased likelihood of information 
exchange when the disseminating farmer (DF) is female, regardless of the sex of the neighbour. 
The likelihood of information exchange increased when distance in farm size cultivated with 
maize was higher than the median in the sub-village and when distance in non-agricultural 
assets index was lower than the median in the sub-village. Information exchange links improved 
awareness and knowledge for all of the technologies, but only increased adoption of maize 
varieties. Together, these findings suggest that social distance shapes the diffusion of 
agricultural knowledge even when DFs are selected by the community to be “representative”.  
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Shikuku, K.M. (2018). Information exchange links, knowledge exposure, and adoption of 
agricultural technologies in northern Uganda. Accepted for publication in World Development. 
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3.1 Introduction  
Agricultural productivity growth is important for economic development in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), but is hindered by low adoption rates for yield-enhancing technologies. Lack of 
information about a technology impedes diffusion of agricultural technologies (Bandiera and 
Rasul, 2006). Identifying and promoting approaches that can address informational constraints 
to adoption is, therefore, a formidable challenge for policy in SSA.  One such approach is the 
direct provision of agricultural training to selected individuals—often referred to as 
disseminating farmers (DFs)—and leveraging social networks for knowledge diffusion 
(Kondylis et al., 2016). 
In 2016, we partnered with the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) 
and Tillers International—an NGO promoting conservation farming in northern Uganda to train 
126 randomly selected DFs about agricultural technologies that are increasingly seen to be 
climate-smart (FAO, 2013; Arslan et al., 2015; Kimaro et al., 2015; Lamanna et al., 2016). The 
technologies considered in this study include drought-tolerant (DT) varieties of maize, disease-
resistant varieties of groundnuts, and conservation farming (CF) basins. Each of the selected 
DFs represented a sub-village (see Chapter 2 for a comprehensive explanation of the selection 
procedure of DFs and details of the training). The DFs were selected by the community not to 
be too wealthy. The training, which lasted for three days, included both classroom sessions and 
practical demonstration in the field. At the end of the training, DFs were asked to share the 
knowledge learnt with their fellow sub-villagers (whom we refer to as neighbours). 
The specific objectives of this chapter are twofold: (1) to assess relationship between 
social distance and information exchange links; and (2) to evaluate the impacts of information 
exchange links on awareness, knowledge, and adoption of agricultural technologies. Interest is 
growing in understanding the effect of “active” interventions that provide direct agricultural 
training to DFs on adoption behaviour of their neighbours (e.g., Kondylis et al., 2016; 2017). 
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The motivation stems largely from an enhanced understanding of the selection criteria for DFs 
(Banerjee et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2015; Beaman et al., 2015; Chami et al., 2017) and the 
increasingly recognised role of incentives for knowledge diffusion (Chapter 2 of this thesis, 
Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 2018; Sseruyange and Bulte, 2018).  
In addition to selection and incentives, diffusion of agricultural technologies through 
social networks could be influenced by social distance—differences in socioeconomic and 
biophysical characteristics between network nodes (Feder and Savastano, 2006; Santos and 
Barrett, 2010). For example, farmers may not learn from DFs of the opposite sex if they viewed 
their messages as inferior to those of the same sex (Ben Yishay et al., 2015). Similarly, 
heterogeneity in growing conditions might generate varied benefits among farmers meaning 
that messages of DFs may not be relevant to the decision making of their neighbours (Munshi, 
2004; Magnan et al., 2015).  
Literature has long established that individuals tend to associate disproportionately with 
others who are similar to themselves (McPherson et al., 2001; Goeree et al., 2010). This 
tendency is referred to as homophily—a term coined by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954). Golub 
and Jackson (2011) showed that the probability of a link between two agents depends on their 
types and affects the speed of convergence of beliefs. Genius et al. (2013) indicated, however, 
that in addition to “homophilic neighbours” farmers may follow or trust the opinion of those 
whom they perceive to be successful in their farming even though they might share different 
traits. Studies that assess neighbourhood effects on the behaviour of economic agents, therefore, 
consider average characteristics of an individual’s reference group (Matuschke and Qaim, 
2009; Krishnan and Patnam, 2013). These studies do not, however, measure the differences in 
the characteristics between network nodes and, therefore, fail to assess effects of social distance. 
Those that have attempted to assess effects of social distance focused on information exchange 
within existing social networks (Feder and Savastano, 2006; Santos and Barrett, 2010). Santos 
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and Barrett (2010) also did not assess effects of information exchange links on adoption of 
agricultural technologies. 
This chapter, therefore, contributes to the literature on social learning and technology 
adoption (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Matuschke and Qaim, 2009; Conley and Udry, 2010; 
Krishnan and Patnam, 2013; Vasilaky and Leonard, 2018) in three important ways. First, the 
chapter focuses on differences in both socioeconomic and soil characteristics between a trained 
DF in a sub-village and his or her neighbours. Such neighbours may be “homophilous” or 
“heterophilous” to the DF in terms of social distance and/or soil characteristics. Second, we 
study information exchange in the context of an active intervention in which DFs are directly 
trained and encouraged to communicate with their neighbours. The study, therefore, departs 
from previous studies which examined the effect of social distance on information exchange 
under the assumption of “passive” learning (Feder and Savastano, 2006; Santos and Barrett, 
2010). Third, we distinguish between awareness exposure, that is, having heard about a 
technology and knowledge exposure, that is, knowing how to implement the technology, and 
study the effect of information exchange links on awareness, knowledge, and adoption of 
agricultural technologies. A few authors have highlighted the importance of distinguishing 
between awareness and knowledge in adoption analysis (Lambrecht et al., 2014). The chapter 
shows that: (1) differences in sex, ownership of non-agricultural assets, and size of land 
cultivated with maize, influence information exchange links; and (2) information exchange 
links generated through an active intervention increase awareness and knowledge exposure, and 
adoption of drought-tolerant varieties of maize. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the conceptual framework 
underlying the study. Section 3.3 describes the data and variables used in the analysis. Section 
3.4 discusses the empirical approach and estimation procedure. Section 3.5 presents the results 
while section 3.6 concludes. 
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3.2 Conceptual framework 
The fundamental issue that training of DFs seeks to address is the notion that use of 
recommended climate-smart agricultural (CSA) technologies which could potentially increase 
productivity and enhance resilience to weather shocks is very low because of inadequate 
exposure of farmers to knowledge about the technologies15. Inadequate knowledge exposure 
implies that farmers may not know the suitability of these technologies to their agricultural 
activities. Suppose, therefore, that farmers currently operate using a traditional not-CSA 
technology whose payoffs 𝑦 are well known, but with which their vulnerability to weather 
shocks is high. For example, a farmer using a local variety of maize that is intolerant to drought 
might be well aware of its yield potential due to many years of experimentation with the variety 
but might experience a major crop failure if drought occurs.  
Empirical predictions for this study are guided by a framework combining insights from 
the standard target input model as applied by Bandiera and Rasul (2006) and a model of 
communication proposed by Ben Yishay and Mobarak (2018). The target input model 
presupposes the existence of a new technology whose required target inputs for implementation 
are not known to farmers. Farmer 𝑗 chooses the amount of inputs according to his or her prior 
beliefs about the new technology. Without additional information, however, expected payoffs 
from the new technology are low, because of the gap between the farmer’s inputs and the target 
inputs. The farmer will, therefore, seek to learn in order to maximise payoffs from the new 
technology16. 
                                                 
15 A fundamental assumption here is that the ‘CSA’ technology being promoted is better, under climate change, 
than what the farmers have already. Whereas this may be true for the new varieties—they have some better traits 
in terms of disease resistance or drought-tolerance—farmers may not prefer such varieties if they are inferior in 
terms of other traits such as colour and taste compared with the local varieties. For example, the two varieties of 
groundnuts (Serenut 5R and Serenut 14R) that we studied were denoted R meaning Red seeded but they are 
generally not as deep red as Red Beauty (a local variety). 
16 The assumption of profit maximisation is central to the theory of the firm and producer behaviour. Most adoption 
studies, therefore, assume that farmers’ adoption behaviour is motivated by profit maximization. We acknowledge, 
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Suppose further that there is an informed farmer 𝑘 who has been trained about the new 
technology and understands the possibilities. Leveraging social networks could help with 
diffusion of knowledge from this informed farmer to neighbours (Conley and Udry, 2010). 
Communicating the information to other farmers requires that the informed farmer sends a 
signal, incurring a cost that is increasing with precision of the message (Ben Yishay and 
Mobarak, 2018). Proximity between farmers 𝑗 and 𝑘 not only in terms of similarity in 
agricultural practices but also capacity to implement such practices is important to ensure that 
the message received from the communicator is relevant to agricultural decisions of the receiver 
(Bandiera and Rasul, 2006). Upon receiving the signal, farmer 𝑗 updates his or her beliefs about 
the required inputs for the new technology. As shown by Ben Yishay and Mobarak (2018), 
expected payoffs from learning decrease with the distance between the communicator and the 
receiver of the message.  
Disseminating farmers in this study were selected to be not very wealthy—as perceived 
by neighbours. As such, it can be expected that DFs will be closer to some neighbours and far 
from others in terms of social distance. Furthermore, the selection criterion was not restrictive 
in terms of other socioeconomic factors such as age, education, membership to farmer 
associations, or cultivated land. The selection criteria notwithstanding, therefore, our study 
allows us to explore the role of social distance and soil characteristics on information exchange 
links. Specifically, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H1: Proximity in terms of social distance and soil characteristics between DFs and their 
neighbours increases the formation of information exchange links. 
                                                 
however, that several other motives, such as minimisation of risks, might drive the adoption behaviour of farm 
households. 
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H2: Information exchange links between trained DFs and their neighbours increase 
neighbours’ awareness, knowledge, and adoption of drought-tolerant (DT) maize and 
disease-resistant groundnut varieties and conservation farming (CF) basins. 
 
3.3  Data and description of variables 
3.3.1 Data 
Analysis is performed on a panel dataset that was collected through two waves of 
household surveys. The baseline survey was conducted in 2015 (see Chapter 2 for a detailed 
explanation about the baseline survey). A follow-up survey was conducted in 2017. During the 
follow up survey, 126 sub-villages whose selected DFs had actually attended the training about 
the CSA technologies were revisited. Effort was made to interview the same respondents who 
had been interviewed at the baseline. In total, 1,036 respondents (122 DFs and 914 other 
farmers) were interviewed in the follow-up survey. The attrition rate was, therefore, about 18%. 
Appendix Table 3.A.1, however, shows that summary sample statistics for the original sample 
and that used for our analysis are very similar. Attrition is therefore not a major concern in this 
study. Interviews were conducted by trained enumerators in the local language using a pre-
designed and pre-tested questionnaire. 
 
3.3.2   Definition of dependent variables 
During the follow-up survey, sample respondents were asked: (1) whether they had been 
contacted by another farmer in the sub-village about new farming methods and (2) whether they 
had heard about or attended an activity organised by another farmer in their sub-village to train 
co-villagers about farming. If they answered ‘yes’, follow up questions asked for the name of 
the contact or trainer and the content of the training. Existence of an information exchange link 
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is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if a farmer had contact with or attended an activity 
organised by the DF in the respective sub-village and zero otherwise. 
Next, we distinguish between awareness, knowledge, and adoption of the 
“recommended” CSA technologies. For each of the crop varieties considered (Longe 10H DT 
maize, DT maize generally, any improved variety of maize, Serenut 5R or Serenut 14R 
groundnut varieties, any Serenut groundnut variety17) and CF basins, awareness is defined as 
equal to one if the respondent has heard about the technology and zero if otherwise. Knowledge 
is defined as a continuous variable measured using an exam about improved varieties. Because 
questions differ in difficulty and farmers differ in their ability to respond (Lagerkvist et al., 
2015), we generate the probability of answering correctly to a question, that is, 𝑝 = (𝑞 𝑄⁄ ) 
where 𝑞 captures the number of people responding correctly to the question and 𝑄 is the total 
number of people. We then use the inverse of the probability, that is, 1 𝑝⁄  as weight for a correct 
answer to that question. The final score is thus a summation of the weighted responses to all 
questions. This procedure ensures that difficult questions (those to which only a few farmers 
answer correctly) carry more weight in the final outcome. 
For each of the technologies considered, adoption is defined as a dummy variable equal 
to one if a farmer implemented the technology on at least one household plot and zero if 
otherwise. Adoption as measured here is, therefore, use of technologies at one point in time18.  
 
3.3.3   Definition of explanatory variables 
Although evidence on social distance as a determinant of information exchange links in 
agricultural settings is scant, Santos and Barrett (2010) provide some guidance on measuring 
                                                 
17 This latter category includes not only Serenut 5R and Serenut 14R, but also Serenut 2, Serenut 3, and Serenut 
4). 
18 We are, however, aware of the suggestion by literature that adoption is not a simple on-off but a gradual 
process that can go up and down depending on circumstances (e.g. Glover et al., 2016). We also did not look at 
the intensity of adoption. 
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social distance. The following steps were followed in constructing the social distance variables. 
In step one, dyadic pairs were generated for each of the respondents interviewed at baseline. 
Step two, involved computing (for each dyadic pair) the absolute difference in the continuous 
variable (education, age, area under maize, agricultural assets index, non-agricultural assets 
index, pH). In step three, the median village distance was obtained for each variable. Step four 
then calculated the distance between the village median and the absolute difference (for each 
variable) between the DF and the neighbour using equation 3.1. 
𝐼(𝑥𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟−𝑥𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛≤0) x |𝑥𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 − 𝑥𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛| +
+𝐼(𝑥𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟−𝑥𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛>0) x |𝑥𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 − 𝑥𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛|        (3.1) 
where 𝐼(∙) is an indicator variable equal to one if true and zero if otherwise; for a continuous 
variable, (𝑥𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 − 𝑥𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛) measures the absolute distance between the village 
median𝑥𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛and the absolute difference between the DF and the 
neighbour𝑥𝐷𝐹𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟. Measuring social distance using this approach allows us to capture 
heterogeneity in distance in the sub-village: in other words, we control for the possibility that 
in a sub-village, a wide social distance between the DF and the neighbour might simply reflect 
an existing wide median distance in the sub-village.  
Social distance between DF 𝑖 and neighbour 𝑗 was measured for categorical variables 
(sex and membership to a farmers’ group) by a set of dummy variables that consider the several 
possible characterizations of the match (Santos and Barrett, 2010). The analysis of the effect of 
membership to a farmers’ group, for example, requires the definition of a dummy variable for 
each of the four possible combinations (member–member, member–non-member, non-
member–member, and non-member–non-member). Table 3.A.2 presents a description of all the 
variables used to measure social distance including their summary statistics. 
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3.4  Empirical approach 
In order to assess the effect of social distance and differences in soil characteristics on 
link formation and subsequent impacts of information exchange link on awareness, knowledge, 
and adoption, a two-step procedure combining difference-in-difference (DID) approach with 
inverse probability weighting (IPW) technique is employed.  
In the first step, the probability for farmer 𝑗 to have formed an information exchange 
link with the DF in his or her sub-village is estimated, using the following model. 
𝑙𝑗
∗ =  𝑧𝑗
′𝛽1 + 𝑥𝑗
′𝛽2 + 𝜀𝑗                             
𝑙𝑗 = {
1, if 𝑙𝑗
∗ > 0
0, otherwise
       
Pr(𝑙𝑗 = 1|𝒛𝒋, 𝒙𝒋) = Φ(𝒛𝒋
′𝜷𝟏 + 𝒙𝒋
′𝜷𝟐)                                                             (3.2) 
where  𝑙𝑗
∗ is a latent unobserved variable whose counterpart, 𝑙𝑗, is observed in dichotomous form 
only; where 𝑙𝑗 = 1 if an information exchange link between farmer 𝑗 and the DF in his or her 
sub-village was formed, as measured during endline survey and 𝑙𝑗 = 0 if otherwise; 𝒛𝒋 is a 
vector of explanatory variables measuring social distance at baseline; and 𝒙𝒋 is a vector of 
additional baseline covariates and sub-county fixed effects).  Φ(∙) is the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function (CDF); 𝜷𝟏 and 𝜷𝟐 are vectors of parameters to be estimated; 
and 𝜀𝑗 is an error term. Estimation of Equation (3.2), by probit, allows us to analyse the 
correlation between social distance and the likelihood of information exchange between DFs 
and their neighbours. Furthermore, it generates propensity scores which are required to match 
treatment and control observations—these matched observations are used to estimate the effect 
of information exchange on awareness, knowledge and adoption of new technologies.  
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Whereas the direct beneficiaries of the training on CSA technologies are the DFs, the 
ultimate impact of interest here comes from the effect of diffusion of DFs’ knowledge on other 
farmers’ knowledge and use of the technologies. In the second step, therefore, DID estimation 
is used to assess the effect of treatment on these outcomes, where treatment of farmer 𝑗 is 
defined as the formation of a knowledge exchange link between farmer j and the DF. 
Within a regression framework, the underlying estimating equation is specified as: 
𝑦𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝐷𝑡 + 𝜃𝑙𝑗𝑘𝑡𝐷𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗𝑡                          (3.3) 
where 𝑦𝑗𝑡 is the outcome variable of interest for farmer j at time t (baseline or endline)—in the 
current case awareness, knowledge, and adoption;  𝑙𝑘𝑗 is the treatment dummy variable (equals 
0 at baseline and for those farmers who did not form a link at endline, and 1 for those farmers 
who formed a link at endline); 𝐷𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one at endline and zero at 
baseline. 
In equation (3.3), the coefficient 𝜃 on the interaction between link formation 𝑙𝑘𝑗 and 
endline dummy 𝐷𝑡 gives the average difference-in-difference (DID) effect of the information 
exchange link. The internal validity of DID estimator depends on the crucial assumption of 
parallel trends. Parallel trends assumes that the average change in the outcome variable for the 
“treated” in the absence of treatment is equal to the observed average change in the outcome 
variable for the “controls”. This assumption implies that differences between the controls and 
the treated if untreated are assumed time-invariant. Therefore, parallel trends assumption is 
consistent with unobservable group-specific time-invariant heterogeneity. Although the 
assumption cannot be tested directly, with several periods of data before the treatment it is 
possible to visually observe trends. A few authors have also tested for parallel trends prior to 
treatment by regressing the difference in the outcome variables between two periods preceding 
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treatment implementation on a binary variable equal to one for treated observations at endline 
(see for example, Mason et al., 2017). 
In the current study, data are only available for two periods: the baseline and endline. 
We are not, therefore, able to test the parallel trend assumption. In order to allow the possibility 
of time-variant selection bias due to initial observables, we therefore use the predicted 
probability of link formation (that is, the propensity score) to match the treatment units with 
observationally similar control units. Clearly, farmers who form a link with the DF in their sub-
village may be systematically different from those who did not: they may, for example, be more 
motivated to learn about new technologies or have better ability to learn and implement new 
technologies. As such, the treatment variable is likely to be endogenous, and we cannot simply 
compare outcomes between treated and untreated neighbours, even after adjusting for 
differences in observed covariates (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
By combining IPW with DID, our empirical estimation allows us to correct for time-
invariant selection bias due to initial observables (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Benin et al., 
2015; Mendola and Simtowe, 2015). Henceforth, we refer to our approach as IPW-DID. In the 
second step, therefore, the estimated propensity scores from equation (3.2) are used as weights 
in the DID equation (3.3). In other words, equation (3.3) is estimated using a DID method based 
on the matched observations and using the estimated propensity scores as weights according to: 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = ∑ 𝜑𝑗(∆𝑦1𝑗 − ∆?̂?0𝑗)𝑗                                (4) 
where ATT represents average treatment effects on the treated, ∆𝑦 = 𝑦𝑡1 − 𝑦𝑡0 and ∆?̂? =
?̂?𝑡1 − ?̂?𝑡0. By extension, 𝑦1𝑗
𝑡1 and  𝑦1𝑗
𝑡0 are the baseline and endline outcomes of a farmer 𝑗 who 
received training from a DF, respectively, and ?̂?1𝑗
𝑡1 and  ?̂?1𝑗
𝑡0 are outcomes of the matched control 
farmer in the latter and initial period, respectively. 𝜑𝑗 are the weights using the propensity 
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scores associated with the treated farmer 𝑗. For farmers in the treatment group, 𝜑 =
1
𝑝
 whereas 
for those in the control group 𝜑 =
1
1−𝑝
 where 𝑝 represents estimated propensity scores. 
Our estimation relies on an important condition known as unconfoundedness. More 
specifically, under this assumption, treatment is independent of outcomes once the vector of 
covariates 𝒙 is controlled for. The conditional independence assumption does not require the 
variables in conditioning vector of covariates 𝒙 to be exogenous for the identification of the 
causal effect of interest (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Diagne and Demont, 2007). The 
restriction imposed, however, is that values of the variables included in 𝒙 should not change for 
any farmer when his or her treatment status changes from not-treated to treated (Diagne and 
Demont, 2007). It is recommended, therefore, that 𝒙 includes pretreatment covariates 
(Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004; Wooldridge, 2005; Diagne and Demomt, 2007). In this 
study, the conditioning set of covariates 𝒙 came from baseline data that were collected before 
DFs received training and that are unlikely to change after “treatment”. 
The procedure of selecting matched control observations for the treatment observations 
using the estimated propensity scores improves overlap in the covariate distributions between 
the treatment and control observations, consistent with the conditional independence 
assumption (Crump et al., 2006). In line with previous studies, common support was imposed 
in order to trim observations with propensity scores close to zero or one. Although dropping 
observations may lead to biased estimates, using the sub-sample can yield higher precision of 
the estimates than for the overall sample, resulting to greater internal validity at the expense of 
some of the external validity (Crump et al., 2006).  
In addition to the IPW-DID approach, an instrumental variable two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regression is estimated in panel data. Whereas IPW builds selection weights using 
observed confounders, with 2SLS the need to identify confounders is circumvented if an 
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appropriate instrumental variable exists. Specifically, IPW uses observed confounders to 
estimate treatment selection probabilities, the inverses of which are used as observation 
weights. In implementing IPW, it is assumed that there are no unobserved confounders, and 
hence the approach cannot be used directly to handle unmeasured confounding (Hogan and 
Lancaster, 2004). Our IPW-DID approach helps to address this problem.  
The method of 2SLS exploits the existence of one or more instruments, variables that 
are associated with receipt of treatment but otherwise not correlated with the potential 
outcomes. 2SLS can be used to adjust for unmeasured confounding, but as with the assumption 
of no unmeasured confounders required for IPW, the validity of an instrumental variable cannot 
be empirically verified and must be defended on subject-matter grounds (Hogan and Lancaster, 
2004). Valid instruments are difficult to find and use of weak instruments makes the estimates 
highly susceptible to biases. In this chapter, three instruments are used, namely difference in 
education when the DF is less educated than the neighbour, difference in agricultural assets 
when both the DF and neighbour are less endowed, and difference in non-agricultural assets 
when both DF and neighbour have a lower endowment. To evaluate the suitability of the 2SLS 
approach, we conduct several tests, results of which are presented at the bottom of Tables 3.2 
and 3.3. Specifically, using the Kleibergen-Paap test for under-identification we reject the null 
hypothesis that our models are under-identified. We further test for weak identification using 
the Cragg-Donald F-statistic. Our values for this statistic exceed the critical 10 percent value 
for weak instruments proposed by Stock and Yogo (2001) that stands at 13.91 for our 
specifications. Furthermore, the Hansen J test cannot reject the hypothesis that our instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term. Overall, these tests confirm the adequacy of our three 
instruments. We, therefore, discuss results of both IPW-DID and 2SLS. 
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3.5   Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics of the sample households at baseline, with and without weighting, 
are presented in Table 3.1. For the pooled sample (column 1), most households are male-headed 
with an average age of 44 years. About 42 percent of the household heads have completed 
primary level of formal education. The dependency ratio is 57 percent; on average, a household 
has two members aged between 16–60 years old. The average index for housing condition—
constructed using principal component analysis19 and based on roofing, floor, and wall 
material; whether or not a household owns a toilet; and main type of cooking fuel – was negative 
and the average herd size is less than one tropical livestock unit, suggesting poor housing 
conditions and very low livestock keeping. Seven out of ten (68%) of the households reported 
to have borrowed and actually received credit.  
About one-third of the sample households had not received weather-related information. 
On average, households are about 42 walking minutes away from the nearest main market and 
about 12 minutes from the nearest main road.  Sample respondents have friendship and kinship 
networks comprising two contacts each, on average. These statistics are close to those reported 
by previous studies conducted in Uganda (see for example, Kassie et al., 2011). Comparing 
these statistics for “treated” respondents versus “control” respondents, before weighting, shows 
that the treatment group has a greater proportion of household heads who completed primary 
education; had more people who received credit and weather-related information; travelled a 
shorter distance to the nearest main road; and had a more extensive friendship network. 
Columns 5–7 in Table 3.1, however, show that weighting observations according to the 
propensity score actually eliminates difference in average group characteristics. 
                                                 
19 Several studies have used a similar approach to construct asset indices (see for example, Booysen et al. (2008); 
and Échevin (2013)). 
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Turning to the outcome variables, descriptive statistics in Table 3.2 show that at baseline 
(2015), very few farmers were aware of the drought-tolerant (DT) Longe 10H maize (5.2%) 
and disease-resistant Serenut 5R/14R groundnut (0.5%) varieties and none had heard about the 
CF basins (Table 3.2, panel A). Awareness, however, increased at endline; 10.6 percent of 
farmers knew about Longe 10H maize, 2.7 percent knew about Serenut 5R/14R groundnut 
varieties, and 13 percent had heard about the CF basins in 2017.  
In both years (2015 and 2017) the proportion of farmers who had heard about the 
technologies was higher when an information exchange link was formed after baseline 
compared to when no link was formed. The baseline differences between treatment and control 
farmers point out the importance of using a DID approach. Adoption rates for the technologies 
were similarly very low at baseline (Table 3.2, panel B). Specifically, 1.3 percent of the 
households grew Longe 10H DT maize variety in 2015. This figure increased to 3.9 percent in 
2017. Similarly, the proportion of those who grew DT maize in general increased from 5.8 
percent in 2015 to 14.3 percent in 2017.  
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Adoption of Serenut 5R/14R groundnut varieties and CF basins remained low both at 
baseline and endline. In both years, farmers who formed an information link with a DF after 
baseline were more likely to know about and grow the DT varieties of maize as well as the 
disease-resistant groundnut varieties than their counterparts who did not form such links. The 
former also had more knowledge about cultivation and benefits of improved varieties of maize 
and groundnuts than the latter. Furthermore, more farmers with information links than those 
without such links knew about and grew improved varieties of maize in general and used CF 
basins. 
 
3.5.2. Determinants of information exchange links 
Table 3.3 presents results of probit regression (equation 3.2) to assess the correlation 
between social distance variables and the likelihood of an information exchange link. Results 
are very similar if we use logit or linear probability model estimation. Average marginal effects 
are reported. The model is estimated with bootstrapped standard errors to account for 
heteroscedasticity. 
Gender composition of the DF-neighbour pair correlates with the likelihood of 
information exchange links. The reference group here is the male DF–male neighbour pair. 
Results indicate that link formation is more likely if the DF is female compared to when the DF 
is male, regardless of the sex of the neighbour. Link formation is 13 percentage points more 
likely when both the DF and the neighbour are female. The corresponding magnitude for the 
female DF–male neighbour pair is 14 percentage points more compared to the male DF–male 
neighbour pair. Although previous studies have shown that male farmers are generally less 
likely than female farmers to seek advice of others (Santos and Barrett, 2010; Ben Yishay et 
al., 2015), our findings suggest greater willingness to learn from female DFs. Because formation 
of links depends not only on the neighbour but also the DF’s effort, our results perhaps suggest 
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that female DFs expended more effort to reach out to their neighbours than their male 
counterparts. When we compare effort level expended by female versus male DFs, our findings 
show that about 12 percent more female DFs than male DFs contacted their neighbours about 
the technologies. Providing direct training to female DFs might enhance trust by other farmers 
in their competence while involvement of the community in the process of selecting DFs might 
increase acceptance of their messages. Ma and Shi (2015) argued that trust in competence plays 
an important role to influence willingness by farmers to learn. Our findings, therefore, suggest 
that including women in otherwise male-dominated extension services may help not only other 
women, but also men to overcome barriers to adoption posed by limited access to extension 
advice. 
The higher likelihood of a link between female DFs and female neighbours compared 
with when the DF is male and neighbour is female is consistent with Kondylis et al. (2016) who 
also argued that including women among selected DFs may remove frictions in the diffusion 
process by empowering female farmers to seek agricultural advice. Furthermore, similarity in 
crop portfolios among women might render the message of the female DF more relevant 
(Quisumbing and Pandolfelli, 2010). The finding that including women among the IPs also 
empowers male farmers to seek agricultural advice is in contrast with Ben Yishay et al. (2015). 
It is possible that male farmers, in our context, did not view female DFs as less able than their 
male counterparts in disseminating agricultural knowledge and therefore consider the messages 
of the former as important.  
Differences between DFs and their neighbours in the amount of land cultivated with 
maize influence information exchange links. Specifically, the probability of link formation 
increased when the difference in farm size under maize between DFs and their neighbours 
exceeded the median distance in the sub-village. More specifically, an increase in distance 
between DFs and their neighbors in farm size under maize by one hectare relative to the median 
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distance for the sub-village correlated with a four percentage points increase in the probability 
for link formation. Santos and Barrett (2010) also found that differences in amount of land 
cultivated influenced information exchange links. Kondylis et al. (2017) indicated that DFs with 
greater endowments of land were more likely to convince other farmers to adopt sustainable 
land management practices. They explained their finding as stemming from credibility in the 
source of information; farmers with larger farms may command more trust and respect within 
the community. In the current case, a larger difference in farm size relative to the sub-village 
median may indicate more experience in the cultivation of maize. 
We further found that distance in ownership of non-agricultural assets determine 
whether or not farmers will establish a link with trained DFs. Results show increased likelihood 
of information exchange both when differences in the non-agricultural assets index between 
DFs and their neighbours is less than the sub-village median and when the differences exceed 
the sub-village median. On the one hand, a one unit decrease in the difference between DFs 
and their neighbours in non-agricultural assets index relative to the sub-village median distance 
correlated with a 9.7 percentage points increase in the likelihood of information exchange. On 
the other hand, a one unit increase in the difference between DFs and their neighbours in non-
agricultural assets index relative to the sub-village median distance correlated with an 8.1 
percentage points increase in the likelihood of information exchange. Whereas similarity in 
wealth status may imply more relevance of the DFs messages to the decision making of their 
neighbours (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 2018), a greater endowment 
with non-agricultural assets may suggest an increased ability to experiment with the 
technologies and to demonstrate their implementation to neighbours. 
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Table 3.3.  Determinants of Link Formation between Disseminating farmers (DFs) and 
Neighbours: Average Marginal Effects from Probit Regression 
Dependent variable = 1 if an information exchange link exists at endline and 0=otherwise 
Variable Marginal effect 
Both DF and neighbour are female 0.127*** (0.037) 
DF is female; neighbour is male 0.138*** (0.040) 
Both DF and neighbour are male 0.034 (0.043) 
Difference in age ≤ sub-village median distance -0.002 (0.003) 
Difference in age > sub-village median distance -0.002 (0.002) 
Difference in education ≤ sub-village median distance 0.001 (0.009) 
Difference in education > sub-village median distance 0.010 (0.008) 
Difference in maize area ≤ sub-village median distance 0.040 (0.045) 
Difference in maize area > sub-village median distance 0.040** (0.016) 
Difference in agricultural assets index ≤ sub-village median distance 0.041 (0.060) 
Difference in agricultural assets index > sub-village distance 0.008 (0.038) 
Difference in non-agricultural assets index ≤ sub-village median 
distance 
0.097** (0.046) 
Difference in non-agricultural assets index > sub-village median 
distance 
0.081* (0.041) 
Both DF and neighbour belong to a farmers’ group   0.025 (0.183) 
Only DF belongs to a farmers’ group 0.044 (0.185) 
Only neighbour belongs to a farmers’ group 0.088 (0.185) 
Difference in soil pH ≤ sub-village median distance 0.166 (0.407) 
Difference in soil pH > sub-village median distance 0.215 (0.266) 
Private reward 0.029 (0.029) 
Social recognition 0.069** (0.033) 
R-squared 0.135 
Observations 855 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors. Additional control variables include sex, age, and 
education of the household head; household members between 16 and 60 years of age; access to credit and weather-
related information; size of friendship and kinship network; distance to nearest main market and road; and sub-
county fixed effects. : ∗∗∗=p < 0.01, ∗∗=p < 0.05, ∗=p < 0.1. 
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Differences in terms of age, education, and agricultural assets index did not significantly 
influence information exchange links. The estimated marginal effects are very small and not 
statistically significant at 10 percent level. Similarly, differences in terms of participation in 
farmers’ organisations did not significantly influence link formation at 10 percent level. 
In summary, our evidence about the effect of social distance on information exchange 
is inconclusive. For some variables such as farm size under maize, distance greater than the 
median for a sub-village correlates with an increased likelihood of information exchange. For 
others such as ownership of non-agricultural assets, the likelihood of information exchange 
increases regardless of whether the distance is greater or less than the sub-village median. Yet 
for others such as sex, the likelihood of information exchange increases as long as the DF is 
female. Although very few studies have explicitly examined the effect of social distance on 
knowledge diffusion, these findings perhaps suggest the need to examine the magnitude of the 
distance (Feder and Savastano, 2006). 
 
3.5.3.  Effect of information exchange links on awareness, knowledge, and adoption 
Before turning to the effects of information exchange links on other outcomes, we 
discuss the quality of the matching process as applied in the first step of our empirical analysis. 
Results of the covariates balancing test for the matched sample are presented in the Appendix 
Table 3.A.3. There are no significant differences in pre-treatment covariates between ‘link’ and 
“no-link” groups after matching. Furthermore, bias was substantially reduced after matching. 
The left panel of Figure 3.B.1 shows the distribution of the estimated propensity scores by link 
status. As expected, there is a larger tail of households in the control (no-link) group whose 
estimated propensity score is close to zero, meaning they are very different (in terms of 
observable characteristics) from households that had a link with trained DFs. As shown in the 
right panel of Figure 3.B.1, the weighting procedure discounted these observations and attached 
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greater importance to observations of both groups that are found in the middle range of the 
distribution. 
After estimating the propensity scores for the “link” and “no-link” households we check 
the common support condition. There is considerable overlap in common support. Among 
households with an information exchange link, the predicted propensity score ranges from 
0.033 to 0.957, with a mean of 0.221, while among those without a link, it ranges from 0.002 
to 0.636, with a mean of 0.121. Thus, the common support assumption is satisfied in the region 
of (0.030, 0.967), with no loss of observations from treatment households. 
The standardised mean difference for overall covariates used in the propensity score 
(14–16% before matching) is reduced to about 2.1–2.5 percent after matching (see Appendix 
Table 3.A.4). This substantially reduces mean bias by 84–85 percent through matching. The p-
values of the likelihood ratio tests indicate that the joint significance of covariates was always 
rejected after matching. The pseudo R-squared also dropped significantly from 11–13 percent 
before matching to 0.5–0.7 percent after matching. Therefore, the low pseudo- R-squared, low 
mean standardized bias, high total bias reduction, and the insignificant p-values of the 
likelihood ratio test after matching suggest that the proposed specification of the propensity 
score was fairly successful in terms of balancing the distribution of covariates between the two 
groups. 
Table 3.4 presents results of IPW-DID and 2SLS estimates of the mean impact of 
information exchange links between DFs and their neighbours on awareness and knowledge 
about DT maize varieties (Longe 10H and Longe 5), improved maize varieties in general, 
disease-resistant groundnut varieties (Serenut 5R and Serenut 14R), and CF basins. IPW-DID 
analysis estimates mean impacts comparing matched treated and matched untreated 
households’ outcomes in the baseline and follow up. Treatment is defined as equal to one if an 
information exchange link exists between sampled respondents in a sub-village and the selected 
 77 
 
DF for that sub-village, and zero if otherwise. Panel A presents results with Radius matching 
whereas panel B presents results with Kernel-based matching. Results of IPW-DID with both 
matching algorithms are very similar indicating robustness to the different matching methods. 
Results of 2SLS are similar to those of IPW-DID in terms of direction of influence, but the 
estimated causal effects are larger in magnitude for most of the outcomes.  
As shown in Table 3.4, information exchange links increased awareness about improved 
varieties of maize and CF basins. According to IPW-DID estimates (Table 3.4, Panels A and 
B), two cropping seasons after baseline, the probability of knowing about Longe 10H DT maize 
significantly increased by about 32 percentage points more (column 1) among farmers having 
information exchange links with a trained DF compared to those in the control group. The 
corresponding increase according to 2SLS estimates was 34 percentage points more (Panel C, 
column 1). The likelihood to have heard about DT maize varieties overall (Longe 10H plus 
Longe 5) rose by 35 percentage points more for households with information exchange links 
compared to those without such links (Panels A and B, column 2); the corresponding increase 
for 2SLS was 54 percentage points (Panel C, column 2). According to IPW-DID estimates, the 
probability of having heard about improved varieties of maize generally increased between 36–
39 percentage points more (Panels A and B, column 3), for farmers who had an information 
exchange link at endline; corresponding to a 42 percentage points increase for 2SLS (Panel C, 
column 3).  
 
 T
a
b
le
 3
.4
. 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 E
x
ch
an
g
e 
L
in
k
s 
o
n
 A
w
ar
en
es
s 
an
d
 K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
ab
o
u
t 
Im
p
ro
v
ed
 V
ar
ie
ti
es
 a
n
d
 C
o
n
se
rv
at
io
n
 F
ar
m
in
g
 
 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
: 
aw
ar
en
es
s 
an
d
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
ab
o
u
t 
ag
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l 
te
ch
n
o
lo
g
ie
s 
 
L
o
n
g
e 
1
0
H
 D
T
 
A
n
y
 D
T
 m
ai
ze
 
Im
p
ro
v
ed
 m
ai
ze
 
S
er
en
u
t 
5
/1
4
 
A
n
y
 S
er
en
u
t 
C
F
 b
as
in
 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
P
a
n
el
 A
: 
IP
W
-D
ID
 w
it
h
 R
ad
iu
s 
m
at
ch
in
g
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
o
st
-p
ro
g
ra
m
 
d
u
m
m
y
*
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 l
in
k
 
0
.3
1
9
*
*
*
  
(0
.1
0
7
) 
0
.3
5
4
*
*
*
  
(0
.1
2
2
) 
0
.3
6
2
*
*
 
 (
0
.1
4
1
) 
0
.0
3
7
  
(0
.0
2
6
) 
0
.0
1
6
 
 (
0
.0
8
5
) 
0
.2
8
2
*
*
 
 (
0
.1
1
3
) 
0
.8
0
8
*
*
*
  
(0
.2
8
2
) 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
1
,3
1
2
 
1
,3
1
6
 
1
,3
1
6
 
1
,3
1
6
 
1
,3
1
6
 
1
,3
1
6
 
1
,3
1
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
a
n
el
 B
: 
IP
W
-D
ID
 w
it
h
 K
er
n
el
-B
as
ed
 m
at
ch
in
g
 
P
o
st
-p
ro
g
ra
m
 
d
u
m
m
y
*
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 l
in
k
 
0
.3
1
2
*
*
*
 
 (
0
.1
0
9
) 
0
.3
5
4
*
*
  
(0
.1
3
9
) 
0
.3
8
8
*
*
  
(0
.1
5
0
) 
0
.0
4
0
 
 (
0
.0
2
5
) 
0
.0
2
5
 
 (
0
.0
8
9
) 
0
.2
9
2
*
*
 
 (
0
.1
2
5
) 
0
.8
4
8
*
*
*
  
(0
.2
8
1
) 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
1
,1
6
6
 
1
,1
6
6
 
1
,1
6
6
 
1
,1
6
6
 
1
,1
6
6
 
1
,1
6
6
 
1
,1
6
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
S
L
S
 e
st
im
at
es
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 e
x
ch
an
g
e 
li
n
k
 
0
.3
4
1
*
*
 
(0
.1
6
7
) 
0
.5
4
4
*
*
 
(0
.2
2
0
) 
0
.4
2
4
*
*
 
(0
.2
1
6
) 
0
.1
9
9
*
 
(0
.1
1
1
) 
0
.2
5
6
 
(0
.2
1
6
) 
0
.4
2
8
*
*
*
 
(0
.1
5
4
) 
1
.6
0
7
*
*
*
 
(0
.5
0
9
) 
K
le
ib
er
g
en
-P
aa
p
 L
M
 
st
at
is
ti
c 
1
5
.9
7
4
*
*
*
 
1
5
.9
7
4
*
*
*
 
1
5
.9
7
4
*
*
*
 
1
5
.9
7
4
*
*
*
 
1
5
.9
7
4
*
*
*
 
1
5
.9
7
4
*
*
*
 
1
5
.9
7
4
*
*
*
 
C
ra
g
g
-D
o
n
al
d
 W
al
d
 F
-
st
at
is
ti
c 
1
8
.8
7
7
 
1
8
.8
7
7
 
1
8
.8
7
7
 
1
8
.8
7
7
 
1
8
.8
7
7
 
1
8
.8
7
7
 
1
8
.8
7
7
 
H
an
se
n
 J
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
 (
p
-v
al
u
e)
 
0
.3
5
4
 
0
.3
5
4
 
0
.3
5
4
 
0
.3
5
4
 
0
.3
5
4
 
0
.3
5
4
 
0
.3
5
4
 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
1
,3
1
8
 
1
.3
1
8
 
1
,3
1
8
 
1
.3
1
8
 
1
,3
1
8
 
1
.3
1
8
 
1
,3
1
8
 
N
o
te
s:
 A
v
er
ag
e 
m
ar
g
in
al
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
re
 r
ep
o
rt
ed
, 
ex
ce
p
t 
fo
r 
co
lu
m
n
 (
3
).
 R
o
b
u
st
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
 c
lu
st
er
ed
 a
t 
su
b
-v
il
la
g
e 
le
v
e
l 
ar
e 
in
 p
ar
en
th
e
se
s.
 A
st
er
is
k
s 
in
d
ic
at
e 
th
e 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
: 
∗∗
∗ =
p
 <
 0
.0
1
, 
∗∗
=
p
 <
 0
.0
5
, 
∗ =
p
 <
 0
.1
. 
IP
W
-D
ID
 m
ea
n
s 
co
m
b
in
ed
 i
n
v
er
se
 p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 w
e
ig
h
ti
n
g
 w
it
h
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
-i
n
-d
if
fe
re
n
ce
; 
2
S
L
S
 m
ea
n
s 
tw
o
-s
ta
g
e 
le
a
st
 s
q
u
ar
e 
re
g
re
ss
io
n
. 
 
78
 79 
 
Whereas the IPW-DID estimates show no significant effect of information exchange links 
on awareness about improved groundnut varieties, 2SLS estimates indicate that awareness about 
Serenut 4R and Serenut 14R disease-resistant groundnut varieties increased by about 20 percentage 
points (Panel C, column 4) more relative to the control group between the baseline and endline. 
Relative to the control group, the likelihood to hear about CF basins rose by 28–29 percentage 
points more with information exchange links, according to IPW-DID estimates (Panels A and B, 
column 6) and about 53 percentage points more according to 2SLS estimates (Panel C, column 6). 
In addition to having heard about a technology, knowledge about how the technology works 
including its benefits is important. Results of IPW-DID show that knowledge increased by 0.81–
0.85 standard deviations above the mean (Panels A and B, column 7) for farmers who had an 
information exchange link with trained DFs relative to the control group between the baseline and 
endline. The corresponding increase according to 2SLS estimates was 1.61 standard deviations 
above the mean (Panel C, column 7). This means that information exchange links with trained DFs 
allowed farmers to learn about the benefits and agronomic practices associated with cultivation of 
improved varieties. 
The findings that information exchange links increased awareness and knowledge are 
consistent with expected short-term effects of providing training to a few individuals in the 
population and leveraging social networks to enhance diffusion of agricultural knowledge. 
Together, these findings support evidence that social learning increases diffusion of agricultural 
knowledge (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010; Kondylis et al., 2016; 2017; Ben 
Yishay and Mobarak, 2018). 
Information exchange links did not only increase awareness and knowledge, but also 
adoption. Table 3.5 presents estimated effects on adoption for both IPW-DID (Panels A and B) and 
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2SLS (Panel C). According to IPW-DID estimates, the probability of growing Longe 10H DT 
maize increased by 11 percentage points more for farmers who had information exchange links 
with trained DFs compared to those in the control group between the baseline and the endline; the 
corresponding increase for DT maize as a whole and improved varieties of maize generally was 25 
percentage points and 26–28 percentage points more, respectively. 
Results of 2SLS show a 12, 53, and 54 percentage points increase in the probability of 
“treatment” households adopting Longe 10H DT maize, DT maize overall, and improved varieties 
of maize as a whole, respectively between the baseline and the endline. These findings perhaps 
suggest that farmers who learnt about improved varieties of maize from trained DFs found the 
information useful and subsequently used it to improve their farming methods. The increase in 
adoption of improved groundnut varieties and CF basins was, however, very low and statistically 
not significant at 10 percent level both for IPW-DID and 2SLS estimates. For these technologies, 
therefore, it seems that the increase in awareness among farmers did not translate into adoption. 
 Construction of conservation basins is labour-intensive. In a context where limited 
availability of labour is a binding constraint to productivity, increased knowledge might not be 
enough to induce adoption of CF basins. The direct training that the DFs received included proper 
usage of herbicides. Yet, this knowledge did not result in increased adoption of CF basins. Usage 
of herbicides in northern Uganda is very low largely explained by lack of effective demand. At the 
same time, Bold et al. (2017) showed that most herbicides in Uganda are of poor quality—this 
might further discourage usage by farmers. Limited usage of herbicides means that the labour 
burdens both in constructing the CF basins and for weeding are very high (see also Andersson and 
Giller, 2012; Andersson and D´Souza, 2014; Giller et al., 2015; Rusinamhodzi, 2015; Brown et al., 
2017a, 2017b). There seems, therefore, to be a trade-off in terms of appropriateness of CF basins 
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as a CSA technology—a perceived CSA technology may not be appropriate in the immediate term 
if it brings with it increased labour burdens and huge upfront investment costs while the benefits 
are only expected later. 
The larger estimates for 2SLS compared with those of IPW-DID suggest that there may be 
a downward bias in the IPW estimates. This means that the unobserved variables that drive link 
formation are negatively related to changes in awareness and adoption. It is possible therefore that 
the IPW-DID approach does not adequately address the endogeneity concerns. 
 
 T
a
b
le
 3
.5
. 
IP
W
-D
ID
 E
st
im
at
es
 o
f 
th
e 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 E
x
ch
an
g
e 
L
in
k
s 
o
n
 A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
Im
p
ro
v
ed
 V
ar
ie
ti
es
 a
n
d
 C
o
n
se
rv
at
io
n
 
F
ar
m
in
g
 
 
A
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 o
u
tc
o
m
e 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s:
 1
=
ad
o
p
te
d
; 
0
=
d
id
 n
o
t 
ad
o
p
t 
 
L
o
n
g
e 
1
0
H
 
A
ll
 D
T
 m
ai
ze
 
A
ll
 i
m
p
ro
v
ed
 m
ai
ze
 
S
er
en
u
t 
5
/1
4
 
A
n
y
 S
er
en
u
t 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
P
a
n
el
 A
: 
IP
W
-D
ID
 w
it
h
 R
ad
iu
s 
m
at
ch
in
g
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
o
st
-p
ro
g
ra
m
 d
u
m
m
y
*
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
li
n
k
 
0
.1
1
5
  
(0
.0
7
2
) 
0
.2
4
5
*
  
(0
.0
7
5
) 
0
.2
5
5
*
 
(0
.1
3
1
) 
0
.0
0
7
 
 (
0
.0
1
0
) 
0
.0
0
5
 
(0
.0
1
3
) 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
1
,3
1
2
 
1
,3
1
2
 
1
,3
1
2
 
1
,3
1
2
 
1
,3
1
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
a
n
el
 B
: 
IP
W
-D
ID
 w
it
h
 K
er
n
el
-B
as
ed
 m
at
ch
in
g
 
P
o
st
-p
ro
g
ra
m
 d
u
m
m
y
*
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
li
n
k
 
0
.1
1
1
  
(0
.0
7
4
) 
0
.2
4
8
*
  
(0
.1
4
3
) 
0
.2
7
6
*
 
(0
.1
4
5
) 
0
.0
0
9
  
(0
.0
1
1
) 
0
.0
1
6
  
(0
.0
3
2
) 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
1
,1
6
6
 
1
,1
6
6
 
1
,1
6
6
 
1
,1
6
6
 
1
,1
6
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
a
n
el
 C
: 
2
S
L
S
 e
st
im
at
es
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 e
x
ch
an
g
e 
li
n
k
 
0
.1
2
4
 
(0
.1
0
2
) 
0
.5
2
8
*
*
*
 
(0
.1
9
7
) 
0
.5
3
7
*
*
 
(0
.2
2
3
) 
0
.0
1
5
 
(0
.0
1
9
) 
0
.0
0
6
 
(0
.0
2
5
) 
K
le
ib
er
g
en
-P
aa
p
 L
M
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
 
1
5
.9
7
4
*
*
*
 
1
5
.9
7
4
*
*
*
 
1
5
.9
7
4
*
*
*
 
1
5
.9
7
4
*
*
*
 
1
5
.9
7
4
*
*
*
 
C
ra
g
g
-D
o
n
al
d
 W
al
d
 F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
 
1
8
.8
7
7
 
1
8
.8
7
7
 
1
8
.8
7
7
 
1
8
.8
7
7
 
1
8
.8
7
7
 
H
an
se
n
 J
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
 (
p
-v
al
u
e)
 
0
.3
1
8
 
0
.2
1
7
 
0
.4
3
2
 
0
.2
2
2
 
0
.5
3
5
 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
1
,3
1
8
 
1
.3
1
8
 
1
,3
1
8
 
1
.3
1
8
 
1
,3
1
8
 
N
o
te
s:
 A
v
er
ag
e 
m
ar
g
in
al
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
re
 r
ep
o
rt
ed
, 
ex
ce
p
t 
fo
r 
co
lu
m
n
 (
3
).
 R
o
b
u
st
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
 c
lu
st
er
ed
 a
t 
su
b
-v
il
la
g
e 
le
v
el
 a
re
 i
n
 p
ar
en
th
es
e
s.
 A
st
er
is
k
s 
in
d
ic
at
e 
th
e 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
: 
∗∗
∗ =
p
 <
 0
.0
1
, 
∗∗
=
p
 <
 0
.0
5
, 
∗ =
p
 <
 0
.1
. 
IP
W
-D
ID
 m
e
an
s 
co
m
b
in
ed
 i
n
v
er
se
 p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 w
e
ig
h
ti
n
g
 w
it
h
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
-i
n
-d
if
fe
re
n
ce
; 
2
S
L
S
 m
ea
n
s 
tw
o
-s
ta
g
e 
le
a
st
 
sq
u
ar
e 
re
g
re
ss
io
n
. 
 
82
 83 
 
3.6   Conclusion 
Informational constraints contribute to the adoption puzzle in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
where implementation of yield-enhancing technologies that have been shown to play an important 
role in improving people’s welfare remains very low. Within an extension system framework, one 
approach to address this problem is direct provision of training to a few carefully selected 
individuals – commonly referred to as disseminating farmers (DFs) – in the target population and 
leveraging social networks for technology diffusion. Central to the success of this approach, 
however, is understanding how information exchange links form between trained DFs and their 
neighbours. Using a panel dataset collected in northern Uganda during 2015–2017, the objectives 
of this chapter were twofold. First, we assessed determinants of information exchange links 
between DFs selected to be representative of the target population and their neighbours, focusing 
on the role of differences in socioeconomic and soil characteristics. Second, we assessed the effect 
of such information exchange links on awareness, knowledge, and adoption of drought-tolerant 
(DT) varieties of maize, disease-resistant varieties of groundnuts, and conservation farming (CF) 
basins. 
The first part of our analysis estimates a probit regression model to assess the determinants 
of information exchange links. For most of the variables considered in the study, we find 
inconclusive evidence about the effect of social distance on information exchange. The likelihood 
of information exchange increased when the DF was female regardless of the sex of the neighbour. 
Information exchange further increased when the difference between the DFs and their neighbours 
in farm size cultivated with maize exceeded the sub-village median distance. In terms of wealth, 
we find a positive correlation between non-agricultural assets index and the likelihood of 
information exchange both when the sub-village median distance exceeds or is below the difference 
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between the DFs and their neighbours.  There is, however, need for future research to study the 
extent to which social distance influences diffusion of agricultural knowledge. It is possible that 
effectiveness of DFs to disseminate agricultural knowledge might diminish when social distance is 
excessive (Feder and Savastano, 2006).  
The second part of our analysis estimated the effect of information exchange links on 
awareness, knowledge, and adoption. Results showed that information exchange links increased 
awareness and knowledge of neighbours about the DT and improved varieties of maize as a whole, 
disease-resistant groundnut varieties, and CF basins. Information exchange links also influenced 
adoption of the maize varieties, but neither groundnut varieties nor CF basins. 
We acknowledge, however, that our results cannot be generalised at the national level since 
the sample was not representative of the entire country. Our estimates of the causal impact of 
information exchange links are, nevertheless, close to those of the few previous studies that assess 
effect of farmer-to-farmer extension on knowledge diffusion and technology adoption (see for 
example, Kondylis et al., 2017). The findings of this chapter thus contribute to the limited body of 
knowledge on identification of DFs, factors that influence information exchange links, and impacts 
on adoption of agricultural innovations. Together the findings of this chapter suggest that even with 
careful selection of “representative” DFs, social distance influences information exchange. 
Furthermore, providing direct training to DFs can help to diffuse agricultural knowledge and 
technologies. There is, however, need to understand the contexts in which farmers operate 
(Andersson and D´souza, 2014)—increased labour burdens associated with CF basins, especially 
when use of herbicides is very low suggests that although the technology is perceived to be climate-
smart, acceptance among farmers will be low. Efforts to promote CF basins may be successful if 
accompanied with strategies to promote usage of herbicides for weeds control and if complemented 
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with increased access to rippers. The latter will also depend on whether herd sizes of oxen, currently 
very low, will increase. 
 
Appendix 3.A: Tables 
Table 3.A.1. Baseline summary statistics without attrition 
Variables 
Whole sample Link No-link Diff 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Household head is male 0.818 0.879 0.808 0.071 
Respondent is male 0.430 0.470 0.424 0.045 
Household head completed primary 
education 
0.420 0.543 0.401 0.142*** 
Age of the household head (years) 43.691 41.664 44.007 2.343 
Dependency ratio 0.567 0.568 0.567 0.001 
Housing condition (index) -0.866 -0.860 -0.867 0.007 
Livestock asset (TLU)  0.698 0.845 0.676 0.169 
Household received credit 0.682 0.810 0.662 0.148*** 
Received climate-related information 0.737 0.802 0.727 0.075* 
Distance to main market (walking 
minutes) 
41.592 43.767 41.253 2.514 
Distance to main road (walking minutes) 12.350 9.000 13.000 4.000*** 
Friendship network (number of friends) 2.023 2.172 2.000 0.172* 
Kinship network (number of relatives) 1.730 1.879 1.706 0.173 
Soil pH 5.834 5.846 5.832 0.014 
Number of observations 862 746 116  
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistically significant difference at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
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Table 3.A.2. Description and summary statistics for social distance variables at baseline 
Variables Description 
Mean 
(SD) 
Female, Female 1= both respondent and DF are female; 0=otherwise 0.294 
(0.456) 
Female, Male 1= DF is female and respondent is male; 0=otherwise 0.225 
(0.418) 
Male, Female 1= DF is male and respondent is female; 0=otherwise 0.276 
(0.447) 
Male, Male 1= both respondent and DF are male; 0=otherwise 0.206 
(0.405) 
Social distance in age Median village distance in age minus the absolute age 
difference (years) between DF and respondent 
8.543 
(6.874) 
Social distance in 
education 
Median village distance in education minus the absolute 
education difference (years) between DF and 
respondent 
2.175 
(1.816) 
Social distance in area 
under maize 
Median village distance in farm size under maize minus 
the absolute farm size difference (ha) between DF and 
respondent 
0.386 
(0.725) 
Social distance in 
agricultural assets 
index 
Median village distance in agricultural assets index 
minus the absolute difference in agricultural assets 
index between DF and respondent 
0.332 
(0.313) 
Social distance in 
non-agricultural 
assets index 
Median village distance in non-agricultural assets index 
minus the absolute difference in non-agricultural assets 
index between DF and respondent 
0.437 
(0.335) 
Both are group 
members 
1= both respondent and DF are group members; 
0=otherwise 
0.593 
(0.492) 
Both are not group 
members 
1= both respondent and DF are not group members; 
0=otherwise 
0.069 
(0.254) 
Only DF is a group 
member 
1= DF is a group member whereas the respondent is not; 
0=otherwise 
0.205 
(0.404) 
Only neighbour is a 
group member 
1= respondent is a group member whereas the DF is not; 
0=otherwise 
0.133 
(0.340) 
Distance in soil pH Median village distance in soil pH minus the absolute 
difference in soil pH between DF and respondent 
0.044 
(0.043) 
Observations  855 
Notes: DF means disseminating farmer.   
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Chapter 4 
Information Networks, Incentives and Technology Adoption 
Experimental Evidence from Uganda 
 
Abstract 
The role of social networks in agricultural technology diffusion has increasingly been studied. 
However, policy implications of previous findings have been limited, as less attention has been 
paid to understanding drivers of network changes. We use data from a randomised experiment in 
northern Uganda to examine effects of information networks on the decision to adopt drought-
tolerant maize varieties (DTMVs) and the mechanisms through which the effects occur. The 
experiment provides training to a random subset of farmers—disseminating farmers (DFs). A 
random sub-sample of the trained DFs receive either a private material reward or social recognition 
for their efforts to share knowledge with neighbours. We find that incentives change both DFs’ and 
neighbours’ networks, and increase the likelihood of the former to adopt DTMVs. Information 
networks substantially increase knowledge and the likelihood of growing DTMVs among 
neighbours who mentioned trained and adopter DFs as contacts for crop production advice.  
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Shikuku, K.M. and Mequanint, M.B. (2018). Information Networks, Incentives and Technology 
Adoption: Experimental Evidence from Uganda. Under review in the Journal of Development 
Economics. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In developing countries, contact farmers are often used as messengers of agricultural 
information. Trainings and demonstrations about new agricultural technologies target these contact 
farmers with the expectation that they will disseminate new information to neighbours in their 
villages (Kondylis et al., 2017). However, our understanding of how this actually happens is 
limited. A body of literature exists on the process of social network formation and underlying 
incentives (Bala and Goyal, 2000; Goyal et al., 2006; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Santos and 
Barrett, 2010). Equally, the role of social networks in technology diffusion has been extensively 
documented in empirical studies20. But these studies have largely taken networks as exogenous, 
and do not address how existing networks change in response to interventions, like training of a 
random node in the network (Breza, 2015). Most studies do not indicate the underlying mechanisms 
through which information dissemination takes place. Neither do they address how incentives 
could affect social networks and information dissemination within such networks. This chapter 
aims to contribute to the literature by endogenising networks, and looking into how training and 
incentives affect information networks as important conduits to influence knowledge about and 
adoption of new technologies. 
Understanding how social networks could be changed can facilitate identifying the 
mechanisms through which information networks affect technology adoption. Such knowledge has 
direct implications for the design of agricultural extension and training programs in developing 
countries. Such understanding is also important to identify strategies for nudging adoption of 
optimal behaviour and designing incentives for better communication within networks. Recent 
                                                 
20 Early contributions to the literature on social learning and technology adoption include Bikhchandani et al. (1992); 
Bikhchandani et al. (1998); Banerjee (1992); Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993; Besley and Case (1994); Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1995); Bala and Goyal (1998); Udry and Conley (2001); Munshi (2004); Acemoglu et al. (2011). 
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efforts studying network effects on adoption examine diffusion from a few starting points  (seed 
nodes) to the larger target population. The focus is often on settings in which seed nodes’ effort to 
communicate to their neighbours about a new technology is voluntary21. Networks may, however, 
interact with incentives subsequently influencing effort to communicate with peers about a new 
technology (Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 2018) and worker performance (Bandiera et al., 2005).  
Theoretically, several reasons can motivate why the effect of social networks on adoption 
of a new technology may be mediated by incentives. When a task is prosocial, meaning that its 
benefits are enjoyed by those other than the seed nodes themselves, incentives may encourage 
efforts to reach out to more neighbours with information about a technology (Ashraf et al., 2014a). 
Incentives may, therefore, increase the seed node’s degree—the number of people with whom 
information about a technology is discussed. Furthermore, incentives may induce seed nodes to 
experiment with a new technology (Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 2018). Several studies have shown 
increased propensity of a neighbour to adopt a technology when his or her network comprises 
adopters (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010; Matuschke and Qaim, 2009; Krishnan 
and Patnam, 2013). In the presence of an adopter seed node, social networks can influence adoption 
decision of neighbours by sending information about the adoption decision of the seed node or 
through diffusion of knowledge (Cai et al., 2015). 
Informed by these insights, we conduct an experiment in northern Uganda in which a 
random sample of households—disseminating farmers (DFs)—are invited to receive training on 
growing of new drought-tolerant maize varieties (DTMVs). Drought-tolerant varieties are 
increasingly seen as interventions that can help to boost yields, while reducing downside risk 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Kim et al. (2015) and Chami et al. (2018) for health-improving technologies; Cai et al. (2015) 
for insurance products; and Kondylis et al. (2017) and Vasilaky and Leonard (2018) for agricultural technologies. 
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associated with droughts (Wossen et al., 2017). A random sub-sample of the DFs then receive 
incentives to encourage them to expend effort to share information with their neighbours. The 
experiment varies whether subjects receive a private material reward or social recognition for their 
effort to share the knowledge learnt. 
The overarching objective of this chapter is to assess social network effects on adoption of 
DTMVs and the main channels through which such effects occur. We observe whether a trained 
DF 𝑖 is mentioned among neighbour 𝑗′s contacts for crop production advice as well as the frequency 
of interaction via the information exchange link. The former allows us to measure network effects 
at the extensive margin, whereas the latter captures the intensive margin. We then test whether 
social networks diffuse knowledge about DTMVs or transfer adoption decisions of DFs to 
neighbours. Further, we answer four questions: (1) do information networks in rural Uganda 
contribute to technology adoption? (2) does providing an incentive to DFs affect their information 
networks and adoption behaviour? (3) does incentivised training of DFs affect neighbours’ 
information networks? and (4) does incentivised training of DFs affect neighbours’ knowledge 
about DTMVs? 
Our design has different distinctive aspects that sharpen the analysis of the paper. The 
technology (i.e., DTMV) that we use in our experiment is a recently introduced one, and people in 
the study communities have not formed their own experiences, subjective opinions and beliefs 
about the technology that might play a confounding role. This is corroborated by quite low adoption 
and knowledge of farmers at the baseline. Our social network is uniquely defined. We define the 
relevant social network as the farmers from whom the respondent seeks advice on crop production. 
These informational networks are further defined based on unidirectional links from DFs to the 
neighbours, because information is more likely to flow from the DFs rather than in the opposite 
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direction, especially since the technology is a new one and directly “injected” into the DFs but not 
the neighbours (Cai et al., 2015). 
The main results of the chapter are as follows. Compared to conventional training, 
incentivised training increases the likelihood of a DF being mentioned as a contact and the 
frequency of interaction for agricultural advice. Particularly, we find that both private material 
rewards and social recognition are equally effective in influencing neighbours’ information 
networks. Altruism of DFs does not, however, significantly influence information networks. 
Having a trained and adopter DF in a neighbour’s information network for crop production advice 
increases adoption of DTMVs by 28 percentage points and knowledge by 1.9 points more than 
when such networks are absent. Information networks, therefore, not only transfer information 
about the functions and benefits of DTMVs but also convey DFs’ adoption decisions, in our 
context—suggesting that the main mechanisms through which social networks affect decision 
making are social learning about benefits of DTMVs and the influence of peers’ adoption decisions. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature on social networks in several important 
ways. First, the chapter contributes to the literature studying the effects of social networks on 
adoption of agricultural technologies. While several studies have shown that a critical mass of 
adopters in a neighbour’s existing network—suggesting passive learning—influences technology 
diffusion (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Matuschke and Qaim, 2009; Conley and Udry, 2010; 
Krishnan and Patnam, 2013), we show that having a directly trained and adopter disseminating 
farmer in a neighbour’s network for crop production advice increases his or her likelihood of 
adopting a technology. Second, the chapter contributes to the small but growing literature 
examining changes in social networks in response to exposure to an external stimulus. Feigenberg 
et al. (2013) randomised microfinance borrowers into either weekly or monthly group meetings, 
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and showed that borrowers randomised into the weekly group meetings continued interacting more 
even outside of group meetings, suggesting a change in the strength of ties through microfinance. 
Vasilaky and Leonard (2018) matched female farmers in Uganda and encouraged them to exchange 
agricultural information. They observed continued interaction between the matched pairs which 
resulted in greater increases in crop yields compared to conventional government extension. 
Banerjee et al. (2018) also analysed persistent changes in the number of links when a random subset 
of the population was exposed to microfinance. In a study that assessed how transfers between 
households changed in response to a randomised savings intervention, Comola and Prina (2014) 
found that treatment households increased the number of recipients relative to the control. While 
these studies generally suggest that networks respond to external stimulus, they provide evidence 
in very specific contexts, where prosocial behaviour is limited. We provide evidence about how 
information networks change in response to an agricultural extension intervention that provided 
direct training to a random subset of seed nodes, and in a setting where individuals are expected to 
engage in a prosocial task to disseminate agricultural information to their neighbours.  
Third, the chapter explicitly shows how three different types of motivations, namely private 
material rewards, social recognition, and altruism influence information networks at the extensive 
and intensive margins. Prosocial preferences of disseminating farmers are measured with an 
auxiliary lab-in-the-field game––an augmented dictator game with a local rural development 
charity as the receiver. Lack of incentives may explain why direct training of contact farmers might 
not improve knowledge and adoption behaviour of neighbours (Kondylis et al., 2017). For 
example, Ben Yishay and Mobarak (2018) showed that private material rewards influenced 
communication within social networks. Additionally, the previous literature does not make a clear 
distinction between the roles of the extensive and intensive margins in social networks.  
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The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the experimental design. Section 
4.3 formalises our empirical estimation approach. Section 4.4 presents and discusses results of the 
empirical analysis, while Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 Experimental Design and Data 
4.2.1 Experimental design 
The experimental design is described in greater detail in Chapter 2. In this section a few 
elements of the experiment are repeated to maintain focus. A total of 132 sub-villages—a sub-
village is equivalent to a hamlet—were randomly assigned to one of three experimental arms of 44 
sub-villages each: (1) training only (“conventional” control), (2) training plus a private material 
reward (PR), and (3) training plus social recognition (SR). Target farmers in the first treatment arm 
received training about DTMVs and were subsequently asked to share the information with their 
co-villagers. Target farmers in the second treatment arm received the same training, but after the 
training were informed they could earn a private reward. They were promised a weighing scale if 
they managed to share sufficient knowledge with their peers—to be established during a surprise 
visit at some unknown date in the future. They would earn the weighing scale in case the knowledge 
score of nine randomly sampled co-villager exceeded a threshold. They were told the reward was 
private, that the weighing scale was theirs to keep, and that they were free to decide how to use it. 
Disseminating farmers in the third treatment arm also received the training, and were informed 
their community would receive a weighing scale if they managed to share sufficient knowledge 
with their peers—to be evaluated the same way as in the previous treatment arm. We announced 
that, in case of sufficient knowledge diffusion, there would be a public celebration during which 
the “good performance” of the DF was publicly announced, and the weighing scale would be 
handed over to the village chief in the presence of other villagers.  
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The trainings were organised in central locations, and DFs were invited to travel to these 
sites. Training sessions were organised per sub-county22, with 11 farmers per session. In each sub-
county, DFs from different treatment arms were trained in separate venues to minimize 
contamination. The cost of transport to the training venue and back was refunded (USD 4, on 
average) and tea and lunch were provided during the training. Of the 132 DFs who we invited, 126 
attended the full training. 
 
4.2.2 Data and summary statistics 
Data were collected during two household survey waves. A detailed baseline survey was 
conducted between September and December 2015 covering 132 sub-villages. In every sub-village 
the DF as well as nine randomly selected co-villagers were interviewed. In total we visited 1,320 
households, and collected information on household demographics, crop and livestock production, 
off-farm income, assets ownership, exposure to weather shocks, sources of agricultural 
information, knowledge about farming practices, and food security. The second survey wave was 
conducted in February–May 2017. During the follow up survey, 126 sub-villages whose selected 
DFs had actually attended the training were revisited. Effort was made to interview the same 
respondents that had been interviewed at the baseline. In total, 1,036 respondents (122 DFs and 
914 other farmers) were interviewed in the follow-up survey. We administered a similar 
questionnaire to that used at baseline. This shows that attrition is non-negligible, and we turn to 
addressing it below. 
                                                 
22 A sub-county is the second administrative unit in Uganda, after the district. At the time of the study, Nwoya district 
had four sub-counties including Anaka, Alero, Purongo, and Koch goma. Below the sub-county there are parishes, 
villages, sub-villages, and households. 
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Panel A in Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of selected household characteristics at 
baseline (2015) and endline (2017). Household heads were predominantly male. On average a 
household head was 45 years old and had completed six years of formal education. The average 
household size was six. The main source of livelihood for most households was farming. 
Households cultivated on average one-half of a hectare under maize. Less than three percent of the 
sample households, both at baseline and endline, had access to formal government extension. 
In both survey waves, a specific module collected data on social networks. Previous studies 
have defined social networks in different ways. For example, some earlier studies defined social 
networks as comprising the entire village (e.g. Besley and Case, 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig, 
1995; Munshi, 2004). The advantage of using the village as the relevant social network is that many 
of a farmer’s contacts would be captured. The limitation, however, is that many who are not in the 
farmer’s contacts are also included (Maertens and Barrett, 2012). Therefore, other studies have 
recently elicited farmer network links directly (Maertens and Barrett, 2012; Krishnan and Patnam, 
2013; Magnan et al., 2015; Cai et al., 2015). Respondents are asked about the people with whom 
they interact for a specific purpose, such as information exchange, risk-sharing, and friendship. 
Once each individual’s connections are determined, links can be classified as unidirectional (𝑖 is in 
𝑗’s network if 𝑗 claims 𝑖), bidirectional (𝑖 is in 𝑗’s network if 𝑗 claims 𝑖 or 𝑖 claims 𝑗), or reciprocal 
(𝑖 is in 𝑗’s network if 𝑗 claims 𝑖 and 𝑖 claims 𝑗). 
We elicit network links directly along several dimensions: names of individuals from whom 
the respondent gets advice about crop production, those to whom the respondent gives advice about 
crop production, those from whom the respondent gets advice about livestock production, those to 
whom the respondent gives advice about livestock production, those from whom the respondent 
would borrow money, those to whom the respondent would lend money, those from whom the 
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respondent would borrow material goods (for example, kerosene and salt), those to whom the 
respondent would lend material goods, those who visit the respondent’s home regularly, those 
whose homes the respondent visits regularly, relatives in the village, nonrelatives with whom the 
respondent socialises, those from whom the respondent receives medical advice, those to whom 
the respondent would go if hit with a disaster, those considered as neighbours, and those with whom 
they belong to the same farmers’ group.  
We required the respondent to mention a fixed number of names (i.e., five names) in a 
specific network type. The advantage of this approach is that it helps respondents to understand 
what is required of them and to consider only very relevant nodes of their specific network 
(Newman, 2010). The drawback is that imposing a threshold limits the out-degree—the number of 
people nominated by the respondent (Cai et al., 2015). Our pilot study before the survey, however, 
showed that none of the respondents named more than five people for all networks when the 
number was not limited. Similar results were also observed at the baseline, with the average 
household effectively consulting only another partner (Table 4.1).  
We use six types of household-level social network measures for our main analysis. The 
first measure is a dummy variable equal to one if the household mentions a trained DF among its 
network of crop production advice, and zero if otherwise. The second social network variable is 
based on the intensity of the link between households (Granovetter 1973) and measures the 
frequency of interaction of a household with the trained DFs through a bilateral link. This measure 
ranges from zero (no interaction at all between the neighbour and a DF) and three (daily interaction 
with the DF). We use unidirectional links because information is more likely to flow from the DF 
to the farmer claiming him or her (Magnan et al., 2015). The third measure captures weak ties and 
is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if a household is connected to the DF for agricultural 
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advice through second-order links and zero if otherwise. A second-order linked household is one 
that is named as a contact by a given household’s neighbours if that neighbour is linked to the DF 
(Cai et al., 2015). The fourth measure is the neighbour’s out degree—a structural characteristic of 
the social network defined as the number of listed agricultural advice contacts for a household. The 
fifth social networks variable is based on membership to financial or risk-sharing neighbourhood. 
Two farmers—the DF and the neighbour—belong to the same financial or risk-sharing 
neighbourhood if they lend to, borrow from, or exchange material goods in common with each 
other at any point during the two-year survey period. The sixth variable captures non-crop 
production advice networks, and is based on co-membership of a DF and a neighbour to networks 
for medical or livestock advice. Baseline household social network variables are reported in panel 
B of Table 4.1. 
Panel C of Table 4.1 gives our main outcome variables. Knowledge is measured as a sum 
of correct responses on a ten-question knowledge exam. The details of the questions are presented 
in the appendix. The questions included general awareness of improved varieties, names of 
improved varieties of maize, and the benefits of growing improved varieties of maize. Adoption is 
a dummy variable equal to one if a household grew a DTMV on any of its farming plots between 
the baseline and the endline. 
Finally, we organised an artefactual field experiment to measure altruism. Following Ashraf 
et al.  (2014a), we implemented a dictator game to elicit an incentive-compatible measure of 
prosocial motives (see Chapter 2 for details about the dictator game). Using the amount donated 
in the dictator game, we generate a dummy altruism variable equal to one if a DF donated above 
the median amount of money and zero if otherwise. About one-quarter of the DFs donated above 
the median amount of money. 
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Table 4.1. Summary Statistics 
 2015 (baseline) 2017 (endline) 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Panel A: Household Characteristics     
Sex of the household head (1=male, 0=female) 0.815 0.388 0.806 0.396 
Age of the household head (years) 44.610 15.189 44.510 14.883 
Household size (number of resident members) 5.789 2.374 6.346 2.623 
Main activity of household head is farming (1=yes, 0=no) 0.913 0.282 0.954 0.210 
Education of household head (years) 5.621 3.360 5.593 3.390 
Area of maize production (Hectares) 0.451 0.883 0.477 0.757 
Received credit (1=yes, 0=no) 0.683 0.466 0.526 0.500 
Own a radio (1=yes, 0=no) 0.505 0.500 0.525 0.500 
Own a phone (1=yes, 0=no) 0.535 0.499 0.566 0.496 
Received advice from government extension (1=yes, 
0=no) 
0.025 0.157 0.010 0.099 
Altruism (1=DF donated above median amount)   0.236 0.425 
     
Panel B: Social networks     
Mentioned a DF as contact (1=yes, 0=no) 0.014 0.119 0.159 0.366 
Mentioned DF is an adopter (1=yes, 0=no) 0.000 0.000 0.075 0.264 
Frequency of interaction with DF (0=no interaction, 
1=rarely, 2=at least monthly, 3=daily) 
0.023 0.216 0.352 0.889 
Neighbour’s out-degree (size of information network)  0.767 1.169 2.014 1.109 
Risk sharing network (1=DF is a member) 0.073 0.260 0.098 0.298 
Weak ties (1=household has a second-order link) 0.004 0.066 0.050 0.217 
Other information network (1=DF is a member) 0.020 0.140 0.024 0.154 
Panel C: Knowledge and adoption     
Knowledge about DTMVs (score) 3.340 1.831 2.485 2.783 
Adopt DTMV—Longe maize (1=yes, 0=no) 0.122 0.327 0.165 0.371 
Observations 905 905 
Notes: DF=Disseminating farmer; DTMV=drought-tolerant maize variety. 
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Only 1.4 percent of the households mentioned a DF among its contacts for agricultural 
advice at baseline compared to 15.9 percent at endline. The average out-degree for neighbours was 
0.77 at baseline and 2.01 at endline. Whereas there was no adopter DF at baseline, 7.5 percent of 
the sample households reported having an adopter DF in their contacts at endline. The frequency 
of interaction between a mentioned DF and the neighbour was 0.33 points higher at endline 
compared to the baseline (0.02). Only seven and 10 percent of the sample households mentioned a 
DF as a contact for risk sharing at baseline and endline, respectively. The proportion of farmers 
connected via second-order links to the DFs was only 0.4 percent at baseline. This increased to five 
percent at endline. The proportion of farmers who are linked to the DFs for information other than 
crop production advice was two percent at baseline; this number did not change much at endline.  
Unfortunately, attrition in our sample is considerable as outlined above. Six out of the 
selected 132 DFs did not attend the training. This means that six sub-villages representing 60 
households or 4.5 percent of the original total sample dropped from the study. Attrition as a 
consequence of DFs not attending training was not concentrated in a particular treatment arm. 
Because DFs were only informed about the incentives (for those in the material reward and social 
recognition groups) at the end of the training, attrition ought not to be related to treatment 
assignment. Four more DFs (0.3% of the total sample) were not available for interviews during the 
endline survey: two had separated with their husbands and we could not track them; one had 
migrated to the neighbouring Gulu town; and another one had been hospitalised. These four DFs 
were not concentrated in one experimental arm once again.  
Finally, we were unable to administer the endline survey to some households (220 
households, or about 17% of the original sample), as these farmers were absent even after three 
callback visits. We have no particular reason to believe that potential causes of attrition are 
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systematically linked to specific treatments (something that is confirmed by the data). Attrition 
rates are rather equal across the three experimental arms. High attrition is potentially problematic, 
as it could introduce selection bias in our randomised experiment. 
We examine the implication of this attrition for our results in several ways. First, we test 
whether our remaining sample is (still) balanced along key observable dimensions—18 variables 
in total. Using the “orth_out” command in STATA, pre-treatment covariates are regressed on 
treatment dummies: an F-test that all treatment arm coefficients equal zero failed to reject existence 
of balance. In addition, we perform randomisation checks comparing each treatment arm to the 
other. As presented in Table 4.2 (for a selection of the variables), there was pre-treatment balance 
across the randomly assigned groups for all but three variables, namely age and education of the 
household head and household income. But, even for the three variables, differences are small: 
education of the household head is 6.32 in the conventional control group and 5.80 in the private 
material reward group; age of the household is 44.79 in the private material reward group and 42.30 
in the social recognition group. 
The second approach is to explain attrition with observable household characteristics. 
Appendix Table 4.A.1 presents the results of a probit regression where we regress attrition status 
on the treatment dummies and household characteristics. As shown, treatment assignment is not 
correlated with attrition. An F-test (p-value=0.632) rejected the null hypothesis that the treatment 
dummies jointly influenced attrition. None of the other variables is correlated with our attrition-
dummy, except for the sex and education of the household head, and experience with floods. Again, 
except for education, these two variables were not significantly different across our three groups 
(Table 4.2). Nevertheless, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that external validity of the 
impact analysis might be compromised by non-random attrition. For example, when attrition is 
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based on unobservables like ability, we could perhaps systematically over- or underestimate the 
effect of incentives on networks. 
As a third approach, therefore, we attempt to control for potential selection concerns by a 
weighting procedure as a robustness analysis (Gerber and Green, 2012; Bulte et al., 2014). 
Specifically, we follow a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, a probit regression is used to 
estimate the predicted probability of having non-missing measures for our outcomes given 
treatment assignment and a vector of observable covariates (see Table 2). In the second stage, we 
weight each observation using the inverse of the thus estimated probability of having a non-missing 
measure of our outcomes. Our main results remain robust to all these robustness tests (see Section 
4.5.2). 
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4.3 Empirical strategy 
Adoption of DTMVs is low among farmers in our study communities. Perhaps, this 
could be due to limited information about its benefits. In our context, the effect of networks on 
adoption of DTMVs by neighbours may depend on whether incentivised training changed the 
DFs’ own networks and adoption decisions relative to conventional training. We thus begin our 
empirical analysis by examining the effect of incentives on adoption decision of DFs and their 
in-degree—the number of neighbors with who the DF shared agricultural advice. Formally, we 
estimate: 
𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑐 =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑐 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑐 + 𝛾𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑣𝑐  +  𝐶𝑐  +  𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑐            (4.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑐 is the outcome of interest: for adoption, 𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑐 indicates whether a DF 𝑖 in sub-village 
𝑣 and sub-county 𝑐 grew a DTMV or not whereas for DF’s in-degree, 𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑐 measures the number 
of people with whom the DF shared agricultural advice. 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑐 and 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑐 are dummy treatment 
variables: 𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑐 is equal to one if the DF was randomly assigned to receive a private material 
reward and zero if otherwise whereas 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑐 is equal to one if the DF was randomly assigned to 
receive social recognition and zero if otherwise. 𝑋𝑖𝑣𝑐 includes household characteristics, and 𝐶𝑐 
captures sub-county fixed effects. We estimate equation (4.1) using OLS and report robust 
standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. 
The coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 in equation (4.1) measure the causal effect of incentive 
treatments on the DFs’ in-degree and adoption decisions, under the identifying assumption that 
𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑐 and 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑐 are orthogonal to 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑐. Random assignment to treatment implies the identifying 
assumption is satisfied, unless there are substantial spillover effects (see the discussion about 
spillovers and the SUTVA in Chapter 2, including the design features included in the 
experiment to minimise spillovers). We further formally test for evidence of spillovers across 
neighboring sub-villages using Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates of the DFs. To 
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check whether information networks of the control group neighbours were affected by 
spillovers, we compare information networks of control group neighbours who are close to a 
treated neighbour, and control group neighbours further away from treated units. According to 
our estimates, summarised in Table 4.A.2 in the appendix, there are no spillovers. Using a 
border-to-treatment dummy variable, a t-test also indicates that control group neighbours’ 
information networks were not significantly affected by the presence of a neighbour from 
another experimental arm. 
To test the social network effect on adoption of DTMVs, we focus on the sample of 
other farmers (neighbours). Consistent with previous studies, we identify two main channels 
through which social networks may influence the adoption of a new technology: (i) neighbours 
may gain knowledge about the availability and benefits of the technology (e.g., Conley and 
Udry, 2010), and (ii) people are influenced by the decisions of others (e.g., Bandiera and Rasul, 
2006; Matuschke and Qaim, 2009). We, therefore, ask: (1) suppose that incentives change 
networks of trained DFs and that (2) DFs respond to incentives by adopting DTMVs, do 
networks transfer adoption decision of the DFs or help to diffuse knowledge or both? 
Identifying the causal effect of social networks on adoption is, however, not trivial. The 
first challenge involves defining the relevant reference group—the set of neighbours from 
whom an individual can learn. Secondly, assuming that the reference group can be defined 
appropriately, disentangling learning from contextual and correlated effects may be 
problematic. Individual behaviour may simply reflect the average behaviour of the reference 
group, but that does not necessarily mean that group behaviour causes the individual’s 
behaviour (Manski, 1993). In the absence of learning, individuals may still behave like their 
neighbours as a result of interdependent preferences or because they are exposed to related 
unobservable shocks (Manski, 1993; Conley and Udry, 2010; Krishnan and Patnam, 2013). 
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Our experiment and rich dataset allows us to address the problems mentioned above as 
follows. First, we collected detailed data on whom individuals know and discuss with about 
farming. Within this reference group, we identify whether a trained DF is mentioned as a 
contact for crop production advice both at baseline and endline. We then ask whether the 
mentioned DF is an adopter of a DTMV. Second, we collect data about the characteristics of 
both the DFs and neighbours, allowing us to control for contextual effects. Third, we estimate 
a difference-in-difference regression with fixed effects, which allows controlling for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Although several techniques are used to identify the effect 
of networks on the adoption decisions of neighbours, we cannot completely rule out that there 
might still be a concern for endogeneity. Our results, however, survive a number of robustness 
checks (presented later in Section 4.4.2). Formally, we estimate: 
𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑡 =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑣𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑣𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑣𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡      (4.2) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑡 represents our outcomes of interest: (1) a dummy variable equal to one if a household 
𝑖 in sub-village 𝑣 adopted a DTMV at time 𝑡 and zero if otherwise and (2) the score that a 
household obtained on an eight-question knowledge test. 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑣𝑡 is a dummy variable 
equal to one if an adopter DF is mentioned among the household 𝑖’s contacts for agricultural 
advice and zero if otherwise, 𝐷𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one at endline and zero at 
baseline, and 𝜏𝑖𝑣𝑡 are individual fixed effects. Included in 𝑋𝑖𝑣𝑡 are incentives treatment dummy 
variables and time-varying characteristics of the DF and the neighbour. Equation (4.2) is 
estimated with robust standard errors  𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑡 clustered at the sub-village level. 
Next, we ask: suppose social networks influence neighbours’ decisions to adopt 
DTMVs, does incentivised training of DFs change networks of the neighbours? To answer this 
question empirically, we causally estimate the intent-to-treat (ITT) effects of a sub-village being 
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assigned to incentivised DF training (relative to conventional DF training) on neighbours’ 
networks and knowledge scores using equations (4.3) and (4.4): 
𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑐 =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑐 + 𝛾𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑣𝑐  +  𝐶𝑐  + 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑐            (4.3) 
𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑐 =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑐 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑐 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑖𝑣𝑐 + 𝛾𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑣𝑐  + 𝐶𝑐  +  𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑐           (4.4) 
where the outcomes of interest 𝑦𝑖𝑣𝑐 in both equations measure whether or not a DF is mentioned 
in a neighbour’s contacts for agricultural advice, the frequency of interaction between a DF and 
his or her neighbours, and a weak tie defined as an indirect link between a DF and a neighbour 
through another neighbour. 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑐 is a dummy variable equal to one if the farmer 
resides in a sub-village in which a DF was assigned to receive a reward and zero if otherwise. 
In equation (4.4), we distinguish between the effect of private reward (𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑐), social recognition 
(𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑐), and altruism (𝐴𝑖𝑣𝑐) on neighbours’ networks. The rest of the variables are as defined 
in equation (4.1). 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Main results 
To set the stage, we first look at the impact of training on social networks. The 
motivation is simple. Underlying incentives for network formation are generally related to 
resource sharing—be it information or risk sharing and social learning. The DFs received 
training on a highly relevant technology in the context of rural Uganda. Such training 
exogenously changes the relative importance of the DFs as a source of information with respect 
to the technology and makes them potentially relevant nodes in their networks. Table 4.3 
presents results of a descriptive analysis about changes in networks at both the extensive and 
intensive margins before and after training of the DFs by comparing the baseline and endline 
data. With the exception of other information networks including contacts for medical and 
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livestock advice, results show significantly higher values of network variables after training of 
DFs than before training. 
Table 4.3. Test of Change in Neighbours’ Networks with and without Training of 
Disseminating Farmers (DFs) 
Variable 
Before 
training of 
DFs 
After training 
of DFs 
t-statistic p-value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
DF is mentioned by neighbour 
(DF mentioned) 
0.014 0.159 -6.664 0.000 
Frequency of interaction with 
mentioned DF (Intensity) 
0.023 0.353 -5.608 0.000 
Weak link: DF linked to 
neighbour for agricultural 
indirectly through another 
neighbour 
0.004 0.050 -4.053 0.000 
DF mentioned in risk sharing 
networks 
0.012 0.043 -3.002 0.003 
DF mentioned in medical or 
livestock advice network 
0.006 0.013 -1.424 0.156 
Observations 1,810 
 
 
Notes: t-test with clustering at sub-village level. Because all DFs received training after baseline, the variable DF 
trained equals one at endline and zero at baseline. 
 
Results in Table 4.4 show that incentivised training influenced the likelihood of DFs to 
adopt DTMVs and changed their in-degree. While columns (1), (3), and (6) indicate positive 
and significant effects of incentives, we are interested to understand what types of incentives 
drive the effects. Results in column (2) shows that social recognition increased the likelihood 
of adopting a DTMV by 14 percentage points relative to conventional training. The effect was 
significantly larger (p-value = 0.067) than that of private rewards (2.5 percentage points). In 
column (4) we find that social recognition also increased the likelihood of growing improved 
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varieties of maize, in general, by 17 percentage points as compared with conventional training. 
This latter effect is statistically the same as that of private reward. In terms of networks, results 
in column (5) show that incentives significantly increased the DFs’ in-degree by 0.69 points for 
private rewards and 0.91 points for social recognition. That incentives affect adoption decisions 
of DFs is consistent with the findings of Ben Yishay and Mobarak (2018), who examined the 
responsiveness of DFs—selected using a criterion similar to the one used in the current study—
to incentives for technology diffusion. These authors showed that material rewards motivate 
DFs to experiment with new technologies. In our context, however, we distinguish between 
private rewards and social recognition, and find that only the latter significantly influenced 
adoption decision of DFs.  
The changes in DFs’ in-degree and adoption decisions suggest possible network effects 
on neighbours’ adoption decisions. We now ask: does having a trained and adopter DF in a 
neighbour’s list of contacts for agricultural advice affect his or her own adoption decision? 
Table 4.5 presents results of network effects on neighbours’ adoption of DTMVs. Columns (1 
and 2) present results at the extensive margin as measured by the presence of an adopter DF in 
a neighbour’s network whereas columns (3 and 4) show results at the intensive margin as 
captured by the frequency of interaction of a neighbour with an adopter DF. We present DID 
fixed effects results, with and without controlling for characteristics of the neighbours and the 
DFs. The results are reported as marginal effects. 
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Table 4.4. Incentives and Disseminating Farmers’ Adoption and Networks 
Incentive type 
Adoption 
 
 
Network 
DT maize Improved maize  Information 
exchange 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Incentivized training 0.110* 
(0.060) 
 
0.164* 
(0.086) 
   0.804*** 
(0.238) 
Training plus private 
reward (PR) 
 0.025 
(0.073) 
 0.153 
(0.097) 
 0.689** 
(0.282) 
 
Training plus social 
recognition (SR) 
 0.136** 
(0.057) 
 0.171* 
(0.096) 
 0.908*** 
(0.300) 
 
Household controls 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Sub-county fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared 0.278 0.340 0.168 0.168  0.169 0.166 
Observations 123 123 123 123  123 123 
Mean of dependent 
variable for non-
incentivized DFs 
0.150 
[0.362] 
0.025 
[0.158] 
0.150 
[0.362] 
0.150 
[0.362] 
 1.225 
[1.050] 
1.225 
[1.050] 
PR = SR (p-value)   0.067  0.836  0.513  
Notes: DF means disseminating farmer. Dependent variables are as follows: columns (1—4) are dummy variables 
equal to one if disseminating farmer (DF) tried out the technology on at least one of the household’s plots and zero 
otherwise; columns (5 and 6) measure the number of people in the sub-village with whom the DF communicated 
about improved farming methods. Robust standard errors corrected for sub-village level clustering are reported in 
parentheses. Square parentheses are the standard deviations of the control group means. Household controls 
include sex, age, education, and main economic activity of the household head, dependency ratio, livestock 
ownership, agricultural assets ownership, and access to credit. Columns (5 and 6) report OLS estimates. Columns 
(1—4) report average marginal effects from probit regression. DT maize means drought-tolerant maize. *** 𝑝 <
0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
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Table 4.5. Effect of Social Networks on Neighbours’ Decisions to Adopt Drought-tolerant 
Maize Varieties (DTMVs) 
Dependent variable: Adoption of DTMV (1=yes, 0=no) 
Explanatory variables: 
Extensive  Intensive 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Endline dummy 0.017 
(0.030) 
0.014 
(0.030) 
 0.024 
(0.031) 
0.019 
(0.030) 
Adopter DF in agricultural advice 
network x Endline dummy 
0.319*** 
(0.070) 
0.279*** 
(0.069) 
 0.103*** 
(0.032) 
0.084** 
(0.032) 
Incentive treatment dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Household controls No Yes  No Yes 
DF controls No Yes  No Yes 
Constant 0.122*** 
(0.008) 
0.068*** 
(0.050) 
 0.122 
(0.008) 
0.055 
(0.052) 
R-squared 0.042 0.080  0.026 0.077 
Observations 1,810 1,810  1,810 1,810 
Notes: Difference-in-difference (DID) fixed effects (FE) estimates. DF means disseminating farmers. DTMV 
means drought-tolerant maize variety. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. 
DTMV=drought-tolerant maize variety. Extensive (columns 1 and 2) indicates that an adopter DF is mentioned in 
the neighbour’s network whereas intensive (columns 3 and 4) indicates the frequency of interaction with an adopter 
DF. Household and DF controls include  farm size under maize, farm size under groundnuts, ownership of radio, 
ownership of mobile phone, access to government extension, agricultural and non-agricultural assets indices, 
livestock ownership in tropical livestock units, and access to credit. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
 
The results suggest that there is a strong relationship between the adoption decisions of 
trained DFs and neighbours’ own decisions to adopt DTMVs, both at the extensive and 
intensive margin. Having an adopter DF as a contact for agricultural advice increases the 
likelihood of a neighbour adopting a DTMV by 32 percentage points more without controlling 
for characteristics of neighbors and DFs, and 28 percentage points when the characteristics are 
controlled for (column 2), between the baseline and endline compared to neighbours who lack 
adopter DFs in their networks.  
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At the intensive margin, a unit increase in the frequency of interaction with adopter DFs 
increased the likelihood of neighbours adopting DTMVs by 10 percentage points between the 
baseline and the endline. These results agree with findings from previous studies that use similar 
estimation procedures (e.g., Krishnan and Patnam, 2013), and are consistent with DFs 
transmitting key information via their own actions. This suggests that DFs were not only 
teaching others about how to use the technology, but also trying to signal its profitability. In 
this context, the findings on dissemination and learning, therefore, relate to the social learning 
literature (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Munshi 2004; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and 
Udry 2010). In the current context, however, we pursue an active intervention strategy rather 
than rely on passive learning. Our approach closely relates to that of Cai et al. (2015) and 
Magnan et al. (2015). 
Throughout, the effects of the intensive margin are generally found to be smaller than 
the extensive margin. This is a bit contrary to our expectation. Our measure of intensive margin 
captures whether the DFs and their neighbour never interacted, interacted daily, at least weekly, 
at least monthly, or less often. First, with a caveat that the current study cannot definitively 
explain this effect, we speculate that if neighbours who interacted with their DFs at the 
extensive margin discussed for longer hours within one visit, it is plausible that the effect could 
be greater compared to less hours of interaction during several period of discussion at the 
intensive margin. Second, while our network questions about the frequency of interactions were 
very specific and clearly intended to reflect only information about crop production, social 
networks in developing countries are multi-tasked so that (some) interactions might also capture 
other aspects. Future research can benefit from explicitly addressing these caveats. 
Although we have so far shown that networks transfer the adoption decision of DFs to 
their neighbours, we have not succinctly illustrated network effects on knowledge of neighbours 
about DTMVs. We now turn to this issue. Do networks affect adoption through diffusion of 
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knowledge? Results of fixed effects DID estimates in Table 4.6 indicate that networks 
influenced knowledge of neighbours about DTMVs: having a trained and adopter DF in a 
neighbour’s list of contacts for agricultural advice increases knowledge of the neighbour by 
1.92 points more at the extensive margin and 0.63 points at the intensive margin between the 
baseline and the endline than when such DFs are absent. 
Table 4.6. Networks Effects on Knowledge of Neighbours 
Dependent variable: Neighbour’s knowledge 
Explanatory variables 
Extensive  Intensive 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Endline dummy -1.038*** 
(0.160) 
-0.923*** 
(0.160) 
 -0.994*** 
(0.159) 
-0.894*** 
(0.159) 
Adopter DF in agricultural advice 
network x Endline dummy 
2.194*** 
(0.346) 
1.924*** 
(0.355) 
 0.765*** 
(0.178) 
0.627*** 
(0.177) 
DF was incentivized 0.026 
(0.187) 
0.018 
(0.181) 
 0.031 
(0.184) 
0.026 
(0.178) 
Household controls No Yes  No Yes 
DF controls No Yes  No Yes 
Constant 3.340*** 
(0.041) 
2.496*** 
(0.283) 
 3.340*** 
(0.041) 
2.424*** 
(0.283) 
R-squared 0.154 0.204  0.136 0.188 
Observations 1,810 1,810  1,810 1,810 
Notes: Fixed effects (FE) estimates. DF means disseminating farmers. Adopter DF is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the mentioned DF grew a DTMV, and zero if otherwise. Endline is a post-treatment dummy variable equal 
to one if survey period is endline, and zero if otherwise. Extensive (columns 1 and 2) indicates that an adopter DF 
is mentioned in the neighbour’s network whereas intensive (columns 3 and 4) indicates the frequency of interaction 
with an adopter DF. Household and DF controls include  farm size under maize, farm size under groundnuts, 
ownership of radio, ownership of mobile phone, access to government extension, agricultural and non-agricultural 
assets indices, livestock ownership in tropical livestock units, and access to credit. In parentheses are robust 
standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
 
 117 
 
We have successfully shown that incentives changed (positively) the networks and 
adoption decision of DFs, consequently increasing the probability of a neighbour to adopt a 
DTMV. It is possible, therefore, that incentivised training affected neighbours’ networks. 
Results of OLS regression to empirically test the effect of incentives on networks of neighbours 
are presented in Table 4.7. We find that providing incentives to DFs increases the likelihood of 
the DF being mentioned as a contact for agricultural advice by eight percentage points (column 
1) compared to conventional training without incentives. Similarly, results in column (3) show 
that DFs interact 0.22 points more frequently with their neighbours when incentivized than 
when they do not receive an incentive. Incentives did not, however, significantly influence 
formation of weak ties (i.e. farmers connected to the DF for agricultural advice through second-
order links) between DFs and their neighbours (column 5). Results are robust when we control 
for sub-county fixed effects (columns 2, 4, and 6).  
Incentives may affect neighbours’ networks differently depending on whether DFs 
receive a private reward or social recognition. We, therefore, extend our analysis of effects of 
incentives on neighbours’ networks to compare private rewards versus social recognition. 
Results are reported in Table 4.8. We find that both private rewards and social recognition 
increase the likelihood of mentioning DFs as contacts for agricultural advice (columns 1 and 
2). Specifically, the probability of a neighbour mentioning a DF as a contact for agricultural 
advice increased by 7.5 percentage points more for private reward and 8.7 percentage points 
more for social recognition compared with conventional training of DFs. The corresponding 
increase in the intensity of information exchange link was 0.23 points more for private reward 
and 0.22 points more for social recognition (column 3). Neither private rewards nor social 
recognition significantly influenced formation of weak ties. Throughout, we find that the effect 
of private reward and social recognition on networks is statistically the same. 
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Table 4.7. Effect of Incentivized Versus Conventional Training on Neighbours’ Networks 
Variable 
Network 
DF is mentioned 
Frequency of 
interaction 
Weak link 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DF is trained and 
incentivized 
0.081*** 
(0.030) 
0.076** 
(0.031) 
0.225*** 
(0.073) 
0.212*** 
(0.074) 
0.008 
(0.018) 
0.010 
(0.019) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-county fixed 
effects 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.016 
(0.071) 
0.061 
(0.081) 
0.097 
(0.162) 
0.171 
(0.191) 
0.017 
(0.039) 
0.055 
(0.051) 
Observations 905 905 905 905 905 905 
Control group 
mean 
0.110 
[0.313] 
0.110 
[0.313] 
0.209 
[0.674] 
0.209 
[0.674] 
0.045 
[0.207] 
0.045 
[0.207]  
R-squared 0.032 0.036 0.024 0.030 0.005 0.018 
Notes: OLS regression. DF means disseminating farmers. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a DF is mentioned among the neighbour’s contacts for agricultural advice, zero if otherwise 
whereas in columns (3) and (4) the outcome measures the frequency of interaction between a neighbour and the 
mentioned DF. The outcome in columns (5) and (6) is an indicator variable equal to one if a DF is not linked to 
the neighbour directly for agricultural advice but through another neighbour, zero if otherwise. In parentheses are 
robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. In square parentheses are the standard deviations for the 
control group. Treatment group comprises sample households residing in sub-villages in which a DF received an 
incentive—either private reward or social recognition—whereas control group comprises households in sub-
villages in which a DF was not incentivized. Household controls include sex, age, and education of household 
head, household size, size of land cultivated with maize, ownership of radio, ownership of mobile phone, access 
to government extension, and access to credit. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
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Table 4.8. Private Reward versus Social Recognition: Effect on Neighbours’ Networks 
Variable 
Network 
DF is mentioned 
Frequency of 
interaction 
Weak link 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Private reward (PR) 0.076** 
(0.036) 
0.070* 
(0.037) 
0.241*** 
(0.092) 
0.219** 
(0.094) 
0.005 
(0.020) 
0.011 
(0.022) 
Social recognition (SR) 0.083** 
(0.038) 
0.083** 
(0.039) 
0.209** 
(0.097) 
0.215** 
(0.096) 
0.006 
(0.022) 
0.006 
(0.021) 
Altruism (A) 0.007 
(0.042) 
0.013 
(0.042) 
0.116 
(0.124) 
0.125 
(0.122) 
-0.003 
(0.020) 
0.009 
(0.020) 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-county effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.011 
(0.072) 
0.048 
(0.081) 
0.069 
(0.170) 
0.143 
(0.190) 
0.017 
(0.041) 
0.055 
(0.052) 
Observations 905 905 905 905 905 905 
R-squared 0.036 0.040 0.029 0.036 0.006 0.020 
Control group mean 0.110 
[0.313] 
0.110 
[0.313] 
0.209 
[0.674] 
0.209 
[0.674] 
0.045 
[0.207] 
0.045 
[0.207] 
p-value: PR = SR 0.862 0.752 0.781 0.973 0.961 0.818 
p-value: PR = A 0.164 0.265 0.371 0.521 0.791 0.943 
p-value: SR = A 0.119 0. 173 0.442 0.485 0.784 0.930 
Notes: OLS regression estimates. DF means disseminating farmers. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a DF is mentioned among the neighbour’s contacts for agricultural advice, zero 
if otherwise whereas in columns (3) and (4) the outcome measures the frequency of interaction between a 
neighbour and the mentioned DF. The outcome in columns (5) and (6) is an indicator variable equal to one if a DF 
is not linked to the neighbour directly for agricultural advice but through another neighbour, zero if otherwise. In 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. In square parentheses are the standard 
deviations for the control group. Control group comprises households in sub-villages in which a DF was not 
incentivized. Household controls include sex, age, and education of household head, household size, size of land 
cultivated with maize, ownership of radio, ownership of mobile phone, access to government extension, and access 
to credit. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
 
 
120 
 
The effect of altruism of DFs on neighbours’ networks was positive, but small and not 
statistically significant at 10 percent level. Consistent with our theoretical model, we speculate 
that uncertainty about the quality of DTMVs might explain the null result of altruism. Bold et 
al. (2017) reported the presence of a high prevalence of low quality seeds in Uganda. Such low 
quality seeds substantially reduced the yields of crops and discouraged farmers’ investment 
behaviour. On the one hand, in the presence of aggregate uncertainty about the quality of seeds, 
farmers may not only herd on inferior “traditional” crop varieties (Monzón, 2017) but may also 
be reluctant to listen to advice related to cultivation of improved new seeds. On the other hand, 
DFs may delay contacting their neighbours about something that could potentially be harmful 
to avoid both societal damage and negative reputation consequences. Both mechanisms would, 
therefore, tend to diminish the effect of altruism on network change. 
 
4.4.2 Robustness checks 
To bolster further confidence in our estimates of network effects on neighbours’ 
adoption of DTMVs, we undertake several robustness checks. First, we perform a placebo test 
by regressing neighbours’ baseline adoption decisions—revealed before training of DFs—on 
the network variable in equation (4.2). A similar approach was used by Magnan et al. (2015). 
If the coefficient on the network variable is significantly positive (or negative), it would indicate 
the presence of unobservable variables correlated to both DTMV adoption and network 
variable, which could introduce bias (Magnan et al., 2015). Results in Table 4.9 indicate no 
statistically significant effect of social networks on adoption decisions of neighbours before 
DFs were trained, suggesting that our estimates are not affected by such a bias. 
 
 
 121 
 
Table 4.9. Placebo Test for Spurious Network Effects 
Dependent variable: Adoption of DTMV at baseline (1=yes, 0=no) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) 
Adopter DF in agricultural advice network 0.054 
(0.035) 
0.040 
(0.033) 
Incentive dummy variables Yes Yes 
Household controls No Yes 
DF controls No Yes 
Sub-county fixed effects yes Yes 
R-squared 0.009 0.081 
Observations 905 905 
Notes: Average marginal effects from probit regression. DF=disseminating farmer; DTMV=drought-tolerant 
maize variety. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. Household controls 
include sex, age, and education of household head, household size, ownership of radio and phone, access to 
government extension and credit, and farm size under maize. DF controls include sex, age, and education of the 
DF, household size, main activity of DF is farming, and access to credit.*** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
 
Second, we combine the fixed effects DID estimation in equation (4.2) with inverse 
probability weighting (IPW). Three different matching algorithms are used, namely Radius 
matching, Kernel-based matching, and Nearest neighbour matching (with three neighbors). 
Given that we use adequate baseline data for matching, this enables us to rule out biases that 
stem from heterogeneity in behaviour and potential sources of self-selection biases, which 
would not be possible in an ordinary matching approach. Results in Table 4.10 are consistent 
with our estimates for fixed effects DID. 
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Table 4.10. Combined Difference-in-Difference (DID) with Inverse Probability Weighting 
(IPW) Estimates of Network Effects on Neighbours’ Adoption and Knowledge 
Variable 
Adoption of DTMV (1=yes, 0=no) 
Matching algorithm 
 Radius Kernel-based Nearest neighbour 
 Panel A: Adoption 
Endline dummy 0.018 
(0.016) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
-0.012 
(0.037) 
Adopter DF in agricultural advice 
network x Endline dummy 
0.265*** 
(0.098) 
0.269*** 
(0.098) 
0.294*** 
(0.099) 
Constant 0.178*** 
(0.025) 
0.181*** 
(0.026) 
0.218*** 
(0.041) 
R-squared 0.133 0.136 0.177 
Observations 1,810 1,688 446 
    
 Panel B: Knowledge 
Endline dummy -0.971*** 
(0.242) 
-0.983*** 
(0.251) 
-1.656*** 
(0.427) 
Adopter DF in agricultural advice 
network x Endline dummy 
1.820*** 
(0.278) 
1.783*** 
(0.271) 
2.321*** 
(0.401) 
Constant 3.717*** 
(0.430) 
3.754*** 
(0.456) 
4.904*** 
(0.810) 
R-squared 0.266 0.268 0.419 
Observations 1,798 1,682 443 
Notes: DF means disseminating farmers. DTMV=drought-tolerant maize varieties. Endline is a post-treatment 
dummy variable equal to one if survey period is endline, and zero if otherwise. In parentheses are robust standard 
errors clustered at the sub-village level. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
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Third, we test whether co-membership of adopter DFs and neighbours in networks other 
than the agricultural advice affects adoption decisions of neighbours. Two additional network 
variables are constructed. The first variable is based on membership to financial or risk-sharing 
neighbourhood. Two farmers—the DF and the neighbour—belong to the same financial or risk-
sharing neighbourhood if they lend to, borrow from, or exchange material goods in common 
with each other at any point during the two-year survey period. The second variable captures 
non-agricultural advice networks, and is based on co-membership of a DF and a neighbour to 
networks for medical or livestock advice. Our focus on these two additional network variables 
is motivated by alternative explanations that would suggest that a significant effect of 
agricultural advice network on uptake might be caused by omitted variable bias because of 
information that neighbours share from common access to other arrangements (Conley and 
Udry, 2010). As shown in Table 4.11, we do not find significant effects of alternative networks 
on adoption of DTMVs, and hence ruling out that neighbours may have changed their adoption 
decision because they shared membership to other arrangements with DFs. 
In addition, robustness analysis of the effect of incentives on networks was performed 
using an inverse probability score weighting procedure to formally assess the sensitivity of the 
main results to the attrition problem as described in Section 4.2. Results are presented in Tables 
4.12 and 4.13. As shown, the attrition-weighted estimates remain robust and are similar to those 
reported in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, suggesting the robustness of our results to the level of attrition 
in our sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
Table 4.11. Difference-in-Difference (DID Estimates of Effects of Alternative Network on 
Adoption of Drought-tolerant Maize Varieties (DTMVs) 
Dependent variable: Adoption of DTMV (1=yes, 0=no) 
 (1) (2) 
Endline 0.023 
(0.020) 
0.026 
(0.020) 
Adopter DF in risk sharing network 0.146 
(0.092) 
 
Adopter DF in risk sharing network x 
Endline 
-0.124 
(0.113) 
 
Adopter DF in medical or livestock advice 
network 
 
0.010 
(0.035) 
Adopter DF in medical or livestock advice 
network x Endline 
 
0.022 
(0.114) 
Household controls Yes Yes 
DF characteristics Yes Yes 
Constant 0.023 
(0.052) 
0.026 
(0.052) 
   
R-squared 0.054 0.054 
Observations 1,810 1,810 
Notes: DF=disseminating farmer; Endline is a dummy variable equal to one if endline and zero if baseline. In 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. Household and DF controls include  farm 
size under maize, farm size under groundnuts, ownership of radio, ownership of mobile phone, access to 
government extension, agricultural and non-agricultural assets indices, livestock ownership in tropical livestock 
units, and access to credit.*** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
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Table 4.12. Attrition-Weighted Effect of Incentivised versus Conventional Training on 
Neighbours’ Networks 
Variable 
Network 
DF is mentioned 
Frequency of 
interaction 
Weak link 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DF is trained and 
incentivized 
0.080*** 
(0.030) 
0.075** 
(0.031) 
0.223*** 
(0.073) 
0.211*** 
(0.074) 
0.009 
(0.017) 
0.012 
(0.019) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-county effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.024 
(0.071) 
0.066 
(0.081) 
0.114 
(0.162) 
0.181 
(0.190) 
0.018 
(0.039) 
0.054 
(0.051) 
Observations 905 905 905 905 905 905 
Control group 
mean 
0.110 
[0.313] 
0.110 
[0.313] 
0.209 
[0.674] 
0.209 
[0.674] 
0.045 
[0.207] 
0.045 
[0.207]  
R-squared 0.032 0.036 0.024 0.030 0.005 0.018 
Notes: OLS regression. DF means disseminating farmers. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a DF is mentioned among the neighbour’s contacts for agricultural advice, zero if otherwise 
whereas in columns (3) and (4) the outcome measures the frequency of interaction between a neighbour and the 
mentioned DF. The outcome in columns (5) and (6) is an indicator variable equal to one if a DF is not linked to 
the neighbour directly for agricultural advice but through another neighbour, zero if otherwise. In parentheses are 
robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. In square parentheses are the standard deviations for the 
control group. Treatment group comprises sample households residing in sub-villages in which a DF received an 
incentive—either private reward or social recognition—whereas control group comprises households in sub-
villages in which a DF was not incentivised. Household controls include sex, age, and education of household 
head, household size, size of land cultivated with maize, ownership of radio, ownership of mobile phone, access 
to government extension, and access to credit. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
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Table 4.13. Attrition-Weighted Effect of Private Material Reward versus Social Recognition: 
Effect on Neighbours’ Networks 
Variable 
Network 
DF is mentioned 
Frequency of 
interaction 
Weak link 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Private reward (PR) 0.073** 
(0.036) 
0.068* 
(0.037) 
0.235*** 
(0.092) 
0.214** 
(0.094) 
0.006 
(0.020) 
0.012 
(0.022) 
Social recognition 
(SR) 
0.083** 
(0.038) 
0.083** 
(0.039) 
0.211** 
(0.098) 
0.217** 
(0.098) 
0.008 
(0.022) 
0.008 
(0.021) 
Altruism (A) 0.008 
(0.042) 
0.013 
(0.042) 
0.118 
(0.124) 
0.127 
(0.121) 
-0.003 
(0.020) 
0.009 
(0.020) 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-county effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.019 
(0.072) 
0.053 
(0.081) 
0.085 
(0.171) 
0.152 
(0.190) 
0.018 
(0.040) 
0.055 
(0.051) 
Observations 905 905 905 905 905 905 
R-squared 0.036 0.040 0.029 0.036 0.006 0.020 
Control group mean 0.110 
[0.313] 
0.110 
[0.313] 
0.209 
[0.674] 
0.209 
[0.674] 
0.045 
[0.207] 
0.045 
[0.207] 
p-value: PR = SR 0.823 0.714 0.833 0.976 0.948 0.840 
p-value: PR = A 0.179 0.281 0.402 0.552 0.766 0.911 
p-value: SR = A 0.123 0.174 0.451 0.488 0.753 0.975 
Notes: OLS regression estimates. DF means disseminating farmers. The outcome in columns (1) and (2) 
is an indicator variable equal to one if a DF is mentioned among the neighbour’s contacts for agricultural advice, 
zero if otherwise whereas in columns (3) and (4) the outcome measures the frequency of interaction between a 
neighbour and the mentioned DF. The outcome in columns (5) and (6) is an indicator variable equal to one if a DF 
is not linked to the neighbour directly for agricultural advice but through another neighbour, zero if otherwise. In 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. In square parentheses are the standard 
deviations for the control group. Control group comprises households in sub-villages in which a DF was not 
incentivized. Household controls include sex, age, and education of household head, household size, size of land 
cultivated with maize, ownership of radio, ownership of mobile phone, access to government extension, and access 
to credit. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Social networks continue to play a central role in the diffusion of new technologies. In 
many developing countries, technology diffusion through social networks offers an opportunity 
to strengthen national extension systems. This chapter examines network effects on adoption 
of drought-tolerant maize varieties (DTMVs) in northern Uganda and the mechanisms through 
which the effects occur. We conduct an experiment in which a random subset of households 
receives training about DTMVs. A random sample of the trained individuals receive incentives 
for sharing the knowledge learnt with their neighbours—we distinguish between a private 
material reward and social recognition incentive schemes. 
Incentives increased the likelihood of DFs to experiment with DTMVs and the number 
of people with whom they discussed about farming, suggesting a change in the networks of 
neighbors. Relative to conventional training, incentivised training increased the likelihood of a 
neighbour mentioning a DF in his or her own contacts for agricultural advice and the frequency 
of interaction with a DF for information exchange, but not second-order linkages through 
friends of neighbors. Altruism of DFs, however, did not influence changes in networks. Having 
an adopter DF in a farmer’s own network not only increased his or her knowledge but also the 
likelihood of adopting DTMVs. The results are robust to several robustness checks, and 
controlling for spillover effects and the problem of attrition in our sample. 
Our results generate several important implications for policy. First, the findings suggest 
that an active intervention in the form of direct training provided to a few selected individuals 
can help to disseminate new agricultural technologies. This is in contrast with Kondylis et al. 
(2017), who found that providing direct training to contact farmers might not significantly 
influence knowledge and adoption decision of neighbors. However, among factors that were 
identified by Kondylis et al. (2017) as potential explanation for their null effects of direct DFs 
training was lack of incentives. In our context, we find that incentivised training of DFs 
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substantially increase interaction within networks. The second implication of our findings, 
therefore, is that incentives matter for technology diffusion within social networks. Ben Yishay 
and Mobarak (2018) showed that private rewards influenced social learning. In addition to 
private rewards, we find that social recognition by announcing “good” performance of DFs in 
public plays an important role to substantially improve social learning. Our findings 
demonstrate that private reward and social recognition are equally important in affecting 
information networks. 
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Appendix 4.A: Tables 
Table 4.A.1. Determinants of Attrition: Probit Regression 
Notes: *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard error p-value 
Private material reward (PR) 0.115 0.288 0.690 
Social recognition (SR) -0.163 0.250 0.514 
Household head is male -0.476 0.220 0.030** 
Age of household head -0.002 0.006 0.736 
Size of the household -0.058 0.045 0.192 
Education of the household head 0.039 0.020 0.049** 
Household income (natural log) -0.064 0.104 0.538 
Participation in casual employment -0.434 0.456 0.341 
Participation in self-employment 0.299 0.532 0.575 
Amount of credit received (natural log) -0.091 0.085 0.285 
Agricultural assets index 0.026 0.021 0.224 
Non-agricultural assets index 0.025 0.027 0.363 
Housing index -0.224 0.233 0.336 
Crop production advice network -0.056 0.082 0.497 
Kinship network 0.010 0.074 0.891 
Experience with floods -0.318 0.186 0.088* 
Experience with droughts 0.601 0.417 0.150 
Constant 0.148 0.694 0.832 
P-Value of test: PR + SR = 0 0.632   
Wald Chi-square (17) 
Pseudo R-squared 
49.33*** 
0.029 
  
Observations 1,286   
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Table 4.A.2. Test for Spillover Effects: t-Test Using a Border-to-Treatment Dummy Variable 
 Without potential 
spillover 
With potential 
spillover 
p-value of 
difference in means 
DF is mentioned  0.092 
(0.011) 
[0.288] 
0.088 
(0.009) 
[0.283] 
0.773 
Frequency of interaction 0.179 
(0.023) 
[0.634] 
0.205 
(0.023) 
[0.710] 
0.417 
Weak link 0.032 
(0.006) 
[0.176] 
0.024 
(0.005) 
[0.154] 
0.339 
Observations    
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. In square parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Chapter 5 
Food Security, Downside Risk, and Resilience Effects of Agricultural 
Technologies in Northern Uganda 
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the effects of drought-tolerant maize varieties (DTMVs) and maize-legume 
intercropping (MLI) on yield and downside risk, food security, and resilience of livelihoods in 
northern Uganda. Both technologies are increasingly promoted as being climate-smart. Using panel 
survey and georeferenced climate data, causal impacts are estimated via fixed effects estimation. 
The chapter finds that adoption of DTMVs increased mean yields and reduced variance of yields 
suggesting that the varieties boosted productivity and addressed production risks under heat stress. 
Neither DTMVs nor MLI, however, reduced exposure to downside risk. Furthermore, the hunger 
period shortened while income, frequency of food consumption, and resilience increased with 
adoption of DTMVs and MLI. Our findings underscore the importance of DTMVs and MLI in 
increasing food security, reducing production risks, and enhancing resilience of livelihoods. In 
order to minimise the trade-offs of downside risk, however, investment in complementary 
interventions may be required. 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Shikuku, K.M. and Mwongera, C. (2018). Food security, downside risk, and resilience effects of 
agricultural technologies in northern Uganda. Under review in Agricultural Economics. 
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5.1.  Introduction 
 The majority of the poor in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are projected to continue residing in 
rural areas until 2040 (Ravallion et al., 2007). Rural populations in SSA mostly rely on rain-fed 
agriculture for their livelihoods and are often characterised by persistently high poverty rates, 
widespread food insecurity, and prevalent malnutrition (Hyman et al., 2008). Livelihoods are, 
therefore, highly sensitive to climatic shocks while the adaptive capacity is weak (Shiferaw et al., 
2014). Together, these two factors increase vulnerability of rural households to climatic shocks 
(Hassan, 2010; Di Falco and Veronesi, 2013). 
Increasing productivity growth in agriculture is widely seen as an effective strategy to 
improve the wellbeing of the poor in developing countries (Evenson and Golin, 2003; Ligon and 
Sadoulet, 2007; Christiaensen et al., 2011). Without adequate measures to address the adverse 
effects of climatic shocks in SSA, however, the costs of agricultural and economic development 
are enormous. An estimated 70 percent of economic losses in the region are attributed to droughts 
and floods alone (Bhavnani et al., 2008). Studies indicate a 2–4 percent reduction in the annual 
growth of gross domestic product (GDP) (Brown et al., 2011); a substantial decline of about 22 
percent in yields of maize, 17 percent each for sorghum and millet, and 18 percent for groundnuts 
(Schlenker and Lobell, 2010); a reduction in farm revenues by about 39 US dollars per hectare for 
every degree centigrade rise in temperature (Hassan, 2010); and a reduction in food security (Parry 
et al., 2005; Lybbert and Sumner, 2012; Wheeler and von Braun, 2013) as a consequence of 
climatic shocks.  
The agriculture sector of Uganda, which employs 66 percent of the population and 
contributes about 22 percent to the total GDP (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2013), faces threats 
from climate change. For example, damages to agricultural output due to climatic shocks amounted 
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to more than 900 million US dollars in 2010; corresponding to 77 percent of total damages across 
all sectors of the country’s economy (Republic of Uganda, 2012; 2016). Furthermore, the current 
and future increased risks are in areas of existing poverty and have serious consequences for local 
economies and food security (Republic of Uganda, 2015). Climatic shocks not only exacerbate 
food insecurity, but may also lead to sustained long-term asset poverty traps if farmers are induced 
to sell their key assets as a coping measure (Wossen et al., 2017). Furthermore, the general 
equilibrium effects of covariate climatic shocks imply that farmers may not find employment in 
neighbouring farms due to widespread crop failure. Clearly, identifying and promoting options that 
will help to address the problems posed by climatic shocks is an imperative towards achieving 
Uganda’s target of 8.2 percent growth rate in GDP by 2040. 
An option that has received considerable attention is climate-smart agriculture (CSA). By 
definition, CSA is a three-pillar approach targeted towards achieving a sustained increase in food 
security, enhancing resilience of livelihoods to climatic shocks, and providing co-benefits of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) mitigation (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
(FAO), 2013). The popularity of the approach, both globally and in SSA, is evident from among 
others, the launch of a Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture (GACSA) in 2014 with the 
goal of helping 500 million smallholder farmers practice CSA, and the Alliance for Climate Smart 
Agriculture in Africa (ACSAA) spearheaded by New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) which intends to help catalyse the scaling up of CSA to 25 million farm households 
across the continent by 2025. Agricultural technologies that reduce variance of yields and address 
downside risk can contribute towards improved welfare of the poor and food insecure farm 
households in SSA (Kostandini et al., 2013; Wossen et al., 2017). 
Yet few studies have examined the impacts of recommended CSA technologies in SSA. 
Cost-benefit analysis by Ngángá et al. (2017a; 2017b) showed positive net present values and high 
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internal rates of return associated with adoption of CSA technologies in western Kenya and coastal 
savannah agro-ecological zone of Ghana suggesting that such technologies are worth investing in. 
Arslan et al. (2015) showed that yields increased and the probability of lower yields decreased with 
adoption of recommended CSA technologies in Zambia. Ex-ante analysis by Shikuku et al. (2017) 
indicated that adoption of improved livestock feeding in rural Tanzania increased milk yield and 
reduced methane emission. A large part of these previous studies focuses on yields. 
The focus on average yields has several implications for food security in SSA. First, 
whereas increased mean yields tend to correlate with improved food security status of rural 
households in SSA, downside risk will negatively affect households’ welfare (Di Falco and Chavas, 
2009). Empirical evidence about the impact of recommended CSA technologies on downside risk 
is inadequate. Understanding impacts of agricultural technologies on downside risk requires 
analysis beyond average yields: such analysis should consider impacts on higher moments such as 
variance and skewness of yields (Di Falco and Chavas, 2009; Shi et al., 2013; Wossen et al., 2017). 
Second, increased focus on yields as a proxy for food security has left much less attention paid to 
the effects of recommended CSA technologies on other indicators of food security, especially 
dietary diversity. A notable exception is Smale et al. (2015) who showed the positive impact of 
hybrid maize varieties on dietary diversity, but did not take into account the effect of climatic 
shocks. Although there is still a major focus on increasing food supply in developing country 
policies, there is also increasing interest in supporting consumption of more diverse and nutritious 
food. Third, very few studies have examined heterogeneous treatment effects of adopting 
agricultural technologies under climatic shocks on yields (e.g., Arslan et al., 2015; 2017; Wossen 
et al., 2017) and an explicit assessment of the impact of agricultural technologies on resilience of 
livelihoods is largely missing. 
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Focused on two pillars of CSA, namely food security and resilience, and two technologies 
including DTMVs and maize-legume intercropping (MLI), this chapter attempts to fill the gaps in 
literature by addressing four specific objectives: (1) to assess the relationship between climatic 
variables and the probability of growing DTMVs and practicing MLI; (2) to assess the effect of 
DTMVs and MLI on yield of maize, production risk, and downside risk; (3) to assess the effect of 
DTMVs and MLI on food security; (4) to assess the effect of DTMVs and MLI on resilience of 
livelihoods. The chapter’s assessment of a wide range of outcomes enables us to identify synergies 
and trade-offs associated with implementation of the two technologies. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 explains the methodology 
followed including the theoretical framework, empirical approach, data, description of variables, 
and summary statistics. Section 5.3 presents the empirical results while in Section 5.4, the chapter 
concludes. 
 
5.2  Methodology 
5.2.1 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework is motivated by a moment-based specification of the stochastic 
production function (Antle, 1983) as empirically applied by Di Falco and Chavas (2009) and 
Wossen et al. (2017).  Consider a maize producing household using inputs 𝒙 (including DTMVs 
and MLI) under risk. The household faces a production function 𝑞 = 𝑔(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘), where  𝒔 is a 
vector of climatic variables (rainfall and temperature) and 𝒘 includes household and farmer 
characteristics. The output 𝑞 produced can either be consumed by the household or sold, that is, 
𝑞 = 𝑐1 + 𝑚, where 𝑐1 is the amount out of 𝑞 that is consumed, and 𝑚 is the marketed surplus that 
can be sold at price 𝑝1. Furthermore, most farm households in Uganda are risk averse (Harrison et 
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al., 2010) and operate under conditions characterised by imperfect markets. In that case, production 
and consumption decisions are inseparable (Singh et al., 1986; de Janvry et al., 1991). Households 
combine farm resources and family labour to maximise utility over leisure and consumption goods 
produced on the farm 𝑐1 or purchased on the market 𝑐2. Utility is maximised subject to a full income 
constraint, where income includes farm and off-farm income. A dietary diversity constraint defines 
the optimal bundle of food attributes or combination of foods consumed by the household (Smale 
et al., 2015). 
Let 𝑈(𝑐1, 𝑐2) be a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function representing households 
preferences under risk. Under the expected utility model, the household makes decisions so as to 
solve the optimisation problem: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐸𝑈[𝑐1, 𝜋(𝒙)])         (5.1) 
where 𝐸 is the expectations operator and 𝜋 represents all incomes received by the household. 
Following Di Falco and Chavas (2009), the choice of 𝒙 in equation (5.1) can be written in terms of 
the certainty equivalent (CE), satisfying: 
𝑈(𝑐1, 𝐶𝐸) = 𝐸𝑈(𝑐1, 𝜋) = 𝑈(𝑐1, 𝐸(𝜋) − 𝑅)                                                  (5.2)  
where 𝐸(𝜋) is the expected income, and 𝑅 is a risk premium measuring the cost of private risk 
bearing (Di Falco and Chavas, 2009). Equation (5.2) shows that, under risk aversion, risk exposure 
will tend to reduce welfare. 
Risk-averse farm households have an incentive to reduce their risk exposure. We assess 
how DTMVs and MLI included in 𝒙 affect exposure to risks. To do that we follow the moment-
based approach (Antle, 1983). Consider the following econometric specification for the production 
function 𝑔(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘): 
𝑔(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘) = 𝑓1(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘, 𝛽1) + 𝑢                 (5.3) 
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where  𝑓1(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘, 𝛽1) ≡ 𝐸[𝑔(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘)] is the mean of 𝑔(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘), and 𝑢 = 𝑔(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘) −
𝑓1(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘 𝛽1) is a random variable with mean zero. The higher moments of 𝑔(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘) are given 
by: 
𝐸{[𝑔(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘) − 𝑓1(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘, 𝛽1)]
𝑘|𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘} = 𝑓𝑘(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘, 𝛽𝑘) ∀ 𝑘 ≥ 2 (5.4) 
Denoting the first moment (mean), 𝜇1 = 𝐸[𝑔(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘)], the second moment (variance), 
𝜇2 = 𝐸{[𝑔(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘) − 𝑓1(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘, 𝛽1)]
2}, and the third moment (skewness), 𝜇3 = 𝐸{[𝑔(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘) −
𝑓1(𝒙, 𝒔, 𝒘, 𝛽1)]
3}, equation (5.1) can be rewritten as: 
𝐸 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐸𝑈[𝑐1, 𝜋(𝒙)]) = 𝑈(𝑐1, 𝜇1, 𝜇2, 𝜇3 )      (5.5) 
The optimum condition for the adoption of DTMVs and MLI in elasticity form is then given 
by: 
𝜇1
∗ −
1
2
(
𝑈′′(𝜋)
𝑈′(𝜋)
𝑚2) 𝜇2
∗ +
1
6
(
𝑈′′′(𝜋)
𝑈′(𝜋)
𝑚3) 𝜇3
∗ = 0    (5.6) 
where 𝜇𝑗
∗ =
𝜕𝜇𝑗
𝑑𝑠
, 𝑚2 is the variance of 𝜋, and 𝑚3 is the skewness of 𝜋 (Antle, 1987; Di Falco and 
Chavas, 2009). From Equation (5.6), 𝜇1
∗ captures the marginal returns of using DTMVs and MLI 
and the term −
1
2
(
𝑈′′(𝜋)
𝑈′(𝜋)
𝑚2) 𝜇2
∗ +
1
6
(
𝑈′′′(𝜋)
𝑈′(𝜋)
𝑚3) 𝜇3
∗  represents the marginal risk premium of 
adopting DTMVs and MLI (Di Falco and Chavas, 2009; Wossen et al., 2017). A profit-maximising 
farm household would adopt DTMVs and MLI when the returns from using these technologies are 
higher than the returns from not using the technologies. However, the expected increases in weather 
extremes under climate change can be conceptualised as an increase in downside risk, which would, 
on one hand, lead to decreasing incentives to adopt risky new technologies (Arslan et al., 2017). If 
DTMVs and MLI are perceived as risk-decreasing, on the other hand, it can be expected that their 
adoption will increase. A few recent studies have shown that adoption of stress-tolerant crop 
varieties can mitigate downside risks (Emerick et al., 2016; Wossen et al., 2017). 
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The framework described above, allows us to test several hypotheses. First, we hypothesis 
that adoption of DTMVs and MLI will increase under high variability in rainfall and perceived heat 
stress. Related to this, and as our second hypothesis, we test that the mean and skewness of yields 
of maize will increase whereas the variance will decrease with adoption of DTMVs and MLI. This 
would mean increased productivity with reduced downside risk. Third, we hypothesise that 
adoption of DTMVs and MLI will improve the food security situation of households and increase 
dietary diversity. Finally, and consistent with the objective of the climate-smart agriculture 
approach, we test the hypothesis that resilience of livelihoods will improve as a result of growing 
DTMVs and practicing MLI. 
 
5.2.2 Estimation strategy 
Our interest lies first, in understanding the correlation between variability in rainfall and 
perceived increase in heat stress and the probability of growing DTMVs and practicing MLI, and 
second, in evaluating subsequent effects of adoption on yield, downside risk, food security, and 
resilience of livelihoods. We begin our analysis by estimating two separate linear probability 
models: one for DTMVs and another one for MLI using panel data and in fixed effects23. The fixed 
effects model is formulated as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷t + 𝛽2𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐌𝐀𝐓𝐄𝐢𝐭 + 𝛽3𝐗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,            𝑖 = 1, … , N; 𝑡 = 1,2,  (5.7) 
where  𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the binary adoption variable equal to one if the household 𝑖 implemented the CSA 
technology at time 𝑡, and zero if otherwise; 𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐌𝐀𝐓𝐄𝒊𝒕 is a vector of climatic variables; 𝐷𝑡 is an 
indicator variable equal to one at endline and zero at baseline; 𝐗𝑖𝑡 comprises time-varying 
                                                 
23 A few studies consider adoption of agricultural technologies in combinations (see for example, Kassie et al. (2015) 
and Arslan et al. (2017). In our case, however, the number of observations for combined DTMVs plus MLI was very 
small: 5 percent at baseline and 7 percent at endline making it difficult to assess impacts of the combination of 
technologies. 
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household characteristics; 𝑐𝑖 captures time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007). Equation (5.7) was estimated with robust standard errors 
clustered at the sub-village level. 
Next, we estimate the impacts of adoption of DTMVs and MLI on yield, downside risk, 
food security, and resilience. Let 𝑌1𝑖 be the value of a given outcome variable for household 𝑖 with 
adoption of a CSA technology, and let 𝑌0𝑖 be the household’s outcome without adoption of a CSA 
technology. At a given point in time, a household either adopts a CSA technology (𝑇𝑖 = 1)  or does 
not (𝑇𝑖 = 0). Thus the observed outcome, 𝑌𝑖 is  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖𝑌1𝑖 + (1 − 𝑇𝑖)𝑌0𝑖       (5.8) 
The treatment effect of adopting a CSA technology for household 𝑖 is 
𝜏𝑖 = 𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖         (5.9) 
but this effect is not directly observable because the household can only be in one state of nature 
(adopter or non-adopter) at a given time. The population parameters we seek to estimate are the 
average treatment effect (ATE) or average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of CSA adoption, 
where 
𝜏ATE = 𝐸(𝑌1 − 𝑌0)         (5.10) 
𝜏ATT = 𝐸(𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝑇 = 1)        (5.11) 
  If CSA technologies were randomly assigned, then the potential outcomes would be 
independent of treatment (that is, (𝑌1, 𝑌0) ⊥ 𝑇, 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑇 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑇 = 0), 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑇 = 1) =
𝐸(𝑌0|𝑇 = 0)),  𝜏ATE = 𝜏ATT, and we could estimate 𝜏ATE by comparing the mean outcomes of 
CSA technology adopters and non-adopters. In the current case, CSA technologies were not 
randomly assigned, so selection bias is a major concern. We employ various econometric and 
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quasi-experimental approaches to address the endogeneity problem and obtain unbiased estimates 
of the ATT of CSA technology adoption.  
 We first estimate fixed effects (FE) regression according to: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷t + 𝛽2𝐂𝐒𝐀𝐢𝐭 + 𝛽3𝐗𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,            𝑖 = 1, … , N; 𝑡 = 1,2,  (5.12) 
where  𝑦𝑖𝑡 again indicates the outcome of interest (yield, food security, and resilience 
indicators);  𝐂𝐒𝐀𝐢𝐭 represents two adoption dummy variables: (1) equal to one if the household 𝑖 
grew a DTMV at time 𝑡, and zero if otherwise; and (2) equal to one if the household 𝑖 practiced 
MLI at time 𝑡, and zero if otherwise; 𝐷t and 𝐗𝑖t are as defined in equation (5.7); and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the 
random error term. 
An alternative approach to controlling for differences between adopters and non-adopters 
of CSA technologies to obtain unbiased estimates of the ATT is combined inverse-probability 
weighting (IPW) with FE, that is IPW-FE. Propensity score matching (PSM) is first used to obtain 
matched treatment and control observations based on the probability of adopting a CSA 
technology. Two assumptions are, however, crucial for PSM, namely ignorability of treatment and 
common support. The ignorability assumption requires that conditional on observed covariates (𝐗), 
adoption of CSA technology, (𝑇) and the potential outcomes are independent: (𝑌1, 𝑌0) ⊥ 𝑇|𝐗 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The assumption of common support requires that there is 
substantial overlap: 0 < 𝑃(𝑇 = 1|𝐗) < 1, that is, households with the same covariates have 
positive probabilities of both adopting and not-adopting a CSA technology.  
We estimate a probit model of CSA technology adoption in the 2017 survey wave as a 
function of household and village characteristics at baseline (2015). Adopters and non-adopters of 
CSA technologies are then matched using three matching algorithms, namely radius, kernel-based, 
and nearest-neighbour matching. We use the estimated propensity scores to generate weights (𝜑) 
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as follows: for adopters, 𝜑 =
1
𝑝
 whereas for non-adopters 𝜑 =
1
1−𝑝
 where 𝑝 represents estimated 
propensity scores. Equation 5.12 is then estimated incorporating weights from PSM. 
Several tests were conducted to assess the quality of our matching procedure. Results of the 
covariates balancing test for the matched sample are presented in the Appendix Table 5.A.1. There 
are no significant differences in pre-treatment covariates between adopters and non-adopters of 
DTMVS and similarly between adopters and non-adopters of MLI after matching. Furthermore, 
bias was substantially reduced after matching. Figure 5.B.1 in the Appendix shows the distribution 
of the estimated propensity scores by adoption status for DTMVs and MLI. As shown, the 
weighting procedure was successful in generating matched treated and control observations. After 
estimating the propensity scores for the “adopter” and “non-adopter” households we check the 
common support condition. There is considerable overlap in common support. Among households 
that adopted DTMVs, the predicted propensity score ranges from 0.080 to 0.879, with a mean of 
0.299, while among those that did not adopt DTMVs, it ranges from 0.080 to 0.667, with a mean 
of 0.221. Similarly, among households that adopted MLI, the predicted propensity score ranges 
from 0.056 to 0.358, with a mean of 0.201, while among those that did not adopt MLI, it ranges 
from 0.058 to 0.339, with a mean of 0.172. Thus, the common support assumption is satisfied in 
the region of (0.080, 0.879) for DTMVs and (0.056, 0.358) for MLI, with no loss of observations 
from treatment households. 
The standardized mean difference for overall covariates used in the propensity score (19.6% 
for DTMVs and 7.6% for MLI before matching) is reduced to about 3.9 percent for DTMVs and 
1.7 percent for MLI after matching (see Appendix Table 5.A.2). This substantially reduces mean 
bias by 80 percent for DTMVs and 77.6 percent for MLI through matching. The p-values of the 
likelihood ratio tests indicate that the joint significance of covariates was always rejected after 
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matching. The pseudo R-squared also dropped significantly from 13.7 percent for DTMVs and 3.2 
percent for MLI before matching to 0.8 percent for DTMVs and 0.1 percent for MLI after matching. 
Therefore, the low pseudo- R-squared, low mean standardized bias, high total bias reduction, and 
the insignificant p-values of the likelihood ratio test after matching suggest that the proposed 
specification of the propensity score was fairly successful in terms of balancing the distribution of 
covariates between the two groups. 
 
5.2.3 Data 
The panel dataset comes from two waves of household surveys which were implemented 
in Nwoya district, northern Uganda. The first survey (baseline) was implemented in 2015 whereas 
the second one (endline) was conducted in 2017. Both survey rounds covered a total of four sub-
counties and 126 randomly selected sub-villages. The sample used in this study is a balanced panel 
of 747 randomly selected maize growing households, hence 1,494 observations for which we have 
complete data. Data were collected on a broad range of topics including household demographic 
characteristics, crops and livestock production and marketing activities, varieties of crops grown, 
access to credit and information, participation in farmers’ associations, food security, off-farm 
income activities, social networks, and assets ownership.  
In addition to the survey data, georeferenced data on rainfall, temperature, and soil 
characteristics were collected. Rainfall data and temperature data were obtained from WorldClim 
version 2 (WorldClim2). The interpolated WorldClim2 rainfall and temperature data have a spatial 
ground resolution of 1km for the period 1970–2000 (Fick and Hijmans, 2017). In order to generate 
variation in rainfall data between baseline and endline, additional data were obtained from the daily 
Africa Rainfall Climatology version 2 (ARC2) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s Climate Prediction Center (NOAACPC) for the period 2014–2016. These 
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additional data are important to allow our fixed effects estimation not to drop the climate variables. 
The ARC2 rainfall database contains raster data at a spatial ground resolution of 1/10 of degree for 
African countries. Georeferenced data on soil pH were obtained from the Harmonized World Soil 
Database version 1.2 (HWSD) (Hengl et al., 2017). The HWSD has a resolution of 30 arc-seconds. 
The collected survey and georeferenced data were used to construct outcome and explanatory 
variables for analysis as follows. 
 
5.2.4 Variables and descriptive statistics 
5.2.4.1 Adoption 
We define adoption as a binary variable taking a value of one if a household implemented 
the technology on at least one of its plots (irrespective of the area covered) and zero if otherwise. 
Specifically, two adoption dummy variables are created: (1) equal to one if a household grew 
DTMVs (Longe 10H, Longe 7H, or Longe 5) and zero if otherwise; and (2) equal to one if a 
household practiced MLI and zero if otherwise. The grain legumes included in the MLI variable 
are beans and groundnuts. Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics on the use of the technologies. 
On the one hand, the share of households growing DTMVs doubled from 11 percent in 2015 to 22 
percent in 2017. On the other hand, 8.5 percent less households practiced MLI in 2017 compared 
to the proportion in 2015 (26 percent). 
Table 5.1. The Proportion of Adopting Households at Baseline (2015) and Endline (2017) 
Variable 
 2015  2017 
 Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
Drought-tolerant maize varieties (DTMVs)  0.11 (0.31)  0.22 (0.42) 
Maize-legume intercropping (MLI)  0.26 (0.44)  0.177 (0.38) 
Number of observations  747  747 
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5.2.4.2 Mean, variance, and skewness of yields 
Construction of outcome variables used in the estimation of impacts of DTMVs and MLI 
on mean, variance, and skewness of yields followed the following steps. First, yield of maize 
(kg/ha) was measured as total quantity of maize harvested divided by the size of land cultivated 
with the crop and summed for two cropping seasons. Yields were winsorised at one percent to 
account for outliers. In the second step, conditional mean yields were obtained by regressing the 
natural log of yields on a set of explanatory variables including use of inputs other than DTMVs 
and MLI, soil characteristics, climatic variables, and household characteristics via ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors clustered at sub-village level. In the third 
step, residuals from the second step were obtained, squared and regressed on the same set of 
explanatory variables. Similarly, for skewness the residuals obtained from the second step were 
raised to the power of three and regressed on the same set of covariates. Table 5.2 shows that both 
at baseline and endline, adopters of DTMVs and MLI obtained substantially higher yields than 
non-adopters. 
 
5.2.4.3 Food security outcomes 
The first outcome of food security is the months of inadequate household food provisioning 
(MIHFP) (Bilinsky and Swindale, 2010). Households were asked to indicate the months, in the 12 
months preceding the survey, when they experienced a shortage of food. Our MIHFP index, 
therefore, equals the sum of the number of months of food shortage. The index ranges from 0 
(maximum food security) to 12 (maximum food insecurity). The second measure of food security 
is the food consumption score (FCS) (World Food Programme (WFP), 2009). Using seven-day 
food frequency data, all food items were grouped into eight specific food groups, namely main 
staples, pulses, vegetables, fruits, meat and fish, milk, sugar, and oil. All consumption frequencies 
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of food items of the same group were then summed – values of each group above seven were 
recoded to seven. For each food group, the value obtained was then multiplied by its weight to 
create weighted food group scores. Weights come from WFP (2009) as follows: main staples = 2; 
pulses = 2; vegetables = 1; fruit = 1; meat and fish = 4; milk = 4; sugar = 0.5; and oil = 0.5. A sum 
of the weighted food groups produced the FCS. Summary statistics in Table 4.2 show that adopters 
of DTMVs are significantly better in terms of food security outcomes compared with non-adopters 
both at baseline and endline. 
A similar pattern is observed for MLI (Table 5.2, panel B). Furthermore, there is an 
improvement in all outcomes at endline (2017) compared to baseline (2015). The differences in 
outcomes at baseline support our empirical estimation approaches. Construction of the income 
variable is described in the next section. 
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5.2.4.4 Resilience outcome variables 
Two moment-based indices of resilience were constructed following Barrett and Constas 
(2014) and Upton et al. (2016). Barrett and Constas (2014) defined resilience as “the capacity of a 
household to avoid and escape from poverty over time and in the face of shocks. If and only if that 
capacity is and remains high over time, then the unit is resilient”. This is the definition used in the 
current study. We begin the construction of our moment-based resilience indices by choosing two 
livelihoods indicators, namely household income per adult equivalents and household dietary 
diversity score (HDDS)24. Income was measured as the total sum of cash received from sale of 
crops, sale of livestock and livestock products, salaried and wage employment, business and other 
types of self-employment, and remittances. This total sum was then divided by the number of adult 
equivalents for a household and converted to US dollars using purchasing power parity adjusted 
exchange rates for 2015 and 2016. Next, we set a threshold value of one US dollar for income and 
follow Swindale and Bilinsky (2006) to set the minimum HDDS threshold equal to the mean HDDS 
of the wealthiest third of our sample, that is 7.65. 
We then estimated the conditional mean income econometrically as a function of exposure 
to climatic shocks as well as community, household, and individual characteristics using OLS 
regression with robust standard errors clustered at sub-village level. Residuals from the conditional 
mean income equation were then obtained, squared, and regressed on the same covariates to 
estimate conditional variance. A similar estimation procedure was followed separately for 
conditional mean HDDS and conditional variance HDDS. Our dependent variable in the 
conditional mean income equation was the natural log of income per adult equivalents whereas in 
the mean HDDS equation we used HDDS as the dependent variable. The HDDS index is based on 
                                                 
24 Upton et al. (2016) also used HDDS as a livelihoods indicator in their estimation of resilience. 
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twelve food groups including cereals; roots and tubers; vegetables; fruits; meat (including poultry 
and offals); eggs; milk and milk products; fish; pulses legumes and nuts; oil and fats; sugar and 
honey; condiments (Swindale and Bilinsky, 2006). Each group is a binary variable equal to one if 
a household member consumed the food seven days before the survey date and zero otherwise. The 
score is thus a summation across the 12 food groups and ranges from zero to 12. In addition to 
mean and variance, we further estimated the skewness of income. As shown in Appendix Figure 
5.B.2, whereas the distribution of HDDS is normal, that of income is skewed. 
The probability of meeting a threshold level of well-being, 𝑦 (1 US dollar per day) for 
income was then derived using the conditional mean, variance, and skewness estimates, and 
similarly the probability of meeting 𝑞 (7.65) for HDDS using conditional mean and variance. As a 
final step, resilience scores were computed as a function of the estimated probability that the 
household will meet or surpass the income threshold and similarly for HDDS. This procedure, 
therefore, gives us two moment-based resilience variables; an income-based and an HDDS-based 
index. 
Furthermore, it is important to understand how resilience changed over time. In order to 
perform this analysis, terciles were created from each of the two indices (income-based and HDDS-
based). We then examine the proportion of people who moved from “least resilient” in 2015 to 
“average resilient” and “most resilient” in 2017. Table 5.3 presents summary statistics of the 
resilience outcome variables. As shown in panel A, values for the two resilience variables were 
higher for households which grew a DTMV compared with their non-adopting counterparts, both 
at baseline and endline. For example, the income-based index was 21 percent higher at baseline 
and 26 percent higher at endline for adopters of DTMVs than for non-adopters. Whereas the index 
rose by about three percent for farmers who grew a DTMV, the index fell by the same magnitude 
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for non-adopters, between the baseline and the endline. Similar to DTMVs, the resilience indices 
were higher for adopters of MLI compared with non-adopters (panels B). 
Table 5.3. Summary Statistics of Resilience Outcome Variables, by Adopter Category 
Variables 
Baseline (2015)  Endline (2017) 
Adopters Non-adopters  Adopters Non-adopters 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
 Panel A: Drought-tolerant (DT) varieties 
Income-based 
index 
0.138 (0.144) 0.083 (0.092)***  0.257 (0.210) 0.118 (0.146)*** 
HDDS-based 
index 
0.404 (0.156) 0.327 (0.139)***  0.562 (0.188) 0.383 (0.188)*** 
Observations 79 668  166 581 
 Panel B: Maize-legume (M-L) intercropping 
Income-based 
index 
0.111 (0.0126) 0.080 (0.087)***  0.194 (0.190) 0.140 (0.166)*** 
HDDS-based 
index 
0.372 (0.0152) 0.322 (0.137)***  0.489 (0.205) 0.409 (0.198)*** 
Observations 196 551  132 615 
Notes: HDDS=household dietary diversity score; Income-based and HDDS-based indices are 
moment-based following Barrett and Constas (2014). *, **, *** means statistically significant 
difference between adopters and non-adopters at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
5.2.4.5 Explanatory variables 
The choice of explanatory variables that would influence the decision to adopt DTMVs and 
MLI, and the outcomes was informed by economic theory, empirical literature, and availability of 
data. The explanatory variables are mainly drawn from studies on adoption of agricultural 
technologies (Kassie et al., 2011; 2013; Asfaw et al., 2012; Shiferaw et al., 2014), those that focus 
on adoption of risk-mitigating technologies (Di Falco and Bulte, 2012; Di Falco and Veronesi, 
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2013), those that estimate resilience of households and its determinants (Barrett and Constas, 2014; 
Upton et al., 2016), and those that examine the effect of agricultural technologies on agricultural 
productivity (Di Falco and Chavas, 2009; Arslan et al., 2017; Wossen et al. 2017) and  food security 
(Smale et al., 2015; Kabunga et al., 2014). 
Variables commonly considered to influence adoption behaviour of rural households 
include households’ human capital (sex, age, and education of the household head, and household’s 
dependency ratio); productive capital (household assets-based wealth index); agricultural 
knowledge; access to credit and markets; social networks; and exposure to climatic shocks. Four 
climatic variables are included: (1) coefficient of variation in seasonal rainfall; (2) total amount of 
seasonal rainfall; (3) perception about prolonged droughts; and (4) perception about increasing 
temperature. We further controlled for biophysical (soil) characteristics by including soil organic 
carbon and soil pH. Furthermore, estimation of the production function as described in section 
5.2.1 requires that we control for use of external inputs, other than DTMVs. We, therefore, 
constructed three dummy variables measuring use of fertiliser, manure, and agro-chemicals 
(pesticides and herbicides). Table 5.4 provides summary descriptive statistics of the explanatory 
variables for the whole sample at baseline and endline. 
Households were predominantly male-headed with an average of 43 years of age and six 
years of completed formal education. About 40 percent of the household heads had completed 
primary level of education (primary 7). A household had on average six members and a dependency 
ratio of 55 percent. Close to 60 percent of households reported to have received credit and more 
than 80 percent had at least one member participating in a farmers’ association in 2017. On average, 
a household had two other households in the same village with whom they were related by blood 
or marriage. 
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Table 5.4. Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
Variable 
 2015  2017 
 Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
HHH is female (1=yes; 0=otherwise)  0.18 (0.38)  0.19 (0.39) 
Age of HHH (years)  42.00 (14.39)  43.00 (14.25) 
Education of HHH (years)  5.71 (3.34)  5.64 (3.38) 
HHH has education above primary seven (1=yes; 
0=otherwise) 
 0.44 (0.50)  0.41 (0.49) 
Dependency ratio (%)  55.60 (21.84)  55.27 (0.20) 
Knowledge about agricultural technologies (score)  4.33 (1.91)  5.67 (3.57) 
Number of different sources of income for the HH  3.00 (0.99)  3.50 (1.45) 
HH received credit (1=yes; 0=otherwise)  0.71 (0.45)  0.56 (0.50) 
HH has a member participating in a farmers’ 
association(1=yes; 0=otherwise) 
 0.76 (0.43)  0.83 (0.37) 
Kinship network (number of relatives in same 
village) 
 2.00 (1.05)  3.00 (1.40) 
Farm size (amount of cultivated land in ha)  1.89 (1.52)  2.02 (1.96) 
Ownership of agricultural assets (index)  0.30 (0.50)  1.29 (0.50) 
Ownership of non-agricultural assets (index)  0.74 (0.65)  0.85 (0.65) 
Livestock ownership (TLU)  0.70 (1.51)  0.92 (1.70) 
Self-reported willingness to take risks (score 0-10)  5.57 (2.71)  5.57 (2.71) 
Total seasonal rainfall (mm)  799.18 (50.50)  799.18 (50.50) 
Coefficient of variation in seasonal rainfall (%)  26.83 (1.56)  26.83 (1.56) 
Household perceives prolonged drought  0.688 (0.464)  0.482 (0.500) 
Household perceives rising temperature  0.232 (0.422)  0.510 (0.500) 
Distance to the nearest main road (walking minutes)  11.73 (18.19)  11.73 (18.19) 
Distance to the nearest main market (walking 
minutes) 
 43.32 (34.07)  43.32 (34.07) 
Soil pH  5.84 (0.15)  5.84 (0.15) 
Soil organic carbon  22.66 (4.07)  22.66 (4.07) 
Number of observations  747  747 
Notes: HH=Household; HHH=household head; TLU=Tropical Livestock Units. 
 
Ownership of assets including livestock was very low both in 2015 and 2017. On a scale of 
zero (does not take risks at all) to 10 (always takes risks), the average willingness to take risks was 
5.6. Households walked, on average, about 12 minutes to the nearest main road and close to 45 
minutes to the nearest main market. Use of external input was very low; only 0.6 percent of 
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households applied fertilisers at baseline while seven percent used agrochemicals. At endline, 1.2 
percent had used fertilisers while the percentage of households that applied agrochemicals 
increased to 15 percent. In terms of climatic variables, the average amount of total seasonal rainfall 
received was 800mm. The coefficient of variation in seasonal rainfall was 26.8 percent. The 
maximum seasonal temperature for 72 percent of our sample households exceeded 28˚C. The 
average soil pH was 5.8 and the soil organic carbon content was 23 percent. 
 
5.3 Empirical results 
5.3.1 Determinants of adoption 
Results of fixed effects regression to assess the determinants of adoption of DTMVs and 
MLI are presented in Table 5.5, expressed in terms of marginal effects. Column (1) presents effects 
on adoption of DTMVs whereas column (2) shows results for MLI. Households that had 
experienced increasing temperature were more likely to grow a DTMV, suggesting that farmers 
perceived such varieties as a strategy to mitigate the effects of heat stress. Specifically, 
experiencing warmer days correlated with a 7.2 percentage points increase in the likelihood to 
adopt DTMVs relative to households that did not report changes in temperature. The likelihood to 
use DTMVs also correlated positively, although not significantly, with the coefficient of variation 
in seasonal rainfall.  
Results further show that the decision to adopt DTMVs is influenced by education of the 
household head and agricultural knowledge. A one point increase in the knowledge score correlated 
significantly with a 5.2 percentage points increase in the likelihood to grow a DTMV. The finding 
that knowledge exposure correlated positively with the adoption decision is consistent with 
previous studies and supports efforts targeting to increase diffusion of agricultural knowledge 
among farmers in SSA (Lambrecht et al., 2014; Kondylis et al., 2017; Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 
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2018). Better educated household heads may have an increased ability to search for and apply 
agricultural knowledge. 
Table 5.5. Determinants of Adoption of Drought-Tolerant Maize Varieties (DTMVs) and Maize-
Legume Intercropping (MLI): Fixed Effects Regression Model 
Variable 
 DTMVs  MLI 
 (1)  (2) 
Total seasonal rainfall (mm)  0.006 (0.021)  -0.054*** (0.020) 
Coefficient of variation in seasonal rainfall 
(%) 
 0.009 (0.015)  -0.007 (0.013) 
Household perceives prolonged drought  -0.004 (0.025)  -0.022 (0.033) 
Household perceives rising temperature  0.058** (0.029)  0.084*** (0.031) 
Household head is female  -0.042 (0.055)  0.053 (0.081) 
Age of household head  -0.011 (0.103)  -0.028 (0.137) 
Household head has education above primary  0.122** (0.059)  0.152** (0.070) 
Dependency ratio  -0.032 (0.071)  0.055 (0.093) 
Income sources for the household  0.005 (0.011)  0.026** (0.013) 
Agricultural assets index  0.053* (0.030)  0.042 (0.036) 
Household assets index  -0.046* (0.024)  0.064* (0.032) 
Farm size (ha)  -0.009 (0.008)  0.008 (0.010) 
Number of relatives  0.018 (0.012)  0.037*** (0.013) 
Group membership  -0.046 (0.034)  0.044 (0.039) 
Knowledge score  0.052*** (0.005)  0.004 (0.006) 
Endline  0.047 (0.160)  -0.493*** (0.147) 
Constant  -1.283 (2.706)  7.832*** (2.728) 
Observations  1,494  1,494 
     
Diagnostics     
R-squared  0.235  0.563 
Proportion of variance due to fixed effects  0.349  0.102 
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at sub-village level. 
All variables are as defined in Table 4.4. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
 154 
 
Ownership of assets influence adoption of DTMVs. Whereas the agricultural assets index 
correlated with an increased likelihood to adopt DTMVs, there was a negative relationship between 
non-agricultural assets index and the probability of growing DTMVs. A possible explanation is 
that  households endowed with agricultural assets may find it easier to experiment with DTMVs 
(Langyntuo and Mungoma 2008). Those with a greater endowment of non-agricultural assets may, 
however, have other means to cope with shocks hence a reduced likelihood to adopt DTMVs. 
Results in column (2) show that several factors influence the likelihood to practice MLI. 
An increase in the long run seasonal rainfall by one millimetre correlated with a reduced likelihood 
of practicing MLI by 8.4 percentage points whereas a rise in temperature increased the probability 
of implementing the practice. The practice of MLI in northern Uganda is largely a diversification 
strategy. In anticipation of climate related shocks, households practice MLI to mitigate the risk of 
total crop failure—should one crop fail, farmers could still harvest the second crop (Shikuku et al., 
2015). Similar to DTMVs, education of the household head correlated with an increased likelihood 
of practicing MLI.  
The number of kinship links was significantly correlated with an increased probability of 
adopting MLI. Contrary to the findings of Di Falco and Bulte (2013), this positive relationship 
suggests that kinship networks are a complementary risk-mitigating strategy that may not attenuate 
incentives to adopt recommended CSA technologies. The possibility of complementarities in risk-
mitigating strategies can further be observed from the positive correlation of the diversity of income 
sources with the decision to adopt MLI. Diversification is widely recognised as a strategy for 
adapting to climatic shocks (Kankwamba et al., 2018).  
Wealth status of households correlate with the decision to practice MLI. We find a positive 
correlation between the non-agricultural assets index and the probability of practicing MLI. 
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Households with a greater endowment of assets may be able to smoothen consumption by selling 
or leasing out some of its assets when hit by shocks. The positive correlation between non-
agricultural assets and the likelihood of practicing MLI possibly suggests that both strategies are 
perceived as risk-minimizing and consumption smoothing options. 
 
5.3.2 Impact of DTMVs and MLI on mean, variance, and skewness of maize yields 
Table 5.6 presents results of econometric analysis to assess the effect of DTMVs and MLI 
on maize productivity (mean of yields), production risk (variance of yields), and downside risk 
(skewness of yields). Columns (1), (3), and (5) present results of fixed effects (FE) regression 
analysis whereas columns (2), (4), and (6) show results of combined FE with inverse-probability 
weighting (IPW). In general, increasing productivity, reducing variance, and increasing skewness 
are seen as desirable. A lower variance of yields means lower risk exposure. Similarly, a higher 
skewness means reduced exposure to unfavourable events located in the lower tail of the yield 
distribution (Shi et al., 2013; Wossen et al., 2017).  
Results show that adoption of DTMVs and MLI had a significant positive effect on average 
yields of maize. Mean yields increased by 18 percent more for adopters of DTMVs and seven 
percent more for adopters of MLI relative to non-adopters (column 1). The regression results for 
the variance function are shown in columns (3 and 4). Both DTMVs and MLI are found to be 
statistically significant. Adoption of DTMVs and MLI reduces the variance of yield. Specifically, 
the variance of maize yield fell by seven percent with adoption of DTMVs and three percent with 
MLI, although for the latter technology, the effect is only statistically significant at 10 percent level 
under the IPW-FE estimation. If the variance were taken to be the only measure of risk, results in  
columns (3) and (4) suggest that DTMVs and MLI are risk-reducing technologies. Risk reduction 
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is welfare-enhancing for risk-averse farmers (Di Falco and Chavas, 2006). Together, the findings 
that DTMVs increased productivity and reduced production risks are consistent with previous 
studies such as Wossen et al. (2017). Variance does not, however, distinguish between unexpected 
good and bad outcomes (Di Falco and Chavas, 2009). We, therefore, extend our analysis to assess 
the effect of DTMVs and MLI on skewness of yields. 
The regression results for the skewness function are presented in columns (5) and (6) in 
Table 5.6. The effect of DTMVs on skewness of yields is not statistically significant at 10 percent 
level (see also Figure 5.B.3 in the Appendix). The effect of MLI is negative and statistically 
significant at five percent level under the FE estimation. This effect, which would suggest that MLI 
increases downside risks, however disappears when differences in observable time-varying 
characteristics of households are controlled for using IPW-FE. The finding that DTMVs did not 
reduce the probability of obtaining yields in the lower tail of the distribution contradicts that of 
Wossen et al. (2017) in rural Nigeria. The finding is, however, in line with the on-going debate 
about CSA technologies and specifically speaks to the argument that such technologies are context-
specific. The finding further supports that in order to understand  the impacts of CSA technologies 
on productivity and risk, there is need to move beyond mean yields and to consider variance and 
skewness of yields. 
In order to understand whether and how the effects of DTMVs and MLI on yields change 
under climatic shocks, heterogeneous treatment effects are estimated. Table 5.7 presents IPW-FE 
estimates of the heterogeneous treatment effects of DTMVs and MLI by climatic shocks on mean, 
variance, and skewness of yields. We find strongly significant effects of DTMVs on mean and 
variance of yields. Adoption of DTMVs increased yields and reduced variance of yields under 
climatic shocks.  
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Table 5.6. Impact of Drought-Tolerant Maize Varieties (DTMVs) and Maize-Legume 
Intercropping (MLI) on Mean, Variance, and Skewness of Yield 
Variable 
 Average yield  Variance of yield  Skewness of yield 
 FE IPW-FE  FE IPW-FE  FE IPW-FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
DTMV  0.175*** 
(0.026) 
0.183*** 
(0.030) 
 
-0.066*** 
(0.013) 
-0.071*** 
(0.017) 
 
-0.013 
(0.022) 
-0.026 
(0.023) 
MLI  0.072*** 
(0.019) 
0.078*** 
(0.028) 
 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
-0.029* 
(0.015) 
 
-0.041** 
(0.018) 
-0.002 
(0.026) 
Endline  0.223*** 
(0.016) 
0.226*** 
(0.019) 
 
-0.076*** 
(0.009) 
-0.081*** 
(0.011) 
 
-0.171*** 
(0.014) 
-0.162*** 
(0.017) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant  6.398*** 
(0.073) 
6.428*** 
(0.131) 
 
0.809*** 
(0.038) 
0.794*** 
(0.086) 
 
-0.436*** 
(0.073) 
-0.297** 
(0.145) 
Observations  1,007 863  1,007 863  1,007 863 
R-squared  0.536 0.659  0.474 0.464  0.448 0.463 
Fraction of 
variance due 
to fixed 
effects 
 
0.631 0.630  0.668 0.683  0.690 0.704 
Notes: FE=fixed effects; IPW-FE combined inverse probability weighting (IPW) with fixed effects (FE), that is, fixed 
effects estimation on matched treatment and control observations. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at sub-village level. 
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Table 5.7. Heterogeneity of Yield Impacts by Weather Shock 
Variable 
Average yield Variance of yield Skewness of yield 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Panel A: Coefficient of variation in rainfall 
 1st quintile 3rd quintile 1st quintile 3rd quintile 1st quintile 3rd quintile 
DTMV 0.114** 
(0.049) 
0.108*** 
(0.040) 
-0.104*** 
(0.024) 
-0.044** 
(0.019) 
-0.052 
(0.036) 
-0.016 
(0.052) 
MLI 0.081* 
(0.081) 
0.121** 
(0.056) 
-0.012 
(0.026) 
0.010 
(0.022) 
-0.021 
(0.034) 
-0.063 
(0.065) 
Observations 283 295 283 295 283 295 
       
 Panel B: Perception about occurrence of prolonged drought 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
DTMV 0.122*** 
(0.042) 
0.172** 
(0.084) 
-0.077*** 
(0.022) 
-0.109*** 
(0.032) 
0.020 
(0.046) 
-0.032 
(0.041) 
MLI 0.050 
(0.032) 
-0.057 
(0.070) 
-0.022 
(0.020) 
0.008 
(0.026) 
0.014 
(0.036) 
-0.021 
(0.037) 
Observations 520 343 520 343 520 343 
       
 Panel C: Perception about rising temperature 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
DTMV 0.188*** 
(0.068) 
0.237*** 
(0.054) 
-0.082*** 
(0.025) 
-0.085*** 
(0.024) 
0.009 
(0.048) 
-0.048 
(0.033) 
MLI -0.005 
(0.060) 
0.019 
(0.046) 
-0.014 
(0.032) 
0.022 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.046) 
0.031 
(0.035) 
Observations 351 512 351 512 351 512 
Notes: Combined inverse probability weighting (IPW) with fixed effects (FE) estimates, that is, fixed effects estimation 
on matched treatment and control observations. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Figures in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. 
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The effect of DTMVs on skewness of yield is also positive under the perceived prolonged 
droughts and increased temperature (Panels B and C), suggesting a reduction of downside risks. 
The effects are, however, not statistically significant at 10 percent level. The effects of MLI is not 
statistically significant under the self-reported perceived prolonged droughts and increased 
temperature (Panels B and C). Results in Panel A, that is, under increased uncertainty in rainfall 
indicate that MLI increased mean of yields but had no significant effect on the variance and 
skewness of yields.  
 
5.3.3 Impact of DTMVs and MLI on Food Security and Resilience 
Results of FE and IPW-FE estimation of the impacts of DTMVs and MLI on food security 
are presented in Table 5.8. As shown in columns (1) and (2) adoption of DTMVs and MLI 
significantly improved food security. Specifically, the period of food shortage reduced by 7–8 days 
for DTMVs adopters and 8–12 days for MLI adopters compared with non-adopters. Furthermore, 
results show an increase in household income per adult equivalents (columns 3–4). Specifically, 
income increased by 25–34 percent with DTMVs adoption and by 20–25 percent with adoption of 
MLI. The frequency of food consumption also improved with adoption of DTMVs and MLI 
(columns 5–6) . The food consumption score increased between 2.3–3.1 points more with DTMVs 
and by 2.4 points more with MLI compared with non-adoption. The findings that DTMVs 
improved food security are consistent with Wossen et al. (2017). 
 
 
 160 
 
Table 5.8. Impact of Drought-Tolerant Maize Varieties (DTMVs) and Maize-Legume 
Intercropping (MLI) on Food Security Outcomes 
Variable 
 Months of food 
shortage 
 Household income  
Food consumption 
score 
 FE IPW-FE  FE IPW-FE  FE IPW-FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
DTMV  -0.282** 
(0.112) 
-0.227** 
(0.141) 
 
0.343*** 
(0.083) 
0.251** 
(0.101) 
 
2.319* 
(1.367) 
3.083* 
(1.562) 
MLI  -0.406*** 
(0.126) 
-0.257** 
(0.128) 
 
0.200*** 
(0.077) 
0.251*** 
(0.078) 
 
2.441** 
(1.105) 
2.236** 
(1.579) 
Endline  0.133* 
(0.078) 
0.180** 
(0.082) 
 
0.462*** 
(0.055) 
0.519*** 
(0.064) 
 
3.121*** 
(0.663) 
3.687*** 
(0.802) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant  2.345*** 
(0.503) 
2.828*** 
(0.662) 
 
4.918*** 
(0.355) 
5.181*** 
(0.446) 
 
37.025*** 
(4.112) 
38.745*** 
(5.944) 
Observations  1,494 1,278  1,494 1,494  1,494 1,494 
R-squared  0.035 0.037  0.187 0.272  0.056 0.102 
Fraction of 
variance due 
to fixed 
effects 
 
0.346 0.398  0.456 0.473  0.387 0.384 
Notes: FE=fixed effects; IPW-FE combined inverse probability weighting (IPW) with fixed effects (FE), that is, fixed 
effects estimation on matched treatment and control observations. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at sub-village level. 
 
Although results of heterogeneous treatment effects of DTMVs and MLI on yield under 
climatic shocks showed positive impacts, we are further interested to explicitly examine effects on 
resilience. Table 5.9 presents FE and IPW-FE estimates of the effects of DTMVs and MLI on 
resilience. We find that both technologies increased resilience of livelihoods. In terms of the 
income-based resilience indicator, results in columns (1) and (2) show that resilience increased by 
3–5 percentage points more for adopters of DTMVs and by 3–4 percentage points more for 
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adopters of MLI compared with non-adopters. The results are consistent when we use HDDS as an 
indicator for livelihood. Specifically, results in columns (3) and (4) indicate that the HDDS-based 
index rose by 0.07–0.08 points for DTMVs and 0.06–0.07 points for MLI. 
Table 5.9. Impact of Drought-Tolerant Maize Varieties (DTMVs) and Maize-Legume 
Intercropping (MLI) on Resilience 
Variable 
 Income-based indicator  HDDS-based indicator 
 FE IPW-FE  FE IPW-FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
DTMV  0.053*** 
(0.011) 
0.031*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.080*** 
(0.011) 
0.071*** 
(0.013) 
MLI  0.030*** 
(0.008) 
0.041*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.056*** 
(0.009) 
0.066*** 
(0.013) 
Endline  0.091*** 
(0.005) 
0.104*** 
(0.007) 
 
0.140*** 
(0.006) 
0.147*** 
(0.007) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant  0.027 
(0.025) 
0.080 
(0.049) 
 
0.293*** 
(0.034) 
0.300*** 
(0.053) 
Observations  1,494 1,278  1,494 1,278 
R-squared  0.556 0.594  0.556 0.594 
Fraction of variance 
due to fixed effects 
 
0.460 0.461  0.460 0.461 
Notes: FE=fixed effects; IPW-FE combined inverse probability weighting (IPW) with fixed effects (FE), that is, fixed 
effects estimation on matched treatment and control observations; HDDS=household dietary diversity score. ***p < 
0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at sub-village level. 
 
Figure 5.B.4 shows the transition from lower terciles of resilience scores to highest terciles. 
The upper panel shows the transition for the income-based index whereas the lower panel shows 
transition for the HDDS-based index. Both panels display a similar pattern. In 2015, majority of 
the households were in the lower and intermediate terciles. The percentage of households in the 
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highest terciles, however, increased in 2017 whereas that in the lower and intermediate terciles 
reduced. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
At the centre of agricultural and economic development policy debates in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) today is the question of how to sustainably increase yield, reduce downside risks, 
improve food security, and enhance resilience of livelihoods to climatic shocks. Climate-smart 
agriculture (CSA) is increasingly promoted as an approach that can help to answer this question. 
This chapter focused on two pillars of CSA, namely food security and resilience, and sought to 
specifically address the following objectives: (1) to assess the relationship between climatic 
variables and the probability of growing drought-tolerant maize varieties (DTMVs) and practicing 
maize-legume intercropping (MLI); (2) to assess the effect of DTMVs and MLI on yield of maize, 
production risks, and downside risks; (3) to assess the effect of DTMVs and MLI on food security; 
(4) to assess the effect of DTMVs and MLI on resilience of livelihoods. 
The study combined a panel survey dataset from northern Uganda with georeferenced 
climatic data and employed fixed effects estimation and inverse probability weighting technique to 
assess causal impacts. We found an increased likelihood to adopt DTMVs and to practice MLI 
when households perceived rising temperatures. The likelihood to practice MLI correlated 
negatively with an increase in total amount of seasonal rainfall. These results suggest that farmers 
perceive DTMVs and MLI as risk-mitigating technologies. Furthermore, adoption of DTMVs and 
MLI increased mean and reduced variance of maize yield suggesting positive impacts on 
productivity and production risks. The impact of DTMVs on skewness of yields was positive under 
climatic shocks, but not statistically significant meaning that the technology did not reduce 
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downside risks. Similarly, MLI did not reduce downside risks under climatic shocks. Finally, we 
found that both DTMVs and MLI improved food security and increased resilience of livelihoods. 
The findings of this study have several important implications for policy and future 
research. First, under conditions characterised by increasing climatic shocks, efforts to promote 
adoption of DTMVs and MLI can help to achieve increased yield, food security, and resilience of 
smallholder farmers’ livelihoods. Promoting adoption of DTMVs will require increased investment 
in the diffusion of accurate knowledge about the technology including its benefits and proper 
implementation. Leveraging social networks may increase knowledge diffusion through social 
learning. Secondly, there is need for further research to assess impacts of DTMVs and MLI on 
downside risks in diverse contexts. 
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Figure 5.B.3. Distribution of maize yield among adopters and non-adopters of drought-
tolerant (DT) maize varieties 
Notes: Kolmogorove-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test p-value = 0.000. 
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Chapter 6 
Synthesis 
6.1 Introduction 
Central to agricultural transformation and economic development in poor countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), especially in the face of increasing climatic shocks, are 
technological innovations. Insights from economist Theodore W. Schultz tell us that 
smallholder farmers in SSA may be poor because they have used the state of art at their disposal 
to the fullest, so that to realise any meaningful change in their livelihoods, they would require 
technological innovations. But why is it that rational farmers continue to rely on low-yielding 
technologies, often producing below their subsistence means, even in situations where welfare-
enhancing technologies exist? In many countries of SSA, there tends to be a huge gap between 
yields at research stations and actual yields in farmers’ fields (Tittonell and Giller, 2013). High-
yielding technologies “lie on the shelves” at research stations while the intended beneficiaries 
live in squalor as a consequence of depressed yields. Poverty traps tend to be well-established 
in many rural areas of SSA. A formidable challenge for policy in this region, therefore, is 
finding ways of breaking such poverty traps and inducing virtuous circles through increased 
diffusion of technological innovations. Social learning can help towards that end (Bandiera and 
Rasul, 2006). Yet, our understanding of the mechanisms through which social learning happens 
is limited. 
This thesis analyses and discusses the role of incentives in the diffusion of agricultural 
knowledge and technologies. The thesis not only sheds light on how incentives shape 
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information exchange networks and the subsequent effects on adoption of agricultural 
technologies, but also provides important insights about the impact of  “recommended” climate-
smart agricultural (CSA) technologies on yields and food security, downside risk, and resilience 
of livelihoods. The insights generated come from a combination of household survey panel data 
and economic lab-in-the-field experiments. The main message of the thesis is that incentives 
directed at randomly selected “seed nodes” within the target population influence knowledge 
and technology diffusion through social learning subsequently improving the welfare of the 
rural poor. In the following sections, the main lessons learnt from each chapter are presented, 
including discussions of the resulting policy implications and recommendations for future 
research. 
 
6.2 Key lessons and implications for policy 
6.2.1 Incentives and the diffusion of agricultural knowledge 
While literature has long established the importance of incentives in inducing worker 
effort (Lazear, 1982; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Shearer, 2004; Charnes et al., 2010), the focus 
has mainly been on the effect of financial rewards in settings in which employee effort only 
benefits the employer (Bandiera et al., 2011). Our understanding of incentives for prosocial 
behaviour, especially in agricultural settings is limited. Prosocial behaviour includes a range of 
individual actions that not only take into account individual benefits, but also those of others. 
A prosocial task is, therefore, one that creates benefits enjoyed by those other than the employer 
and employee (Ashraf et al., 2014).  
Prosocial behaviour is a function of extrinsic, intrinsic, and image motivation (Benabou 
and Tirole, 2006).  Extrinsically motivated individuals would expend costly effort in 
completing a task only when provided with private material rewards. In agriculture, for 
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example, Ben Yishay and Mobarak (2018) showed that communication within social networks 
about new technologies is more effective when knowledgeable individuals are incentivised with 
small bags of agricultural inputs. Intrinsically motivated individuals exhibit others-regarding 
behaviour and believe that doing something “good” for others is good (Ariely et al., 2009). 
Image motivation means that individuals behave the way they do in order to seek social 
approval of their behaviour (Gneezy et al., 2011). Insights from behavioural economics indicate 
that interaction of extrinsic motivation with intrinsic and image motivation may create potential 
crowding-in or crowding-out effects suggesting the need to consider the three types of 
motivations in analysing prosocial behaviour (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Ariely et al., 2009; 
Gneezy et al., 2011). 
A few authors have examined the effect of the three types of motivation on prosocial 
behaviour. Ashraf et al. (2014) studied the diffusion of a health intervention—condoms—and 
found that altruism, material rewards, and image motivation influenced effort to sell condoms 
in Zambia. Very few studies have examined incentive effects on worker performance in 
agricultural settings (Bandiera et al., 2005; Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 2018). Empirical 
evidence on the effect of altruism and image motivation on prosocial behaviour in agriculture 
is missing. 
Chapter 2 distinguished between private material rewards and social recognition and 
generated an incentive-compatible measure of altruism using an auxiliary lab-in-the field 
experiment. The chapter studies the incentive effects on the diffusion of agricultural knowledge 
from randomly selected and trained disseminating farmers (DFs) to their neighbours. We learnt 
that both material rewards and social recognition induced DFs to expend costly effort to 
communicate with their neighbours about the new technologies, but only social recognition 
influenced the likelihood of DFs to experiment with the technologies. Without incentives, 
altruistic DFs did not communicate with their neighbours about the new technologies. 
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The main policy implication of these findings is that efforts promoting the diffusion of 
agricultural technologies through social networks would benefit from carefully selecting a 
subset of individuals in the target population, and providing direct training and incentives to 
them hence encouraging communication with neighbours. Several studies have recently 
indicated that without incentives communication within social networks may be sub-optimal 
(Kondylis et al., 2017; Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 2018).  Kondylis et al. (2017), for example 
showed that although direct training of contact farmers increased their own knowledge and 
experimentation with new agricultural technologies, this did not translate into improved 
knowledge and adoption rates of other farmers. In discussing their results, the authors indicate 
that lack of incentives was an impediment to technology diffusion. One of the main reasons 
attributed to the failure of national extension systems in developing countries is the high cost 
of implementation (Anderson and Feder, 2007). We show that recognising the effort of DFs in 
public has a similar effect in inducing communication effort as does private material rewards, 
and even greater impact on experimentation with agricultural technologies. 
The findings further imply that when networks are dispersed and benefits associated 
with a technology are heterogeneous, incentives matter even to the most altruistic disseminating 
farmers. Heterogeneity of benefits depends not only on the biophysical environment, but may 
also be caused by differences in the quality of agricultural inputs. Bold et al. (2017) showed a 
large presence of adulterated agro-inputs in Uganda which depressed yields and discouraged 
investment by farmers. The aggregate uncertainty introduced by fake seeds may lead to 
‘incorrect herds’ when the inferior technology is chosen in the long run with positive probability 
(Monzón, 2017). Designing optimal incentives for prosocial behaviour in agricultural settings 
will, therefore, require a better understanding of the context in which farmers operate and 
addressing market imperfections related to poor quality of inputs.   
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6.2.2 Social distance and information exchange 
Homophilous individuals have a tendency to associate disproportionately with others 
who are similar to themselves (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954). Although studies that examine 
social learning in agriculture recognise this fact, very few have actually empirically examined 
the correlation between social distance and information exchange. The studies that have 
attempted to address this gap have generated inconclusive evidence on the effect of social 
distance on communication within networks. Whereas the general conclusion so far is that 
individuals tend to learn more from neighbours with whom they have similar characteristics or 
face similar agronomic constraints (Munshi, 2004; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Santos and 
Barrett, 2010; Magnan et al., 2015; Ben Yishay and Mobarak, 2018), some authors have shown  
that information diffusion only diminishes if the social distance is excessive (Feder and 
Savastano, 2006). But does social distance matter in agricultural knowledge and technology 
diffusion when the community is involved in selecting “perceived” representative 
disseminating farmers (DFs) and when the thus selected DFs are provided with direct 
agricultural training? 
Chapter 3 of this thesis attempts to answer this question. We learn that social distance 
matters for information exchange even when the community itself is involved in the selection 
process of the DFs. There is an increased likelihood of information exchange from female DFs, 
regardless of the sex of the recipient neighbour. We further find that the likelihood of 
information exchange increases when the difference between DFs and their neighbours in farm 
size cultivated with maize is greater than the median distance in the sub-village.  In terms of 
wealth, results show an increased likelihood of information exchange both when differences in 
the non-agricultural assets index between DFs and their neighbours is less than the sub-village 
median and when the differences exceed the sub-village median. Information exchange links 
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with trained DFs increased knowledge for improved varieties and conservation farming basins, 
but only increased adoption for improved varieties. 
In terms of policy, the findings of Chapter 3 suggest that including more female “seed 
nodes” among individuals selected to help with communication about new agricultural 
technologies will enhance diffusion by increasing outreach to both male and female farmers. In 
Mozambique, for example, Kondylis et al. (2016) found that female farmers were more likely 
to visit male messenger demonstration plots monthly only in communities with female 
messengers. Involving the community in selecting DFs may increase trust in the motive and 
competence (Buck and Alwang, 2011) of female messengers subsequently increasing 
acceptance of their messages among men and women. As indicated by Kondylis et al. (2016), 
female messengers may increase female farmer awareness of the technology and hence their 
demand for information—consistent with women becoming empowered in the presence of 
female leadership (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004). 
If the positive correlation between farm size under maize and information exchange can 
be interpreted to imply more experience in cultivating the crop, targeting experienced DFs may 
enhance social learning. Indeed, Barrett and Santos (2010) showed increased likelihood of 
information exchange within networks when the messenger was more experienced in farming. 
Furthermore, DFs whose endowment of assets is close to that of co-villagers may be more 
effective to disseminate agricultural technologies because their messages are likely to be 
relevant to the decision-making of their neighbours. Those with a greater endowment might, 
however, cover experimentation costs hence have an increased ability to demonstrate use of  
the technologies. As indicated by Feder and Savastano (2006), however, information exchange 
may stop if social distance is excessive. Future research should, therefore, examine the non-
linear impacts of these variables on information exchange when the distance is excessive. 
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The finding that increased knowledge did not translate into increased adoption of 
conservation farming basins imply that additional constraints might exist. Technologies that 
mean simply substituting a new variety into an existing production system require little overall 
change (although albeit some extra investment). Farmers are likely to face many more barriers 
in adopting technologies that require a major change in the production system – these barriers 
can be lack of knowledge, a reluctance to change if the benefits are not clear – as well as extra 
investment required in labour or inputs. Several studies have indicated that if not accompanied 
with increased application of herbicides, implementation of conservation farming might be 
labour burdensome (Andersson and Giller, 2012; Andersson and D’Souza, 2014; Giller et al., 
2015; Rusinamhodzi, 2015; Brown et al., 2017a, 2017b). In Nwoya district, use of herbicides 
is very low. Efforts promoting climate-smart agricultural technologies must, therefore, take into 
consideration that appropriateness of such technologies will not only depend on their potential 
to address climatic shocks but also possible trade-offs related to increased labour-burdens. In 
other words, what is perceived as “climate-smart” might not be “farmer-smart”. 
 
6.2.3 Information networks, incentives, and adoption of agricultural technologies 
An extensive body of work has studied network effects on adoption of agricultural 
technologies (Besley and Case, 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Udry and Conley, 2001; 
Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Matuschke and Qaim, 2009; Conley and Udry, 2010; Krishnan and 
Patnam, 2013). The main finding of most of these studies is that having an adopter in one’s own 
network enhances his or her likelihood of adopting a technology. But what mechanisms drive 
network effects on adoption? Does incentivised training of disseminating farmers (DFs) play a 
role in influencing the networks of their neighbours? Given that incentives not only increase 
the likelihood of DFs adopting drought-tolerant maize varieties (DTMVs) but also change their 
own networks (Chapter 2 of this thesis),  does having an adopter DF as a contact for agricultural 
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advice influence the adoption decisions of the neighbours? If so, do networks influence 
adoption by transferring the adoption decision of the DFs or through knowledge diffusion? 
In Chapter 4, the thesis turns to the questions mentioned above. We learn that 
incentivised training of DFs changes networks of neighbours, and that this change in networks 
subsequently enhances the likelihood of neighbours adopting DTMVs by transferring the 
adoption decisions of DFs and through diffusion of knowledge about the varieties. 
Two main policy implications can be drawn from these results. First, our study suggests 
that providing direct training about DTMVs to a subset of farmers and relying on social 
networks to rapidly multiply their effect on knowledge by others can be an effective strategy to 
increase the adoption of the varieties in similar contexts. Nudging such individual “seed nodes” 
to adopt the varieties can make a significant difference in adoption by others. Second, our 
finding that farmers’ networks transfer adoption decisions of the ‘seed nodes’ suggests that 
encouraging a subset of individuals in the population to take-up a new technology with the hope 
that others will follow their behaviour might actually achieve expected outcomes. This is 
consistent with the idea of observational learning (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 
2010). In the current context, however, individuals learn from their peers who are selected to 
be representative of the community. 
 
6.2.4 Technology adoption, downside risk, food security, and resilience 
There has been tremendous progress in understanding farmers’ adoption behaviour in 
developing countries. Among factors identified as determinants of adoption of agricultural 
technologies include informational constraints (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis, Foster 
and Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley and Udry, 2010; Vasilaky and Leonard 2018), inconsistent 
preferences for time (Duflo et al., 2011), profitability (Suri, 2011) and appropriateness 
(Emerick et al., 2016) of the technology, quality of agricultural inputs (Bold et al., 2017), the 
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degree of risk aversion, credit constraints, and access to markets. Similarly, another vast strand 
of literature has examined impacts of agricultural interventions on productivity and households’ 
welfare (Kassie et al., 2011; Asfaw et al., 2012; Shiferaw et al., 2014).  Only few studies, 
however, take into account climatic factors when assessing adoption and impacts of agricultural 
technologies (Di Falco and Veronessi, 2013; Arslan et al., 2015; 2017).  
Under conditions characterized by increasing climatic shocks, the suitability of 
agricultural technologies can be assessed through its impacts on not only food security but also 
downside risks and resilience of livelihoods. A natural starting point in assessing impacts of 
agricultural technologies under climatic shocks is to consider yields. This is because for many 
households in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), higher yields tend 
to correlate with improved food security status of households which in turn contributes to labour 
productivity. Furthermore, higher yields might imply an increase in marketable surpluses and 
hence income. As most households in SSA tend to spend a larger share of their budgets on food, 
increased income might indicate an improvement in food security through lower food prices. 
Frequent occurrence of climatic shocks, however, means that it might not be enough to produce 
more yields. Efforts must be made to promote interventions that ensure stable yields while 
reducing the probability of crop failure—that is, minimizing downside risks. 
In Chapter 5, the thesis first examines the correlation between climate variables and the 
likelihood of adopting drought-tolerant maize varieties (DTMVs) and maize-legume 
intercropping (MLI). The impacts of DTMVs and MLI on yield and downside risk, food 
security, and resilience of livelihoods are then evaluated.  We learn that there is a positive 
correlation between farmers’ perceptions about rising temperature and the likelihood of 
adopting DTMVs, on one hand, and a negative correlation between the total amount of seasonal 
rainfall and the probability of practicing MLI, on the other hand. Whereas both DTMVs and 
MLI increased mean yields and reduced the variance of yields, only the former technology had 
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a statistically significant impact under climatic shocks. Neither DTMVs nor MLI, however, 
significantly reduced downside risk although both technologies substantially increased food 
security and enhanced resilience of livelihoods. 
The findings of Chapter 5 provide several important implications for policy. Firstly, 
promoting adoption of DTMVs and MLI could help farm households to adapt to climatic 
shocks. We found a strongly positive correlation between agricultural knowledge and the 
probability of adopting DTMVs suggesting the need for increased investment in knowledge 
diffusion. Secondly, interventions to address drought stress through crop genetic improvements 
will have a paramount role to play in terms of increasing yields, reducing variability in yields, 
improving food security, and enhancing resilience of livelihoods. Thirdly, although resilience 
increased with adoption of DTMVs and MLI, failure of both technologies to address downside 
risk suggests the need to identify and promote complementary interventions in order to 
minimize trade-offs. Future research should, therefore, help to fill this gap. 
 
6.3 Concluding remarks and implications for future research 
The role of agriculture in economic development has greatly evolved. The evolution is 
largely as a result of rapidly changing contexts characterised by climate change, increasingly 
integrated value chains, changing dietary patterns, and globalization. Consequently, agriculture 
in most developing countries, is now increasingly seen as contributing towards several 
dimensions of economic development. These include, among others, accelerating economic 
growth at early stages of development, reducing poverty and vulnerability, narrowing rural-
urban income disparities, releasing scarce resources such as water and land for use by other 
sectors, and delivering a multiplicity of environmental services (Byerlee et al., 2009; de Janvry 
and Sadoulet, 2010).  
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The capacity of agriculture to deliver on these roles will require technological 
innovations and hence finding ways to accelerate adoption of agricultural technologies is an 
imperative. This thesis explored the role of incentives and social learning in the diffusion of 
agricultural technologies increasingly promoted under the rubric of climate-smart agriculture 
(CSA) because of their perceived potential to increase yields and hence food security, enhance 
resilience to climatic shocks, and contribute mitigation co-benefits where possible. The thesis 
has shown that incentives matter in the diffusion of CSA technologies through social networks 
and that such technologies have an important role to play in improving food security and 
increasing resilience of livelihoods. 
While, to our knowledge, the thesis provides first  evidence on the effect of intrinsic, 
extrinsic, and image motivation on the diffusion of agricultural knowledge and technologies, a 
number of issues remain. First, the social recognition treatment group of the experiment 
publicly announced the performance of the disseminating farmers and awarded the community 
a material reward. Would the results have been different if we only announced the “good” 
performance of the disseminating farmers? Second, limited by statistical power, the experiment 
provided training to all disseminating farmers but varied the incentive for communication 
effort. We do not know what the results would have looked like had we included a pure control 
without training. Third, the thesis focused on the effect of incentivising disseminating farmers, 
but the question remains whether and how first order beneficiaries can in turn be incentivised 
to reach out to second-order beneficiaries, and so on.  
Similarly, we find a win-win situation where the technologies increased food security 
and enhanced resilience. However, we made no attempt to look at mitigation—for obvious 
reasons that the time duration of the study was too short to measure changes in greenhouse gas 
emissions in a meaningful way. Our finding that downside risk did not reduce suggests a 
possibility of trade-offs within a specific dimension of CSA, in the current case, the food 
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security dimension. Taking mitigation into account would, however, enhance our understanding 
of the trade-offs and synergies across the three dimensions of CSA, namely food security, 
resilience, and mitigation. We hope future research will address these caveats. 
My final reflection relates to the external validity of the findings of this thesis. 
Specifically, to what extent are results generated from one experiment in a single locality in 
Uganda applicable to other contexts in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Firstly, the problem of weak 
extension systems is not unique to Uganda—most countries in SSA face a similar problem. 
Secondly, our results about incentives effects on social learning agree with those of Ben Yishay 
and Mobarak (2018) whose context and sample summary statistics were very close to those of 
this thesis. Furthermore, recent studies conducted in other parts of SSA including, for example, 
Kondylis et al. (2017) have recognised the role of incentives in social learning. Hence, I believe 
that the lessons derived from this research are applicable and relevant to many similar contexts 
in SSA.  
Related to this final reflection is that artefactual field experiments remain an abstraction 
of reality. Still, lab-in-the field experiments were used in this thesis. Why? To the extent that 
people’s behaviour in an experimental setting predicts their real life behaviour (see for example, 
Armantier and Boly, 2012), they enhance our understanding of how decisions are made in real 
life (Beekman, 2015). By implementing lab-in-the-field experiments, this thesis contributes to 
enhanced understanding about how prosocial preferences influence decision making at the 
individual level. This approach also lends credibility to the identification of causal effects of 
prosocial preferences on agricultural knowledge and technology diffusion. 
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Summary 
This thesis examines the effect of incentives on the diffusion of agricultural 
technologies through social learning, and evaluates the subsequent impacts of adoption on yield 
and food security, downside risks, and resilience of livelihoods in the post-conflict northern 
Uganda. The thesis fits in three broader strands of literature: (1) empirical work on the 
relationship between social learning and adoption of new technologies; (2) the role of incentives 
on communication within social networks and prosocial behaviour; (3) impacts of agricultural 
technologies on productivity, food security, and resilience of rural livelihoods under increasing 
climatic shocks. 
Chapter 1 presents an overview of the importance of technological innovations on 
agricultural development under increasingly changing climate, highlights the key concepts in 
the thesis, namely incentives, social learning, productivity and food security, downside risk, 
and resilience, and describes the research problem. This discussion logically leads to a 
formulation of the research questions guiding the main chapters of the thesis. Specifically, the 
research questions include: What effects do prosocial preferences, private material rewards, and 
social recognition have on the diffusion of agricultural knowledge and technologies (Chapter 
2)? What is the relationship between social distance and the probability of information 
exchange between trained disseminating farmers (DFs) and their peers (Chapter 3)? What are 
the effects of adoption of recommended climate smart agricultural (CSA) technologies on 
yields and food security, downside risk, and resilience of livelihoods (Chapter 4)? What 
mechanisms explain network effects on adoption of CSA technologies (Chapter 5)? 
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In Chapter 2, the effects of incentives on agricultural knowledge and technology 
diffusion are examined. In each sub-village and for all the DFs who attended full training, each 
DF was paired with one neighbour randomly selected from the list of 10 households interviewed 
at baseline.  In addition to the data from the RCT, an augmented dictator game was used to 
measure prosocial preferences of the DFs. Results showed that both private material rewards 
and social recognition increased (by the same magnitude) the effort expended by the DFs to 
communicate with their neighbours about the technologies, but only social recognition 
influenced experimentation by the DFs. Unless incentivised, altruistic DFs did not share 
knowledge with their neighbours. The results provide evidence that incentives matter in 
agricultural knowledge and technology diffusion via social learning even among the most 
altruistic DFs. 
In Chapter 3, quasi-experimental approaches are used to study the correlation between 
information exchange and social distance, and the subsequent impacts on neighbours’ 
awareness, knowledge, and technology adoption. Results show that female DFs are more likely 
to share information with their neighbours—both male and female. Distance in ownership of 
agricultural assets and the size of farm cultivated with maize and also correlated with an 
increased probability of information exchange. Information exchange increased awareness and 
knowledge of the neighbour about CSA technologies, but the increase in knowledge only 
translated in increased up-take of drought-tolerant maize varieties. 
In Chapter 4, the mechanisms through which social networks influence adoption of 
agricultural technologies are tested. Combining experimental data from the RCT with detailed 
social networks survey data, the chapter assesses the effect of incentives on neighbours’ 
information exchange networks, and how changes in networks influence neighbours’ 
knowledge and adoption decision. Results show that social networks influence adoption of 
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drought-tolerant maize varieties through the diffusion of knowledge and by transferring 
information about the adoption decisions of the DFs. 
Chapter 5 examined the correlation between climate variables and the likelihood of 
growing drought-tolerant maize varieties (DTMVs) and maize-legume intercropping (MLI). 
The chapter further quantifies the impacts of DTMVs and MLI on yields, downside risk, food 
security, and resilience of livelihoods. The results indicate that farmers’ perceptions about 
rising temperature correlates with an increased probability of growing DTMVs whereas an 
increase in total seasonal rainfall correlates with a reduced likelihood of implementing MLI. 
Adoption of DTMVs increased yields and reduced variance of yields with climatic shocks. Both 
DTMVs and MLI improved food security and enhanced resilience of livelihoods, but the effect 
on downside risk was not statistically significant. The findings suggest that both technologies 
are promising adaptation strategies for farmers and highlight the need to find complementary 
interventions that would help to address downside risk. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents a synthesis of the core chapters. The main findings are 
discussed and insights for policy implications as well as future research discussed. The thesis 
concludes with a few general remarks. 
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Samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt het effect van prikkels op de verspreiding van 
landbouwtechnologieën door middel van sociaal leren. Ook  evalueert het het effect van 
eventuele adoptie op opbrengst en voedselzekerheid, financiële risico’s en veerkracht in het 
noorden van Oeganda, waar conflict heeft plaatsgevonden. Het proefschrift past in drie delen 
van de literatuur: (1) empirisch werk over de relatie tussen sociaal leren en de adoptie van 
nieuwe technologieën; (2) de rol van financiële prikkels voor communicatie binnen sociale 
netwerken en sociaal gedrag; (3) Het effect van landbouwtechnologieën op de productiviteit, 
voedselzekerheid en veerkracht van het boeren tijdens klimaatverandering. 
Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een overzicht van het belang van technologische innovaties voor 
landbouwontwikkeling tijdens klimaatverandering, benadrukt de kernbegrippen in het 
proefschrift, namelijk prikkels, sociaal leren, productiviteit en voedselzekerheid, financiële 
risico's en veerkracht, en beschrijft het onderzoeksprobleem. De discussie leidt logischerwijs 
tot een formulering van de onderzoeksvragen die de kern zijn van de belangrijkste hoofdstukken 
van het proefschrift. Concreet zijn de onderzoeksvragen: welk effect hebben sociale 
voorkeuren, beloningen en sociale erkenning op de verspreiding van agrarische kennis en 
technologieën (hoofdstuk 2)? Wat is de relatie tussen sociale afstand en de waarschijnlijkheid 
van informatie-uitwisseling tussen opgeleide verspreidende boeren (VB’s) en andere 
boeren(hoofdstuk 3)? Welke mechanismen verklaren netwerkeffecten bij de toepassing van 
KSL-technologieën (hoofdstuk 4)? Wat zijn de effecten van de toepassing van aanbevolen 
klimaat slimme landbouwtechnologieën (KSL) op opbrengsten en voedselzekerheid, financiële 
risico's en veerkracht van kostwinning (hoofdstuk 5)? 
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In Hoofdstuk 2 worden de effecten van prikkels op agrarische kennis en 
technologiediffusie onderzocht. In elk subdorp en voor alle VB’s die volledige training 
volgden, werd elke VB samen gezet met één buur die willekeurig was geselecteerd uit een lijst 
met 10 eerder geïnterviewde huishoudens. Naast de gegevens van de RCT werd een uitgebreide 
dictator game gebruikt om de sociale voorkeuren van de VB’s te meten. De resultaten toonden 
aan dat zowel fysieke beloningen als sociale erkenning de inspanningen vergrootte (met 
dezelfde omvang) die de VB’s gebruikten om met hun buren over de technologieën te praten, 
maar alleen sociale erkenning beïnvloedde experimenteren door de VB’s. Tenzij gestimuleerd, 
deelden altruïstische VB’s geen kennis met hun buren. De resultaten leveren bewijs dat prikkels 
van belang zijn in landbouwkundige kennis en technologische diffusie via sociaal leren, zelfs 
bij de meest altruïstische VB’s. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 worden quasi-experimentele methodes gebruikt om de correlatie tussen 
informatie-uitwisseling en sociale afstand te onderzoeken, en het effect daarvan op het 
bewustzijn, de kennis en de technologie-acceptatie door buren. De resultaten laten zien dat 
vrouwelijke VB’s vaker informatie delen met hun buren, ongeacht het geslacht van de 
ontvanger. Afstand tot de boerderij en de grootte van de maisboerderij zijn ook gecorreleerd 
met een verhoogde kans op informatie-uitwisseling. Informatie-uitwisseling verhoogde het 
bewustzijn en de kennis van de buurman over KSL-technologieën, maar de toename van kennis 
vertaalde zich alleen in een toename van het gebruik van droogte-tolerante maisvariëteiten. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 worden de mechanismen getest waarmee sociale netwerken de adoptie 
van landbouwtechnologieën beïnvloeden. Door de combinatie van experimentele gegevens van 
de RCT met gedetailleerde sociale netwerkgegevens, beoordeelt het hoofdstuk het effect van 
prikkels op de informatie-uitwisselingsnetwerken van buren en hoe veranderingen in netwerken 
de kennis en adoptiebeslissingen van buren beïnvloeden. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat sociale 
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netwerken de adoptie van droogtetolerante maisvariëteiten beïnvloeden door de verspreiding 
van kennis en door informatie over de adoptiebeslissingen van de VB’s over te dragen. 
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de correlatie tussen klimaatvariabelen en de waarschijnlijkheid 
van het gebruik van droogtetolerante maïsvariëteiten (DTMV's) en mais-peulvruchten 
combinatieteelt (MPC). Het hoofdstuk kwantificeert de impact van DTMV's en MPC op het 
rendement, het financiële risico, de voedselzekerheid en de veerkracht van de kostwinning. De 
resultaten geven aan dat de perceptie van boeren over stijgende temperatuur correleert met een 
verhoogde kans op het groeien van DTMV's, terwijl een toename van de totale 
seizoensgebonden regenval correleert met een verminderde waarschijnlijkheid van het 
implementeren van MPC. Gebruik van DTMV's verhoogde opbrengsten en verminderde 
variatie van opbrengsten tijdens klimaatschokken. Zowel DTMV's als MPC verbeterden de 
voedselzekerheid en verbeterde  de veerkracht van de kostwinning, maar het effect op het 
financieële risico was niet statistisch significant. De bevindingen suggereren dat beide 
technologieën veelbelovende strategieën voor boeren zijn en benadrukken de noodzaak om 
aanvullende strategieën te vinden die zouden helpen om het financiële risico verminderen. 
Tenslotte presenteert hoofdstuk 6 een synthese van de kernhoofdstukken. De 
belangrijkste bevindingen, een aantal beleidsimplicaties en toekomstig onderzoek worden 
besproken. Het proefschrift concludeert met een aantal algemene opmerkingen. 
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